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 The purpose of this thesis is to imagine a posthumanist ethical comportment in the 
wake of injury and in the face of species disgust. I specify a posthumanist ethical 
comportment versus a posthumanist ethics to recognize the multiplicity of ethical 
bearings and beings with others rather than a single compact, deployable ethics. There is 
not a right, ethical answer to unethical situations and to speak to this impossibility to also 
to speak to the incoherency of beings and hopes. This thesis is a part of the always failing 
project of dismantling the human and the violences that accompany humanisms through 
the unknowability of creature-beings. I bring together the work of scholars in feminist 
theory, queer theory, posthumanist critical animal studies, ecofeminisms, performance 
studies, critical race studies, and feminist science studies, tracing the implications of their 
work for posthumanisms and each of their relationships to my concepts of 
disidentification with the human and/as doing creature hope. I particularly draw on the 
work of José Muñoz and his conceptions of disidentification and hope. Unique in its open 
analysis beyond racialized or gendered analogy, this thesis examines the function of 
suffering in posthumanisms, what interspecies hopes, fears, pleasures, and anxieties 
reveal about the human, and interspecies sexual intimacies that might be known as 
bestiality, in order to imagine what it means to treat others well. Critiquing notions of 
empathy and ethics that rely on likeness or proximity to the human or human affinity or 
knowledge practices, I explore what it means to have and practice creature hope.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 BEING AND WRITING, WITH HOPE 
 
 
Introduction  
 In Fall 2013 I entered my Master’s program brimming with energy and what I can 
only describe as a naïve readiness to push the feminist academy towards a 
posthumanism(s) that would surely attend to the violences and exploitations of both 
human and non-human animals. It was, and remains, so clear to me the connections 
between the unbearable sufferings of all creatures made Other. Yet, the unknowable 
promise that had previously sustained me wore away as I was constantly confronted with 
the abject agony of so many beings unattended to even within a discipline seeking to 
dismantle systems of violence, the limitations of my own work with regard to those 
beings, and perhaps most of all the impossibility of writing myself out of the sufferings I 
sought to extinguish. When it came time to decide upon a thesis topic, I knew that at this 
point I could only write hopefully, without recourse to and mostly against the human, 
beyond appealing to the sentience of non-human animals, both within and against the 
seeping liberal humanism that extends “human” protections to less-than-human and non-
human beings marginalized by its own pernicious workings. I knew that I had to write 
both with the knowledges I had somehow come into and the painfully eager hope I had 
seemingly lost.
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This thesis will be focused on what it means to disidentify with the human and do 
creature hope. The questions undergirding my exploration include: Must we always have 
recourse to the human? What possibilities for creatures does this preclude? How can the 
texts that I engage with in this thesis be read as moments of disidentification with the 
human and of doing creature hope? Where does disidentifying with the human take us, as 
creature-beings disparately together in our lives and finitudes? How can we consider the 
infamous question of the animal without reifying corporeal limitations in theorizing 
matter at the level of species? What does it mean to predicate relief on sentience and the 
extending outward of protections based on experiences of/in the body typically codified 
as human? Does locating redress specifically on these often (but not always) suffering 
bodies in fact foreclose new possibilities for human and non-human animal 
subjectivities? What would the redress of non-human animal bodies look like without 
explicit claims of sentience, suffering, or even animality itself? Is this possible? 
Desirable? Can “creature” offer us a new direction for hoping against the violences 
suffered by human, less-than-human, and non-human beings and hoping apart from 
defining beings by the very violences they may or may not suffer? What does it mean for 
beings to do creature hope together? These questions are important for many reasons 
which I will expand on in this proposal, but perhaps mostly because I do not think that we 
can look to the human, the animal, or even to sentience anymore. Going to sentience 
seems less useful to me now because, as I will discuss in the second chapter, non-human 
animal sentience and suffering are often conflated; that is, I have found that in many 
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posthumanist works non-human animal sentience is always already suffering and other 
modes of being are eclipsed by pain. Furthermore, Jeremy Bentham’s question that 
Jacques Derrida found so compelling: “Can they suffer?” alludes to a human that asks the 
question and extends human protections already denied to so many human Others (The 
Animal 27) Perhaps it is time to think of creatures, and not-necessarily-new ways of 
being, matter-ing, and mattering together, hopefully.   
This thesis is inspired by and aims to bring together primarily, but not 
exclusively, the works of Jacques Derrida, Cary Wolfe, Donna Haraway, Stacy Alaimo, 
Mel Chen, Monique Allewaert, and José Muñoz. This project grapples with scholars who 
work in the areas of feminist theory, queer theory, posthumanist critical animal studies, 
ecofeminisms, performance studies, critical race studies, and feminist science studies in 
ways that I personally have not come across to date. My interest in bringing these 
theorists together is less about creating a neat, linear argument regarding our need to 
dispense with the human or with sentience altogether and more about onto-
epistemological daydreaming on doing creature hope. I feel an urgency to look at hope 
and futurity in creative ways that do not mark or maintain species boundaries, particularly 
violent to and exploitive of those beings currently understood as less-than-human and 
non-human.  What this thesis offers is an organic, generative, and undeniably messy 
exploration of creature hope as a verb.  
It is worthwhile to note that in this thesis I am engaging with many works that are 
not labeled posthumanist, for example, one of the main concepts in this piece is that of 
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disidentification using the work of José Muñoz. That the main inspiration for this thesis is 
not considered posthumanist seems crucial to discuss, as it highlights what kind of work 
can be understood as posthumanist and what kind of work is missing from 
posthumanisms. I refuse to rest with posthumanist work; I need concepts that are not 
bound by typical posthumanist understandings of sentience as suffering. I need 
explorations of being in which non-human animals do not become objects of knowledge, 
in which their suffering is not fetishized, and in which non-human animal feeling and 
being are not tied to human feeling and understanding. In this thesis I draw upon a 
genealogy of not knowing, and while Muñoz’s work does not explicitly discuss non-
human animals or resist the human(isms) in ways that are normatively posthumanist, it 
opens possibilities for considering beings while resisting positioning them as objects of 
knowledge ready for theoretical consumption. That Muñoz does not explicitly talk about 
humans/non-humans leads me to wonder what kind of work can be labeled as 
posthumanist as well as what potentially groundbreaking work may be refused in the 
name of posthumanism itself. What seems so useful and important to me about 
disidentification is that it is always both with and against dominant culture, creating new 
relational and political possibilities through “emergent identities in difference.” 
(Disidentifications 6-7) Muñoz’s work allows me to think about disidentification with the 
human as not a conscious choice of fully accepting or rejecting the human, but a 
decoding and recoding of being capable of a unique and unapologetic candidness 
regarding the delineation of the human. I find it promising and exciting that working 
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against the human does not necessarily mean working outside of the human, as the latter 
is ultimately impossible and any claim to working outside of the human seems very much 
humanist. Given that I am working with the concept of disidentification with the human 
in relation to [creature] hope, I want to be clear about how hope is being used here. While 
Oxford Dictionaries defines hope as foremost “a feeling of expectation and desire for a 
certain thing to happen,” Muñoz uses hope to discuss that which has yet to be imagined, 
as that which cannot be expected yet is very much desired (“Hope”). In other words, hope 
cannot be specifically anticipated, located, or known; any certainty forecloses hope itself. 
When I say “hope beyond the human” I do not mean to locate hope as spatiotemporally 
after the human, but rather to gesture to the hope that arises from the uncertainty of the 
human. What is crucially hopeful about disidentification with the human as creature 
hope, then, is that it is always open to its own reimagining.   
Of course, in my work on creature hope I am not the first to suggest that we need 
to turn to terms and theoretical frameworks not circumscribed by the human/animal 
binary, especially since human and animal have never truly existed in binary opposition 
to one another. In The Animal That Therefore I Am Jacques Derrida proposes “ecce 
animot” or “l’animot” to denote the importance of recognizing the multiplicity of non-
human animal creatures and the violence inherent in singularizing “the animal.” The 
aforementioned terms are a crucial aspect of Derrida’s plea to “envisage the existence of 
‘living creatures,’ whose plurality cannot be assembled within the single figure of an 
animality that is simply opposed to humanity.” (47) Donna Haraway imagines the 
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conceptual possibilities of “companion species” as different species living and evolving 
together, keeping company as “messmates” in life in The Companion Species Manifesto: 
Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness as well as in later works (When Species Meet 
17). Haraway argues that “companion species” is more a verb than a noun, as it is about 
interacting in relationships filled with both pain and pleasure, labor and play, pointing to 
how human and non-human species cannot be analyzed apart from their complex 
relations with one another (Companion Species 18). Stacy Alaimo looks towards “trans-
corporality” in Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self, defined 
there as “thinking across bodies” and the ways “in which the human is always 
intermeshed with the more-than-human world.” (2) Alamio argues that such a term and 
theoretical site “opens up a mobile space that acknowledges the often unpredictable and 
unwanted actions of human bodies, non-human creatures, ecological systems, chemical 
agents, and other actors.” (2) In Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer 
Affect Mel Chen claims that: 
 
Using animacy as a central construct … helps us theorize current anxieties around 
the production of humanness in contemporary times, particularly with regard to 
humanity’s partners in definitional crime: animality (as its analogue or limit), 
nationality, race, security, environment, and sexuality. Animacy activates new 
theoretical formations that trouble and undo stubborn binary systems of difference 
… animacy has the capacity to rewrite conditions of intimacy, engendering 
different communalisms and revising biopolitical spheres, or, at least, how we 
might theorize them. (3) 
 
  
Chen considers animacy with/as affect and affectivity, through animacy hierarchies most 
broadly categorized as words, animals, and metals. In Ariel’s Ecology: Plantations, 
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Personhood, and Colonialism in the American Tropics Monique Allewaert dedicates an 
entire chapter to “parahumanity, a condition of fragmentation between the human and the 
animal,” in order to consider the literal and figurative splintering of colonized black 
subjects (98). Allewaert’s parahuman refers to the perversion of the human, a 
continuously open state of relation to both humans and animals that precludes any 
recovery of the human.  
Given the brilliance and incredible potential of the aforementioned works, why 
“creature” and “creature hope?” Creature does not work to ground the human, maintain 
human difference, open the human, or extend it outwards; rather, it originates from the 
inhuman, the ahuman. Creature already exists in a space of alterity and it is in a constant 
state of collapse from its unknowable boundaries. Creature is not palatable, it is not 
comfortable, and it should not be. While “human” and “non-human” so easily slip into 
the less-than-human, into the absence and loss of something that humans must apparently 
reclaim for less-than-human humans and for non-human animals, creature is not tethered 
to the human/animal binary nor does it find recourse in the human. Animal both 
encompasses the human and makes possible the distinction of the human, but “creature” 
is, according to Oxford dictionaries, foremost “an animal, as distinct from a human 
being” (“Creature”). Although Urban Dictionary may not be the most credible source 
academically speaking, I find it quite interesting and telling that the most popular entry 
for “creature” on that cite is “Any human being with an appearance or behavior so unique 
that their identity as a homo sapien is questionable,” a definition which alludes to a 
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popular understanding of creature as the in/ahuman (“Creature”). Creature itself signifies 
an uncertainty about veritable forms of life while creature-beings undoubtedly call upon a 
corporeality and liveliness that is something near animate, near sentient, but not fully 
knowable. Creature, and more specifically creature hope, are not my claims to having 
dismantled the human or my answers to how to dismantle the human; rather, they are 
terms and frameworks that help me think through about what it means to disidentify with 
the human, and dismantling the human as always to come. I find it important to keep 
creature open and somewhat nebulous, not only to hold open the possibilities of creature 
but also to allow for its dissolution; creature may or may not be useful in other times and 
spaces, and part of the hope of creature is that it may later lend itself to frameworks not 
yet conceived or conceivable. I understand creature to be a crucial theoretical departure 
from Derrida’s “ecce animot,” Haraway’s “companion species,” Alamio’s “trans-
corporeality,” Chen’s “animacy,” and Allewaert’s “parahuman.” 
  “Ecce animot” and/or “l’animot,” while working against the constructed 
monolithic “animal” that continually violates and haunts all non-human animal life, may 
collapse into the very same human as animal/distinct from animal trap that regularly but 
dissimilarly denies human, less-than-human, and non-human animal beings a hopeful 
existence. Furthermore, I find Derrida’s insistence on the separation of humankind even 
from within “ecce animot” and/or “l’animot,” troubling, especially the explicit claim that 
any kind of work that does not attend to human difference, whatever that may be, is 
asinine. That being said, I greatly appreciate  Derrida’s attention to “the stakes in always 
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seeking to draw the limit, the unique and indivisible limit held to separate human from 
animal,” although his textual preservation of the human and human difference may very 
well do this limiting work (The Animal 48). I am inspired by both his contemplation 
beyond “the animal” and by his nod to “living creatures,” although I will not qualify 
creatures with living, as that forecloses the possibilities of doing creature hope with those 
beings that are no longer living, not yet living, or conceived of by humanisms as never 
living at all (47). Creature as it will be used in this thesis does not seek to entirely define 
the beings it may refer to or to engage with the specific limits of creature itself, but 
simultaneously will attempt to grapple with beings that may experience suffering in ways 
that other posthumanist terms and frameworks that attempt to theorize non-human beings 
and matter do not, and I believe, cannot.  
Haraway’s “companion species” investigates kinships between various human 
and non-human life forms as collective action and as a “political act of hope” 
(Companion Species 3). She argues that both cyborgs and the broader category of 
companion species speak to how beings live and evolve together, muddling boundaries of 
the human/non-human, nature/culture, and other liberal humanist binaries (4). The 
concept of “companion species” beautifully explores encounters and sites “between” 
species in all their messiness and ambiguity, but it also relies upon the delineation of 
humans as Homo sapiens with special biological and historical status (Haraway Reader 
2). Moreover, “companion species” insists on an unmistakably human knowledge and 
curiosity about non-human animals, tethering scientific knowledge about and social and 
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political respect for non-human beings together. Haraway asserts that “companion 
species need to understand their messmates” but this project of understanding is one 
undertaken by the human (When Species Meet 30). Why must we understand non-human 
animals? Why do we assume that we can know or understand? And if this responsibility 
of understanding is not limited to the human, why should non-human animals be called 
upon to partake in such work? Haraway’s preoccupation with attaining more, truer 
knowledge, especially scientifically significant knowledge, about non-human beings 
deemed to be companion species suffocates non-human animal being and feeling with 
human knowing.  
“Trans-corporeality” primarily deals with the ways in which human corporeality 
constantly comes into being through more-than human nature. While Alamio claims that 
such a concept and theoretical framework reconceives of culture as always already 
nature, and refuses to see nature as a passive landscape to be acted upon by human 
culture, framing human corporeality with and against non-human nature while not 
attending to non-human corporealities may function to reinscribe the passivity of non-
human beings. Furthermore, the most attended to subject in theorizing through trans-
corporeality always seems to be the human, therefore I question whether the possibilities 
of trans-corporeality are already given over to the human in any form. Indeed, while 
addressing how trans-corporeality may be read as anthropocentric, Alamio argues that its 
promise extends from the human outward to non-human beings and the environment. I 
find creature a more useful concept as it resists locating theoretical, social, ethical, and 
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political possibilities in one species, or envisioning beings in a concentric circle through 
which these possibilities may be dispersed. 
“Animacy,” a slippery term that alludes to the “quality of agency, awareness, 
mobility, and liveness.” is utilized by Chen to simultaneously contemplate binaries of 
difference and hierarchies of being and thingness and to imagine the racialized and 
sexualized biopolitical scope of the (in)animate (M. Chen 2). My work on creature hope 
is greatly informed by Chen’s work on animacies, but I find myself wondering if 
animacies can attend to not only the ways beings sometimes suffer at the hands of one 
another but also the hope that beings can do together. I imagine creature to occupy a 
mostly-unlocatable theoretical space within animacies, in a realm in which the 
animate/inanimate cannot be delineated. However, creature does not occupy the entirety 
of animacies, which contains words, metals—material and immaterial objects that cannot 
feel in the way beings can, although I cannot say what or who those beings are or might 
be. In this thesis I am concerned with hoping within and against the violences that 
creatures may come into being through, and I question whether animacy can index hope 
in the ways I imagine that creature may be able to. Although I consider creature and 
creature hope a departure from Allewaert’s “parahuman,” I absolutely do not want to 
dismiss the parahuman or to position creature in opposition to it. Rather, I would like to 
consider creature and creature hope alongside of the parahuman and alternative 
human(ism)s proposed by black studies scholars which I will discuss further in the 
literature review. My concern regarding parahuman is that, alone, it may not be the best 
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equipped framework for taking the conditions, agencies, possibilities and hopes of and 
for non-human animal beings into account. Also, while parahumanity refuses to cement 
into hybrid identities for good reason on which I will elaborate in the literature review, I 
do not want to foreclose the potential of hybridities for creature and creature hope.   
I have come across a number of scholars who mention creature, including 
Derrida, Chen, and Alamio, but I have yet to encounter any work that dwells on creature 
as a theoretical opening for how beings matter or offer it as a possibility of doing hope. 
Many of these scholars are concerned with and warn against collapsing difference and 
while I do not deny difference I am also not interested in marking or maintaining it. That 
is, my interest is not in knowing or marking difference, but rather a radical difference of 
knowability that precludes any reservation of presence and certainty for the human. I 
believe that the constant insistence on difference in part comes from a desire to maintain 
the human and human privileges in some form, and through creature hopes I want to 
trouble this preservation of the human. Chen’s claim that “difference does not collapse 
even when we wish it away” seems especially relevant for my work on disidentifying 
with the human and/or doing creature hopes (M. Chen 93). What kind of activity is 
“wishing away” difference? Is there hope to be found in “wishing away?” This action 
seems important to address in relation to disavowing the human in light of the human 
deciding/naming/benefiting of and from species difference. What the concept of creature 
throws into sharp relief is the impossibility of excavating the human from the multiple 
matrixes of power in which it is embedded, yet, for all the possibilities of creature and 
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creature hope I also need to contend with its relationship to the ethical racialized stakes of 
relinquishing claims to the human. For example, it is important to consider that the act of 
“wishing away” [species] difference could very easily fall in line with the unattended 
whiteness in posthumanist projects. I previously argued that creature is already 
in/ahuman, and this means that I must constantly attend to the proximity of blackness to 
the animal and to creature. Since this project is framed through posthumanisms, I must 
address the uninterrogated whiteness in posthumanisms as well as the posthumanist 
conflation of liberal humanisms with all humanisms and of the human as man with all 
humans.  
Although I resist strict definitions and applications of creature, especially given 
that in this thesis it is opened through hope as an impossibility of imagining, I do not 
want to present creature as a word without fraught meanings and histories that complicate 
its usage for this project. The origin of “creature” is the Latin creatura “a created being,” 
which became “creature” in Middle English, defined as “something created” 
(“Creature”). “Create” is from Latin creat- meaning “produced,” becoming “create” in 
Late Middle English to mean “form out of nothing” in the supernatural sense (“Create”). 
For me, this brief etymology of creature presents two main issues: first, the relationship 
of “creature” to the divine, and second, the presumption of “creature” as a finished 
product. However, I argue that these issues also point towards the verb capacity of 
creature hope. “Creature” can acknowledge that beings do not simply exist as they are, 
but come into being through intertwining power structures and therefore, are open to 
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infinite re-creation. Creature need not be static nor necessarily created by a supernatural 
being. What if we reconceived of “creature” in a more flexible manner that could account 
for the vulnerability of being forms while disrupting the ties of creature to concentrated 
sources of control? Doing creature hope then, alludes to beings becoming and re-
becoming through their unimaginable desires. Susan Stryker also imagines the potential 
of injurious terms such as “monster” and “creature” in “My Words to Victor Frankenstein 
Above the Village of Chamounix,” calling for the reclaiming of words such as “monster” 
and “creature” in order to approach an “egalitarian relationship with non-human material 
being” and to disempower those who might use the words violently (240). The potential 
Stryker sees in “creature” and “monster” is not merely the power in reclaiming those 
terms, but of conceiving embodiment in a way that does not have to be readable or 
knowable. Without analogizing the subjects in my and Stryker’s work, occupying 
“creature” is about the ungovernability of the body. Her words both embolden my 
proposal to turn towards creature and caution me against calling upon those most harmed 
by “creature” to bear the burden of reclaiming it. “Creature” and similar terms such as 
“animal” and “beast” have been used to denote racial difference, dehumanizing persons 
of color and justifying their exploitations. I refuse to ask persons of color to reclaim 
“creature” when they have historically been denied access to the human via “creature;” 
instead I would like to consider the ways in which marginalized humans are already 
disidentifying with the human through resistant writing and performance and how these 
disidentifications are hopeful for less-than-human and non-human beings. Despite the 
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issues with “creature,” I still find it important to utilize because there is no word that 
exists outside of the problems of the human and its reliance on Others’ object status; no 
new, unfraught word can continually point towards this dependency. 
Several critical race studies and scholars have mapped the ethical stakes of 
disavowing or abandoning the human. In “Blackness, Animality, and the Unsovereign” 
Che Gossett details how black radical thinkers have consistently addressed the proximity 
of Blackness to animality in the colonial imagination and created an opening for human 
and non-human abolition that critical animal studies scholars have largely ignored. 
Indeed, posthumanist accounts of the human often presume a fairly neat human/animal 
binary where the human is always granted general rights and immunities, ignoring that 
whiteness is a precondition of human coherence. Gossett frames abolition as an 
“unfinished project” and a “means of worlding and ‘becoming with.’” This “becoming 
with” splinters the human and offers a relational framework for understanding 
entanglements of Black human and non-human animal lives and deaths. Sylvia Wynter’s 
“Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After 
Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument” works to wrestle the human away from its 
colonial overrepresentation as Man. Wynter argues that the human as Man is not the only 
modality of human, and therefore this project must account for the humans and 
humanisms that do not underpin racialized and colonized Western logics as well as for 
how disidentification with the human may or may not emerge as disidentification with 
human as Man. In Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black 
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Feminist Theories of the Human Alexander Weheliye argues that the Western conception 
of the human exists through the exclusion of persons of color and is therefore profoundly 
racialized. Weheliye imagines habeas viscus, which calls upon the racialized hierarchies 
etched in human flesh, as an “object of knowledge” that points towards the 
decolonization of the human (4). His conception of flesh is somewhat similar to my 
conception of creature; as both refuse to release the tension between the problems and 
possibilities of inhabiting these concepts. Weheliye calls out posthumanisms and critical 
animal studies for synonymizing human with Man, for assuming the human to be a 
universal category that all humans have access to, and for demanding that it must be 
gotten beyond, instead urging us to consider the shapes that the human and humanity has 
taken for and by those outside its parameters. Given these works, I am driven to consider 
disidentification with the human as Man within and beside of alternative modalities of the 
human. Must the human always be marked by non-human violences? Must claims to the 
human always threaten non-human beings?  
I am offering creature hope as an unlocatable critical apparatus that is able to 
grapple with intimacies, desires, and hopes across and against species boundaries, but this 
hope that creature-beings may do together is not always based on a physical encounter 
nor does it necessarily rely on love or community. I am thinking about “trash animals,” 
non-human animal species that are viewed as “alien, invasive, or destructive to human 
enterprise.” (Nagy 5) A creature hope predicated on lovability and physical proximity 
excludes species that humans generally fear (eg. spiders), see as carrying disease (eg. 
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rats), or consider pests (eg. gulls).  I am also thinking about humans with bodies that are 
sick and infectious, that may be seen as grotesque, with bodily fluids oozing and seeping 
in contagion. I am thinking about humans with depression, anxieties, or other mental 
health issues that may not want to be with others but still need hope as well as those 
humans who are differently abled, who may not be neurotypical, and may not be able to 
communicate in the way normative notions of love and community often require. 
Creature hope is not always based on affection, love, sympathy, affinity, emotional 
connection, or community. When I speak of creatures being and be-ing together, I am not 
alluding to a romanticized notion of togetherness or hope. Why must creatures be 
loveable to have hope? Justice? To be in community with one another?  
This thesis springs from my interest in an ethical comportment that does not align 
non-human animal feeling with human feeling and/or understanding.1 Disidentifying with 
the human and creature hope are not about imagining oneself as the non-human animal or 
human empathy for non-human animal. As Saidiya Hartman argues in Scenes of 
Subjection, empathy is tenuous, unreliable, and often a violence in and of itself. 
Furthermore, endless, loose, dramatized iterations of suffering that are often meant to 
provoke empathy may make one familiar with and indifferent to the pain of Others.  
Empathy also requires one to participate in Others’ suffering, both through viewing and 
response (Hartman 3-4). Dr. Randy Laist’s recent opinion piece in The New York Times’ 
                                                          
1 I draw my understanding of this project as a work on a posthumanist ethical comportment versus a 
posthumanist ethics from a personal communication with thesis committee member Dr. Sarah Cervenak. 
21 October 2015.   
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“The Stone,” a forum for philosophers, exemplifies the need to conceive of disidentifying 
with the human and creature hope apart from empathy, affinity, and/or community. In 
“Why I Identify as Mammal” Laist details his reasons for identifying as mammal and 
contends that this mode of identification could resist rampant anthropocentrism and 
human destruction of the non-human world.  He argues that despite the commonalities he 
shares with beings such as tuna fish or mosquitos, awareness of those commonalities 
“doesn’t compel [him] on a visceral level” while what he shares with other mammalian 
beings such as bears and squirrels arouse an “inherent sympathy that is at the center of 
my being” (Laist). Relying on human impulses towards other beings is potently 
anthropocentric and leaves non-humans subject to the unpredictable and dissonant whims 
of humans. Laist’s empathetic capacities are bound by arbitrary species boundaries he 
himself insists upon: 
  
… there is a danger in pushing the borders of affiliation so far out that they no 
longer have any resonance. Placing an emphasis on our mammalian identity is a 
reasonable compromise between a restrictive anthropocentrism and a vapid all-
inclusiveness…drawing the line of sympathy at the base of the mammal branch 
on the tree of life provides a stable…frame of reference for considering the senses 
of both similitude and otherness through which we experience the non-human 
world.  
 
 
In contrast to disidentification with the human, this concept of mammalian identification 
treats species identification as a choice, ignoring that one cannot simply cast off the 
human. Furthermore, Laist’s mode of inter-species identification remains dependent on 
human exception and is greatly limited by human resonance and reason as well as the 
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demand for the stability of interspecies relations. I am not denying that occupying and 
doing creature hope is affective but I want to resist giving these concepts over to human 
stirrings. That Laist deems shifting inter- and intra- species connections and intimacies 
that do not depend on the affinity of the human to be dangerous and vapid is particularly 
striking, as it announces such modes of being as a threat to the delineation and special 
status of the human. 
 
Literature Review  
 For the purposes of this thesis, I am using creature in a primarily posthumanist 
critical animal studies and ecofeminist sense rather than locating creature in the realm of 
posthumanist theories of the cyborg, transhuman, and/or superhuman, which fall within 
or can easily slip into intensifications of the human and humanisms. At this particular 
moment I am less interested in prosthetics and technologies than in the beings that 
posthumanist ecofeminisms and animal studies have named as sentient: the creatures we 
normatively call “humans” and “animals” or “human and non-human animals.” I 
eventually hope to expand this project in such a vein, but that is currently beyond the 
scope of my exploration. Although I will engage with many scholars and artists in this 
thesis, my exploration will be primarily guided by the works of Jacques Derrida, Cary 
Wolfe, Donna Haraway, Stacy Alaimo, Mel Chen, Monique Allewaert, and José Muñoz. 
The first six scholars have developed their own terms in attempts to engage with the non-
human world, while the last has developed a term that I believe has incredible potential 
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for posthumanisms. In this literature review I will walk through these concepts, such as 
trans-corporeality, animacy, and parahumanity, and engage with them separately so as 
not to have them lapse into one another or to have one concept eclipse others.  
Jacques Derrida’s works on “the question of the animal” are perhaps some of the 
most popular philosophical texts in posthumanisms, fundamentally challenging the 
human naming of those called animal, and I feel it is important to use them to guide 
disidentification with the human and creature hopes. I will chiefly engage with The 
Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida’s infamous address inspired by his experience of 
being naked before his companion cat, asking what the cat sees and thinks gazing upon 
his human nakedness through the cat’s own non-sense of nudity. That is, the animal does 
not experience its own nakedness as nakedness in the way that the human does, which 
leads Derrida to ask “Who?”  Who is looking? Who am I? “Who am I (following)?” (The 
Animal 6) Derrida is interested in relational modes of being and specifically what is at 
stake in the question of the animal, and being after, near, with, and before the animal. 
When Derrida writes that “To Follow and to be after will not only be the question, and 
the question of what we call the animal” he is setting up a conversation that deals with 
who can look and respond in its own name (10). For Derrida, this ordinary situation of 
looking at the cat looking at him—and thus seeing himself as naked—marks an intensely 
philosophical moment in which the absolute alterity of the other becomes clear. He 
ponders being with the animal and what that means for his own subjectivity: “The animal 
is there before me, there next to me, there in front of me-I who am (following) after it. 
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And also, therefore, since it is before me, it is behind me. It surrounds me.” (11) This 
following, this trace, is always there simultaneously in, through, containing, and 
surpassing the encounter with the animal. After Derrida’s vulnerable moment of 
nakedness before his cat, he laments that he can be relieved by receding back into the 
human and its account of non-human life. The human, naming itself into existence, 
lingers at its own threshold, which leads me to question whether disidentification with the 
human is a distinctly human practice within creature hope. Derrida speaks to this 
endlessness and groundlessness of the human, arguing that “As with every bottomless 
gaze, as with the eyes of the other, the gaze called ‘animal’ offers to my sight the abyssal 
limit of the human: the inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man, that is to say, the 
bordercrossing from which vantage man dares to announce himself to himself, thereby 
calling himself by the name that he believes he gives himself.” (12) This passage does 
more than hint at the impossibility of working in any way apart from the human because 
for Derrida the human endlessly names and defines itself, thus disidentification with the 
human must always acknowledge its non-place in this limitlessness space. Whenever I 
think of this passage, I imagine a fun house full of mirrors, infinite reflections forming a 
human void. The human is announced to itself, by itself, unable to break from the loop of 
human named presence.  
Derrida finds Bentham’s question “Can they suffer?” to be more important and 
useful than traditional questions of whether the animal can think, reason, or speak 
because it is a question founded on inability rather than ability (The Animal 27). In other 
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words, for Derrida the question of suffering is a radical departure because it is based on 
non-power/passivity rather than power/capability and leaves little to no room for 
doubting its existence. I admit that I find this question compelling as well, as have many 
others that posit suffering as the very thing that demands the ethical and political 
consideration of non-human animals. However, it is crucial to explore how this question 
may ultimately may work to uphold the human by extending it outwards. Who is asking 
the question? Who will relieve the suffering? Why is the non-human animal defined here 
only by the pain it suffers at the hands of those beings called human? In my introduction, 
I outlined Derrida’s “ecce animot” and/or “l’animot” which he proposes to signify the 
plurality of non-human animal life and work against the human framing of animal in the 
singular. I would like to briefly return to that in order to elaborate on my concerns 
regarding suffering as an imperative for consideration of non-human beings. I previously 
shared my hesitancies of using “ecce animot” and/or “l’animot” because they may 
collapse into the human as animal/distinct from animal trap given Derrida’s insistence on 
maintaining the human; reading the question of suffering along with Derrida’s new terms 
for the animal(s), I wonder if this plurality is already made singular through the insistence 
that the non-human animal is always suffering at the hands of humans and must be 
rehabilitated by those same humans.  
 Derrida’s “‘Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject,” is an interview with 
Derrida that primarily interrogates the question “Who comes after the subject?” (255) In 
this work I am most interested in Derrida’s assertion that the blurred oppositional limit 
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between human and animal and the extended limits between animal and vegetal, living 
and non-living has rendered the ethical question of the animal not one of subjectivity or 
sentience in relation to being eaten, but rather how the other should be eaten, hence 
Derrida’s larger question of what it means to eat well since, after all, one must eat 
(“‘Eating Well’” 282). Despite Derrida’s sympathy for beings that may suffer he does not 
follow the question to vegetarianism or veganism, what he calls sacrificing sacrifice 
(human, of the animal). This piece poses interesting questions for disidentification with 
the human, if the human is marked by sacrificing the animal. Does disidentifying with the 
human include sacrificing sacrifice? Does sacrifice preclude hope for non-human 
creatures?   
Cary Wolfe, a scholar at the forefront of posthumanisms, also fundamentally 
informs this thesis. In What Is Posthumanism? Wolfe frames posthumanism as both 
before and after humanism but not after the human itself: “posthumanism in my sense 
isn’t posthuman at all- in the sense of being ‘after’ our embodiment has been 
transcended- but is only posthumanist, in the sense that it opposes the fantasies of 
disembodiment and autonomy, inherited from humanism itself.” (xv) Wolfe’s work can 
be read as an unsettling of the proper subject and the humanist assumptions that ground 
and reproduce it. He claims that posthumanism in this form is “not posthuman or 
antihuman but rather simply posthumanist” which outlines his larger project of working 
towards and attending to the greater specificity of the human that has only come into 
being with and through non-human life forms rather than doing away with the human in 
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its entirety (Wolfe 120). Wolfe breaks down posthumanisms as humanist and 
posthumanist; for example, animal rights theory and discourse are categorized as 
humanist posthumanisms since animal rights is an extension of the human conception of 
personhood and rights (124). Conversely, posthumanist posthumanisms do not rely on 
humanist assumptions regarding subjectivity and knowledge (126). Oddly enough, while 
Wolfe disavows humanist posthumanisms, at certain points I do read his work as 
reminiscent of humanist posthumanisms in that working towards the specificity of the 
human undercuts his aim of ceasing to extend the human and retracting its reach.  
Wolfe’s argument that the body or a body can no longer be spoken of because 
phenomena take place between rather than within bodies is of great interest in me in 
terms of disidentifying with the human and doing creature hopes (xxiii). However, I also 
want to contend with how Wolfe follows this argument in terms of the place and duties of 
the human: 
 
… the human occupies a new place in the universe, a universe now populated by 
what I am prepared to call nonhuman subjects. And this is why, to me, 
posthumanism means not the triumphal surpassing or unmasking of something but 
an increase in the vigilance, responsibility, and humility that accompany living in 
a world so newly, and differently, inhabited. (47) 
 
 
If Wolfe’s ultimate project is working towards the specificity of the human, I am curious 
about the ways in which “vigilance, responsibility, and humility,” as distinctly human 
notions, may increase without extending the human towards non-human beings. Wolfe 
engages with a great numbers of philosophers and writers in this piece, but I am 
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especially interested in his reading of and engagement with the works of Derrida and 
Cora Diamond. Diamond proposes that we open a distinctly human justice and 
compassion outwards to non-human animals and argues that it is only by emphasizing the 
special status of the human that we may have ethical, just relationships with “fellow 
creatures” (77). While Wolfe explicitly opposes the extending of the human, his 
exploration of Diamond’s work leads me back to the ways in which suffering may 
become a theoretical stop-gap for attending to the harms of non-human animals while 
preserving the human. Consider Wolfe’s interaction with Diamond as follows: “what 
generates our moral response to animals and their treatment is our sense of the morality 
and vulnerability that we share with them, of which the brute subjection of the body … is 
perhaps the most poignant testament.” (74) I wonder what would become of the human 
and the animal if we did not focus so much on what we deem to be a distinctly human 
moral response to the sufferings humans themselves cause non-humans. That is, while it 
is crucial to acknowledge and deal with the ways in which all beings’ lives are already 
bound together in our shared lives and finitudes, why is the relationship between 
creatures always over-defined by pain and hopelessness? Addressing the work of Derrida, 
Diamond, and [Martha] Nussbaum, Wolfe seems to agree that “the fundamental ethical 
bond we have with nonhuman animals resides in our shared finitude, our vulnerability 
and morality as ‘fellow creatures,’” but what kinds of ethical relations between creature-
beings are foreclosed if they are already eclipsed by suffering? (80)  
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For the purposes of this thesis, I find Wolfe’s refusal of the human to be 
transparent to its self to be quite important for conceiving of disidentification with the 
human. Wolfe claims that “‘we’ are always radically other already in- or ahuman in our 
very beings;” the human arrives after that which enables it and therefore the human is 
created by and through the inability to know itself (89). I also find provocative Wolfe’s 
work on trans-species modes of identification through the analysis of the work of Temple 
Grandin, which explores disability in relation to animality both ethically and politically. 
Wolfe argues that being differently abled enables a connection to non-human animals 
precluded by normative full human ability and that “a shared trans-species being-in-the-
world constituted by complex relations of trust, respect, dependence, and 
communication” directs us to an ethics of compassion (141). I find this trans-species 
connectivity based on empathy problematic as it is largely based on human feeling and 
affinity towards non-human animals, which I cannot read as anything other than the 
extension of the human. Furthermore, if we are to move away from an ethics based on 
ability, how can we frame differently-abled human beings as having special abilities that 
open ethical connections between species? 
Donna Haraway discusses her concept of “companion species” in The Companion 
Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness, When Species Meet, and 
The Haraway Reader. In The Companion Species Manifesto Haraway’s expanded 
description of “companion species” as relations between species occurs in four main 
prongs: first, as a concept that keeps with evolutionary biology, with species announcing 
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biological sort; second, with species philosophically defining being difference; third, 
species as a tangle of sign and flesh; and fourth, species relations as written by labor, 
love, commodity, and cruelty (15-16). The exploration of “companion species” is 
primarily guided by dog-human relations, as Haraway suggests that dogs are perhaps the 
most significant example of companion species. This text analyzes how “an ethics and 
politics committed to the flourishing of significant otherness be learned from taking dog-
human relationships seriously,” since, above all, companion species is about what 
feminist claims of kin and kind can do (Companion Species 3). The work of companion 
species is “Living with animals, inhabiting their/our stories, trying to tell the truth about 
relationship, co-habitating an active history.” (20) Haraway tells stories of relations 
in/with/between “companion species,” focusing on fleshy relations, accountability, love, 
and scientific significance and validity. Her insistence that we “must” tell a story, get the 
facts, and “stay hungry for the truth” is troubling for many reasons, because who gets to 
imagine and tell the story of companion species? (19) Who finds the facts or assumes that 
there are knowable facts? Whose truth is lusted for? The scientific knowledge 
“companion species” strives to gain and indeed, already assumes through its delimit of 
biological species, indicates not only its anthropocentrism but also its framing of non-
human animals as objects of knowledge. In The Haraway Reader Haraway argues that 
“we have never been human … Nonetheless … people are human in at least one sense. 
We are members of a biological species, Homo sapiens. That puts us solidly inside 
science, history, and nature, right at the heart of things.” (2) I find these claims distinctly 
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anthropocentric regardless of their seeming disavow of the human. The latter claim 
implies that non-humans are ahistorical and that their being and evolution took/takes 
place in anachronistic space, in other words, species that are not in companionship with 
the human are not a part of true history, scientific or otherwise.   
When Species Meet elaborates on companion species as “messmates” in the 
world, as a verb that describes beings “becoming with” one another (16-17). Species are 
constitutive and are only known through sites and moments of encounters; in other 
words, relationships, not individual beings, are the smallest possible unit of analysis. 
Haraway is most interested in “’encounters’ that involve, in a non-trivial but hard-to-
characterize way, subjects of different biological species,” particularly face-to face 
meetings (When Species Meet 46). She asserts that this work of companion species is not 
posthumanist, but rather a “non-humanism in which species of all sorts are in question” 
that cannot “abide” human exceptionalism (164). However, I question the “non-
humanism” of companion species, as it emphasizes the importance of inter-species direct 
relations and human curiosity about and understanding of non-human animals, assuming 
the superiority of human understanding and relying upon human proximity to non-human 
beings for respect and accountability to and for non-human beings. It also assumes that 
such proximity and knowledge will lead to less-violent inter-species relations, as 
Haraway claims that physical touch brings about accountability: “Accountability, caring 
for, being affected, and entering into responsibility are not ethical abstractions; these 
prosaic things are the result of having truck with one another.” (36) But if the ethical 
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implications of “companion species” require human proximity, touch, and affect, then 
what of non-human beings that do not live and evolve with humans? If “companion 
species” demands non-human being and be-ing with humans, then it cannot claim to 
resist anthropocentrism. Haraway’s understanding of knowledge, respect, and response 
are tied together, as is evident in her critique of Derrida’s naked encounter with his cat. 
She argues the following: 
 
[Derrida] did not seriously consider an alternative form of engagement [with his 
cat] either, one the risked knowing something more about cats and how to look 
back, perhaps even scientifically, biologically, and therefore also philosophically 
and intimately … with his cat, Derrida failed a simple obligation of companion 
species; he did not become curious about what the cat might be doing, feeling, 
thinking, or perhaps making available to him in looking back that morning. (When 
Species Meet 20) 
 
 
Why must a human ethical response to non-human beings require “knowing something 
more?” What is this “something more,” why is it needed, and how can it be attained? 
Why would greater human curiosity, knowledge, and understanding necessarily lend 
itself to more ethical human/non-human encounters and engagements? Furthermore, 
while Haraway refuses to give suffering priority in “companion species,” a matter I will 
expand on in chapter two, her acknowledgement of the impossibility of eliminating or 
justifying suffering does not give rise to deeply questioning scientific knowledge 
practices that require non-human animal suffering.  
In Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self Stacy Alaimo 
theorizes trans-corporeality as “thinking across bodies,” as a theoretical framework that 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
“explores the interconnections, interchanges, and transits between human bodies and non-
human natures.” (2) Alaimo writes against the prevalent theorizing of matter named as 
bodies in a purely discursive manner and conceiving of matter as passive. She urges 
theorists to take matter seriously and to conceive of nature as a constantly active force 
rather than as passively acted upon and given meaning by culture. For Alamio, culture is 
always already nature. Bodily Natures does not explicitly work to dismantle the human 
but instead denies the human its separation from the environment and from other beings, 
it works towards a material ethics born from grappling with trans-corporeality. Alamio 
argues that the ethical and political possibilities that span trans-corporeality are capable 
of attending to the harms done to both bodies and the environment and holding humans 
accountable while refusing to deny non-humans their own ways of being and doing. She 
urges us to consider that “A material ethics may emerge from this trans-corporeal space, 
an ethics that is centered neither in individual humans nor in an external nature, but 
instead in the flows and interchanges between them.” (136)  
Alamio notes that the purpose of Bodily Natures is “to trace how trans-
corporeality often ruptures ordinary knowledge practices.” (17) To accomplish this she 
explores environmental justice and health as it relates to gender, race, and class in various 
texts, including memoirs, literature, and theory. Through these texts she theorizes trans-
corporeal spaces and the ways in which vulnerable human bodies are tangled with other 
creatures, the environment, and human-made substances, ultimately proposing a 
posthumanist environmental ethics that acknowledges the flux of bodies and environment 
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and “that builds connections rather than boundaries” (111). Here, the environment is 
figured as the worldly stuff that human bodies are always made of and in, as the human 
body as always open to “outside” forces that continuously shape and reshape its flesh. 
Human bodies are not only permeable, but are always coming into being through that 
which is understood as non-human: “Imagining human corporeality as trans-corporeality, 
in which the human is always intermeshed with the more-than-human world, underlines 
the extent to which the substance of the human is ultimately inseparable from ‘the 
environment.’” (Alamio 2)  Alamio’s conception of the human as never just human is 
important for my work on creature and creature hope because it complicates species 
boundaries and relationships between beings and their environments. Trans-corporeality 
will guide my work both on what disidentifying with the human means in terms of 
relating to other beings as well as hoping across hierarchal markers of being.  
While I find Alamio’s work on trans-corporality necessary and useful, I also find 
it crucial to depart from trans-corporeality’s focus on the human and the breakdown of 
human corporeality/non-human nature. The possibilities of trans-corporeality are located 
overwhelmingly in the realm of the human and through the reconceptualization what it 
means to exist as human. Alamio briefly addresses charges of anthropocentrism as 
supposed misreadings of trans-corporality, arguing that the promises of the framework 
extend outward into the more-than-human world. Conversely, I would like to conceive of 
creature hope as not originating from the human, as a concept that is always collapsing 
inwards from the unknowable boundaries of creature-being. Alamio’s overwhelming 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
focus on the human corporeal leans towards the fetishization of the human body and its 
fleshy experiences. 
Mel Chen explores the concept of animacy and animacy hierarchies most broadly 
categorized as words, animals, and metals in Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, 
and Queer Affect. Chen finds it critically important to disturb normative understandings 
of life, liveliness, and agency, and argues that animacy is not limited to being or beings 
normatively “animate,” rather animacy is open to “both inquiry and resignification” (M. 
Chen 4). Chen positions Animacies in relation to the upswing in posthumanist theorizing 
on being and object life and claims that it “builds on these insights by digging into 
animacy as a specific of affective and material construct that is not only nonneutral in 
relation to animals, humans, and living and dead things, but is shaped by race and 
sexuality, mapping various biopolitical realizations of animacy in the contemporary 
culture of the United States.” (5) The purpose of Chen’s careful and creative theoretical 
work on animacies is not to revitalize various materialities in the sense of giving them 
life, but rather to explore the ways in which our understandings of life are bound by 
orders of sex, race, class, and ability. Chen also expands affect to account for feelings not 
contained or restricted by one body or being’s emotions, and considers the affectivity 
within affect, or “how one body affects another,” in relation to hierarchies of animacy 
(12).   
For the purposes of this thesis, I am particularly interested in Chen’s explorations 
of “Words” and “Animals,” the former considering how language is animated as well as 
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the ways in which it animates, de-animates, and/or re-animates and the latter grappling 
with animality as “a condensation of racialized animacy” and its relationship to 
queer(ing) intimacies (M. Chen 14). Foremost a linguist, Chen looks at the possibilities of 
animacies (as animating beyond its typical usage) and queering together, as both 
continually work to recast the terms of be-ing and being together along and/or across 
certain subject/object, human/nonhuman lines. Chen’s work on affect and affectivity that 
has the potential to take into account multiple bodies and feelings will be very important 
to my work, as creature hope in the singular is really already plural and I openly 
acknowledge that those hopes do not always align or even directly address one another. 
Furthermore, to discuss what it might mean to do creature hope, I need animacies and 
affect as they are conceived of in Animacies, cutting across conceptions of proper being 
desires and responses to those desires, for example the human sterilization of companion 
animals for purposes of eliminating future non-human animal suffering.  
 Chen refuses to strictly delineate humans, animals, and objects, and although my 
aim is similar as I do not strictly define creature, I want to branch off of animacies to 
attend to the pains and hopes that may manifest through and/or against beings’ 
relationships to one another, especially when relationships across species boundaries are 
defined by violences. Animacies does very important work considering inanimate matter 
that may be categorized as objects in relation to beings human and non-human, but in my 
work I want a more explicit role in theoretically taking care of those non-human animal 
beings that so often suffer at the hands of humans, while refusing to define those beings 
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by their suffering. As previously mentioned, I conceive of creature as already existing 
within animacies; animacies exhausts creature and possibly even creature hopes, although 
I question whether it is sufficient on its own to fully consider the possibilities of 
disidentifying with the human and in particular performances of creature hope. 
Regardless, Animacies will undoubtedly play a fundamental role in the writing of this 
thesis, as it will enable me to deal with the fluxes, overflows, and ruptures of/in creature 
intimacies, desires, and hopes.  
 As I mentioned in my introduction, Monique Allewaert’s conception of and work 
on the parahuman will be essential to my exploration of creature and creature hope. In 
Ariel’s Ecology: Plantations, Personhood, and Colonialism in the American Tropics 
Allewaert theorizes parahumanity as “a condition of fragmentation between the human 
and the animal” (98). Parahuman beings then, are those who exist in a state marked by 
black bodies literally and figuratively torn and broken by colonialism. Neither elevated 
human nor organic animal, the parahuman is given over to by the slave body, a body 
always subject to possible dismemberment (Allewaert 90). “Para,” in part, refers to the 
perversion of the human that refuses its recovery as well as the location of the parahuman 
to other beings: “In taking up the term parahuman, I aim to challenge the hierarchal 
organization of life forms that was common to the colonial anthropologies and natural 
histories: I put animals, parahumans, and humans in horizontal relation (that is to say, 
para or beside each other) without conflating them.” (86) Allewaert refuses to position 
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the parahuman as after the human, but instead as “parasitic on and thus after and also 
beside the human.” (110) 
Allewaert’s investment in the parahuman departs from projects that aim to 
rehabilitate human populations rendered Other as human; she is far more interested in 
black performances and stories of parahumanity and the possibilities of dwelling in this 
liminal space. By not fully retreating from animality, the parahuman is kept constantly 
open to other beings and the social and political possibilities of relating to both human 
and non-human animals intimately. Allewaert is particularly struck by the ways in which 
agency may take form in and from the space of the parahuman and its new mode of 
personhood accessible through and defined by fragmentation, a personhood not modeled 
strictly on humanity or animality (109). It is important to note that the parahuman never 
solidifies into new hybrid identities, which Allewaert sees as problematic and stifling 
because it does not allow for temporary relations and intimacies. Concerned with the 
hierarchal valuing of beings human, parahuman, and non-human, Allewaert argues that 
remaining in the space of the parahuman actively resists hierarchy and recasts 
parahumanity on the terms of parahumans rather than colonizers. The parahuman rejects 
the colonial human identity that “coheres over and against animal being.” (Allewaert 
105)  
 The racial stakes of the parahuman and the human are central to Allewaert’s 
work; the parahuman highlights that only white people have the rights to uncontaminated 
humanity and that “the production of the human is often achieved through the 
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racialization of parahumanity” (103). Therefore, part of Allewaert’s insistence on 
remaining in parahumanity is that the alternative of (re)claiming humanity may operate 
within the logics of colonization. Parahumanity keeps the human open in such a way that 
it is against normative humanisms; Allewaert claims that the parahuman creates political 
possibilities for both parahumans and non-human animals, “producing a mode of 
personhood and politics not grounded on human exceptionalism.” (113) The parahuman 
illuminates amazing potential for the way beings can relate to one another in non-
hierarchal ways while taking account of the racialized histories of the human, parahuman, 
and non-human. As I previously mentioned, I do not wish to dismiss or argue against the 
parahuman nor do I want to position creature in opposition to the parahuman, rather, I 
will consider creature and creature hope alongside of the parahuman. I wonder about the 
conditions for and agency of non-human animals that parahumanity may or may not be 
able to take into account. Is parahumanity open to and for non-human animal hopes by 
non-human animals? Does parahumanity offer possibilities for non-humans not bound by 
the human and parahuman? Does refusing hybridity close certain hopes for humans, 
parahumans, and nonhumans? 
José Muñoz’s Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity and 
Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics will both be crucial 
to this project, as they will help me think through modalities of creature hope and what it 
means to disidentify with the human, respectively. In Cruising Utopia Muñoz asks us to 
consider that perhaps queerness has not happened yet and what possibilities might open 
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up to us if we refuse to discipline, define, and locate a knowable and foreseeable 
destination of queerness. He intervenes on current homonormative politics and gay 
pragmatic thought through considering utopian queer futurity. Muñoz critiques straight 
time and the dismal future it promises, which is no future at all but merely the 
reproduction of current violences, and instead looks forward (non-linearly) to an 
idealized queer future.  He asks us to consider that perhaps queerness does not yet exist 
as well as what possibilities queerness might hold if we do not try to name it as the ways 
things are in the present. Muñoz summons the pleasures and idealism from the “no-
longer-conscious” to envision a queer future, not looking back in history through straight 
time, but complicating the future and present with the past; he understands the past as 
performative, as doing and working right now as well as in the future (Cruising Utopia 
20). Muñoz analyzes texts that he deems to possess a utopian impulse that invokes future 
generations and rejects straight time while conjuring a distinctly queer hope; these pieces 
referenced are said to be “doing in futurity,” that is, they work outside of straight time, in 
the future to create a queer future, operating against gay pragmatism (26). The hope the 
analyzed texts disrupt the homonormativity and pragmatic politics of the present; such 
politics supposedly have aims that are more attainable and accomplishable, but those 
aims are emptied of meaning, possibility, and pleasure (32). I envision using Muñoz’s 
work on hope, utopia, and futurity to structure my overall exploration of creature hope, 
but also specifically to analyze queer of color poetry that I read as doing creature hope in 
my third chapter as well as the ways in which queer theory may or may not be prepared 
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to contend with intimacies, desires, and hopes that arguably throw into question species 
boundaries.  
In Disidentifications Muñoz builds on previous work around disidentification 
from multiple disciplines by analyzing cultural performances of disidentification as 
always both with and against dominant culture. He frames disidentification as 
“descriptive of the survival strategies the minority subject practices to negotiate a phobic 
majoritarian public sphere that continuously elides or punishes the existence of subjects 
who do not conform to the phantasm of normative citizenship.” (Disidentifications 4) In 
other words, disidentification works both within and outside of dominant culture, it can 
be understood as a complex and contradictory grappling with cultural logics as well as a 
strategy of resistance and survival for minoritarian subjects. The cultural workers and 
performances Muñoz explores in this text can be understood as “emergent identities in 
difference,” with their disidentifications creating a counterpublic with possibilities for 
new relations and politics (6-7). Disidentification does not mean that minoritarian 
subjects can treat identification as a buffet where all aspects of identity can be 
consciously and fully accepted or rejected, rather it is a decoding and recoding of 
dominant culture from a position of minoritarian subjectivity. Disidentification with the 
human is a useful framework for me to consider the ways that human Others may identify 
both with and against the human as a way to survive an existence as less-than-human and 
what possibilities and dangers lie in relinquishing the terrain of the human for various 
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creatures. Can certain disidentifications with the human be explored as doing creature 
hope? 
This thesis is also greatly informed by the work of posthumanist ecofeminists 
such as Marti Kheel, Carol Adams, Lori Gruen, Josephine Donovan, Greta Gaard, and 
Vandana Shiva, amongst numerous others. While I will not engage explicitly with these 
scholars and their work, I want to acknowledge that their ecofeminisms sparked my 
interest in the connections between human and non-human animal violences and 
environmental exploitation and degradation. In regards to this particular project, I am 
especially inspired by Lori Gruen’s “Facing Death and Practicing Grief,” which deals 
with what it means to be in relationships with other beings, both human and non-human, 
both living and dying, and how those relationships render all beings vulnerable, 
dependent, and often in various states of grieving. When I think about Gruen’s work, I 
am reminded that grief is an inevitable aspect of relations between beings and is therefore 
inseparable from the hope that creatures may do together. Furthermore, I am encouraged 
to fight the urge to retreat from or to try to do away with the vulnerability and pain of 
being with others, or of writing about being with others.  
 
Chapter Overview 
 Chapter II: The Uninterrogated Category of Suffering will contain a deep and 
thorough theoretical engagement with works by the theorists I briefly addressed in my 
literature review, as well as other scholars that will play a secondary role in my 
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exploration of disidentification with the human and creature hope. I will be reading these 
texts through and against one another in order to develop and situate my own conceptual 
framework. This chapter will tease out how these different scholars invoke and portray 
the human, the animal, and most of all, suffering (especially of the non-human animal). I 
prioritize suffering not only because it so often functions as the most important 
connection that human and non-human beings have as well as the catalyst for ethical 
consideration, but also because so much of hope comes from places of harm. Suffering 
must be reckoned with in a way that does not define non-human beings as only suffering 
beings in the eyes of those called human. In taking up various works of posthumanism, I 
will discuss how questions and claims of sentience are effectively questions and claims of 
suffering as well as the conflation of sentience and suffering in relation to the larger 
question about how non-human animal suffering is being talked about, showing how 
many scholars end up taking recourse to the human through their arguments regarding 
non-human animal suffering. For example, if non-human animal sentience is always 
already suffering and other modes of being are eclipsed by pain, then those modes of 
being are placed exclusively in the domain of the human. I will also examine 
posthumanist scholars’ theoretical reliance on human understanding and knowledge 
about non-human animal sentience and suffering. Other themes I will explore in relation 
to conflations of sentience and suffering include the difference between redressive and 
rehabilitative concepts in posthumanisms and empathy as human(ist) participation in non-
human suffering.  
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In Chapter III: Creature-Being, Hopes and Anxieties I will begin unfolding my 
theoretical exploration of disidentification with the human and doing creature hope, 
furthering my understanding of these concepts in both their possibilities and their 
limitations, through various texts and socio-spatial circumstances that I read as pointing 
to a posthumanist way of being and theorizing not invested in discovering or recovering 
the human. These disidentifications and/as hope may or may not dispense with the 
human, as that seems an impossible project to me anyway, but they also do not attend to 
the human, locate the human, or even work towards its specificity. In chapter three I will 
look at works of queer of color poetry, most notably in the online journal Nepantla which 
includes the stirring poem “Necropsy.” The queer poets of color in Nepantla remind us 
that all beings’ pasts, presents, and futures are always already inextricably bound 
together, and so too are our hopes. I will explore Franz Kafka’s The Metamorphosis, 
through a disidentificatory reading which not only complicates species boundaries and 
call into question the very notion of the human, but expands on the problems of empathy 
and ethics that draw on likeness to the human. I will also look at stories of persons 
experiencing homelessness with their companion animals, considering the policing of 
intimacies and pleasures in spaces of social death and interspecies companionship and 
community in seemingly hopeless situations. An underlying theme in this chapter beyond 
my main concepts includes the hopes that arise between beings that may or may not live 
in the present, between the living and the dead, and beings that live(d) in various spaces.  
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Chapter IV: Interspecies Sexual Intimacies, Blindly will indirectly speak to my 
concepts of disidentification with the human and/as doing creature hope though a 
continuously faltering discussion of interspecies sexual intimacies, desires, and longings, 
understood most commonly through terms such as bestiality and/or zoophilia. I do not 
construct arguments for or against human/non-human sex, instead I call attention to and 
question the concepts and traps that surround these intimacies as well as the overloaded 
frameworks of bestiality and/or zoophilia. To guide my discussion, I will focus on two 
main texts: the novel A Dog’s Head (Une Tête de Chien) and the documentary Zoo. I will 
also engage in a short analysis of the film Wedding Trough (Vase de noces) in order to 
strengthen my watching of Zoo. My analysis of these texts includes the following themes: 
first, the excesses and absences of interspecies desire and/or/as bestiality—intimate 
desires and actions that resist full telling and/or viewership either through a saturated or 
empty presence; second, the limitations of various intertwined discourses surrounding 
bestiality/zoophilia considering violent footholds such as consent, agency, and protection, 
and what these concepts do for the human subject; and third, the rifts and ruptures of 
being, limitations of ever knowing or acting completely with another creature-being, and 
creature desires that cannot be fully known or understood. I consider this subject matter 
and these texts and their inquiries to be of the utmost importance for disidentification 
with the human and/as doing creature hope because they motion towards the incoherency 
and unknowability of creature-beings human and non-human and the problems with 
creating neat theories and ethics around them. To conclude, I will elaborate on what kind 
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of work disidentification with the human and/as doing creature hope can and cannot do. 
In my introduction, I posed the following question: “Can ‘creature’ offer us a new 
direction for hoping against the violences suffered by human and non-human beings and 
hoping apart from defining beings by the very violences they may or may not suffer?” In 
the conclusion to my final chapter I want to address how my framework struggles to 
account for hopes that are in themselves violent. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
THE UNINTERROGATED CATEGORY OF SUFFERING 
 
 
The Conditions of Posthumanisms & Attending to Suffering  
What is it about suffering that makes it so compelling, so unquestionable? Why 
does suffering remain a largely uninterrogated state of being? Even Derrida, who so 
radically conceives of the human abyss, always retreats to the question of suffering. This 
chapter explores what it means to treat others well, and what I hope to show is that the 
fixed posthumanist ethical response(s) to non-human suffering needs the continuous 
suffering of non-humans and for non-human being to be over-defined by suffering in 
order to delineate the human; therefore, posthumanisms that frame non-human sentience 
as suffering horrifically meet liberal humanisms. I find it interesting that so many of the 
scholars I grapple with in this chapter keep coming back to vulnerability, and more 
specifically, shared vulnerability. There seems to be present the fear of being given over 
to one another, a fear that humans are much like non-humans, in the sense that non-
humans are so often fully splayed open in front of the human. Perhaps our preoccupation 
with suffering stems from an anxiety about those painfully passive aspects of being 
which humans so readily and completely ascribe to non-human animals. The so-called 
radically shared vulnerability does not seem so radically posthumanist to me, instead, in 
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the vein of humanisms, it says that even we, despite our humanity, are vulnerable. I am 
not questioning the existence or importance of suffering, but rather its disciplinary 
functioning.  
In its entirety, this thesis aims to explore and detail my theoretical contribution to 
posthumanist feminist critical animal studies: the open, messy, queered, and admittedly 
fraught concepts of disidentifying with the human and/as doing creature hope. As the 
subtitle of this thesis suggests, I understand these concepts to be offering something 
different from many other scholars in posthumanisms, where the broader theme of non-
human sentience as suffering seems to form the limit of posthumanist work. This second 
chapter aims to contend with suffering (mostly of non-human beings) as simultaneously 
an inescapable aspect of being in the world that must be reckoned with in a meaningful, 
non-anthropocentric way; a state of being that is not shared equally by all beings human, 
less-than-human, and non-human; and as too often a means of over-defining non-human 
beings and giving non-suffering modes of being over to the human. Essentially, this 
chapter will investigate the key methodological features of posthumanism: first, the 
fusion of sentience and suffering for non-human beings, how non-human being and 
feeling are sutured to pain, and second, the reliance on human understanding and 
knowledge about non-human animal sentience and suffering. Ultimately, I argue that 
presenting non-human animal sentience as always already suffering and/or non-human 
animal sentience and suffering as matters legitimized by human understanding falls in 
line with the delineation and special status of the human. The purpose of this chapter is to 
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trace through the relationship between sentience and suffering in the works of the 
scholars I discussed in my literature review. I will be working scholar by scholar, so as 
not to glaze over the specificities of their work or present the relationships between these 
concepts as the same in various works. I want to be clear that my intention is not to 
disregard the importance of the work I may critique, but to put these works together like 
an unsolvable jigsaw puzzle, seeing what images repeat and what may be missing. I also 
want to be upfront and transparent about the personal importance I give to all beings’ 
suffering, including non-human animal suffering for the production and consumption of 
animal flesh and feminized proteins (from female reproductive systems, such as dairy and 
egg products). I know the allure of clearly mapping non-human animal suffering and the 
changes I have made in my own life as a reaction to such suffering, but I have arrived at 
the position that it is not enough, not for humans and certainly not for non-human 
animals. When suffering becomes the only aspect of non-human animal being that 
matters this is actually a violence against non-human animals. All creature beings, human 
and non-human, deserve far more than the absence of suffering and the warped 
definitions of creature-being that come about in pursuit of it.  
How does the conflation of and/or insistence on human knowledge of non-human 
sentience and suffering in posthumanisms take recourse to the human? Commonly the 
work of posthumanist, ecofeminist, and/or critical animal studies scholars has been to 
declare non-human animals sentient and to foster widespread recognition of non-human 
animals as beings capable of feeling so as to mitigate or eradicate human exploitations of 
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and violences towards non-human animals. The assertion of non-human animal sentience 
not-so-subtly functions as an assertion of non-human animal pain. Oxford Dictionaries 
defines “sentience” as “Able to perceive or feel things,” “suffering” as “The state of 
undergoing pain, distress, or hardship”, and “suffer” as the “Experience or be subjected to 
(something bad or unpleasant)” (“Sentience,” “Suffering,” “Suffer”). If the work of 
proving and exploring non-human animal abilities of feeling is circumscribed by non-
human animal experiences of pain/trauma/loss/sadness made inescapable by humans, 
then the limit of posthumanisms is the non-human being always already in a state of 
suffering. I question the primacy of suffering, as, historically, various less-than-human 
and non-human Others have been considered to be always already in states of suffering, 
justifying exploitation and genocide. Thinking about the ability and capacity of feeling 
conjures notions of measuring limits and the fullness of being “at capacity.” How much 
feeling can one hold? If the feeling capacity of non-human animals is suffering, is there 
any room left for other modes of being within and apart from pain? Furthermore, if only 
humans can feel and experience ways of being that are not suffering, then those feelings 
and experiences can only be inhabited by the human. Hindering non-human animal 
abilities of feeling by states of being humans impose on them and relying on human 
measures, claims, and relation of/to Others’ abilities to feel and perceive is acutely 
humanist; yet, this is often the work of posthumanisms.  
Thus far, I have broadly sketched what I understand to be significant issues in 
posthumanisms, which necessitates addressing the difference between redressive and 
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rehabilitative concepts as well as empathy as human(ist) participation in non-human 
suffering. The work of Saidiya Hartman best demonstrates why empathizing with and 
rehabilitating suffering populations is potently problematic. My reasoning for using 
Hartman lies is her own discussion of methodology in Scenes of Subjection, where she 
argues that there is no right, good, unburdened way to do this work, no way to go about 
discussing the suffering of abject Others. Nothing can narrate or account for their 
experiences of pain, and the fantastically brutal spectacle exceeds any sort of discussion 
or analysis. There is no unproblematic way to talk about these happenings and 
acknowledging injury is not enough, it has to be always present in the ultimately 
impossible and constantly failing discussion of harms. Bringing posthumanist works into 
conversation with Hartman’s work, as well as the work of other scholars in critical race 
studies such as Monique Allewaert, Che Gossett, and Alexander Wehylie, and the work 
of queer theorist Jose Muñoz, highlights the conditions of posthumanisms. That is, I 
argue that excluding ideas that do not fit the mold of posthumanisms enables issues such 
as the fusion of sentience and suffering.  
In my thesis proposal and well as in my first chapter, I wrote of my affective need 
to “theoretically take care” of non-human animal beings that may suffer through 
disidentifiying with the human and/as creature hope, prompting a discussion in my thesis 
proposal defense as to what this impulse might mean and the kind of work it may do. Is 
the work of disidentifying with the human and doing creature hope redressive or 
rehabilitative? Oxford Dictionaries defines “redress” as to “Remedy or set right (an 
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undesirable or unfair situation),” “Set upright again,” or “Remedy or compensation for a 
wrong or grievance” and rehabilitate as to “Restore (someone) to health or normal life by 
training and therapy after imprisonment, addiction, or illness,” “Restore (someone) to 
former privileges or reputation after a period of critical or official disfavor,” or “Return 
(something, especially an environmental feature) to its former condition” (“Redress,” 
“Rehabilitate”). For Hartman, the work of redress is always incomplete because wrongs 
and violences cannot be fully compensated for or entirely righted: “redress does not or 
cannot restore or remedy loss” (76). Redress is distinguished by actions restricted by 
circumstances of exploitation and violence that seek to re-member, relieve, and re-
articulate [desires of] the pained body. Hartman takes up Victor Turner’s conception of 
redressive action as limiting or containing a breach and expands upon it, conceiving of 
redress in liminal spaces as discordant actions that remedy and care for the pained body 
and rework the conditions of social death, considering pain and pleasure/desire together 
in tension rather than in opposition to one another (77-78). Hartman argues that “redress 
is itself an articulation of loss and a longing for remedy and reparation.” (77) In other 
words, a crucial aspect of redress it that it calls attention to harms done and the rippling 
effects of those harms.  
Thinking through the work of disidentification and creature hope, I 
enthusiastically borrow from Hartman’s ideas about redress, although to be clear I do not 
analogize the subjectivity and conditions of less-than-human and non-human Others. 
Disidentifying with the human and/as creature hope does not aim to restore non-human 
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beings to their state prior to human use and violence or assume that harms can somehow 
be undone, a task which is not only impossible but also seems tragically humorous given 
the connotations of the term posthumanist. Instead, these concepts imagine an ethical 
comportment in the wake of injury and what it means to constantly attend to harms and 
desires in tandem. This thesis is not about bringing back a prior state of creature-being 
and it does not assume that the non-human animal needs to be or can be rehabilitated. 
More importantly, it does not define redressive action as human action but rather takes 
into account human and non-human acts of relief, pleasure, desire, and hope both within 
and against pain, despair, and boredom. These actions may be mundane, small, seemingly 
insignificant doings, especially juxtaposed with the awful spectacle, but they give rise to 
hope “beyond” the human. If posthumanist works conflate non-human sentience and 
suffering, then they foreclose redressive acts that offer the alleviation of pain or pleasure 
inside of pain. 
The posthumanist fastening of non-human being and feeling to pain is largely the 
result of attempts to facilitate human empathy for non-human beings, which I argue is a 
mode of human(ist) participation in non-human animal suffering. Hartman asks “what 
does exposure of the violated body yield?” (3) What is the project of empathy? What 
work does it do? What does it require? Hartman argues that empathy requires 
participation in Others’ suffering as viewing and response and blurs “witness and 
spectator” (3-4). The frequency of the spectacle of the pained body and the simultaneous 
distance from and nearness to the body brings about a detached and immune participation 
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that borders on the fetishization of pained and suffering bodies. Empathy attempts to 
conceive the inconceivable and is ultimately self-interested and absorbed, unknowingly 
and impossibly assuming the positionality and conditions of the pained subject. Stirring 
empathic impulses displace and dilute the specificity of the subject. The problems of 
empathy in relation to non-human animal suffering in particular is that it is distinctly 
human and humanist participation in non-human animal pain. In other words, why must 
the human be able to imagine the pain of the non-human animal for it to be legitimate? 
Why must non-human animal relief be predicated on the affective whims of the human? 
If the human cannot imagine or understand the suffering of the non-human animal, is the 
non-human animal still suffering? Disidentification with the human and/as doing creature 
hope does not require human empathy for the non-human animal, does not need human 
legitimization of non-human animal being or feeling, and does not call for the continued 
participation of humans in non-human suffering or endless iterations of the horrible 
spectacle. The all-too-common posthumanist utilization of human empathic impulse is 
not only anthropocentric but also maintains and furthers human violation of non-human 
beings, to say nothing of what it means that there is a presumed uniquely human response 
to suffering.  
 
Sentience, Suffering, & Human Knowledges in Posthumanisms  
Jacques Derrida’s “ecce animot” and/or “l’animot” in The Animal That Therefore 
I Am at first seems to be a concept that does not conflate non-human animal sentience and 
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suffering as it does not limit human violences against animals to corporeal suffering or 
singularize non-human animal being, however, I argue that the plurality of these terms is 
actually still a singularity of the animal due to Derrida’s focus on non-human animal 
suffering. In other words, Derrida’s concept is theoretically supposed to be able to take 
into account the multiplicity of non-human animal being, yet Derrida is most compelled 
by the question of non-human suffering as posed by the human. Derrida is drawn to 
Jeremy Bentham’s question “Can they suffer?” because it focuses on inability instead of 
ability, unlike questions of whether non-human animals have language or reason (The 
Animal 27). While any ability is about having power and being capable, suffering is a 
non-power, it is just about being, and for this reason Derrida finds the question of 
suffering to be more capable of ethically considering the animal(s). The passivity that 
suffering denotes is especially compelling for Derrida, as is evident in the following 
quotation: “The question is already disturbed by a certain passivity. It bears witness, 
manifesting already, as question, the response that testifies to a sufferance, a passion, a 
not-being-able. The word can [pouvoir] changes sense and sign here once one asks, ‘Can 
they suffer?’” (27) 
Derrida argues that this question should be “first” and “decisive,” as it is 
tantamount to that of “‘Can they not be able?’” (The Animal 27-28) I take issue with the 
importance this question is given, as it must be asked, spoken into existence by the 
human; it still relies on human knowledges about non-human animals. After all, it is the 
human that asks “Can they suffer?” and then must endeavor to answer the question, 
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through both scientific and philosophical knowledge practices. Moreover, what does it 
mean to witness and testify to suffering? Derrida frames this work as that of the question 
itself, but if the question is constructed and spoken by the human, must the human 
witness and testify to non-human suffering? For Derrida, the question of suffering 
removes the doubt that remains in questions of non-human language and reasoning 
abilities, but even posing the question suggests a doubt to which a human “one” must 
attend.  Furthermore, Derrida argues that the question of suffering stirs in us a recognition 
of our own finitude, and ultimately, a “surge of compassion … (yes, they suffer, like us 
who suffer for them and with them)” (28). This assertion brings us back to the work of 
Hartman and the problem of participating in the suffering of Others, creating a knot of 
witness, spectator, participant, and responder. I opened this section with Derrida because 
he is conceivably one of if not the most popular scholars in posthumanisms and because 
his work exemplifies the popular position in posthumanisms that the most important and 
ethically compelling aspect of non-human animal being is the (non)ability to suffer and 
that the human/non-human connection of suffering is an impetus for thinking about 
human experiences not bound by personally embodied experiences pain, such as 
compassion. In the next passage Derrida writes of the non-power and possibility in shared 
vulnerability, suffering, and death, but gives the “experience of compassion” to the 
human: 
 
Being able to suffer is no longer a power; it is a possibility without power, a 
possibility of the impossible. Mortality resides there, as the most radical means of 
thinking the finitude that we share with animals, the mortality that belongs to the 
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very finitude of life, to the experience of compassion, to the possibility of sharing 
the possibility of this non-power, the possibility of this impossibility, the anguish 
of this vulnerability, and the vulnerability of this anguish. (The Animal 28) 
 
 
This positioning of non-human animal suffering provoking other-than-suffering modes of 
being for the human leads me to wonder what experiences other than suffering are 
available to non-human beings. 
The question of non-human suffering inevitably leads to how one (the human) 
must respond to suffering, and Derrida wonders on the same page how one must take it 
into account, be concerned, and respond. What comes of compassion in the face of 
suffering? Understandably, there are no direct answers here or elsewhere in his work that 
I have encountered, but I do want to address where Derrida does and does not take 
response to suffering in “‘Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject.” Thinking 
about human eating practices, Derrida is interested in eating well, conceived here partly 
as addressing the other through the self since one never eats alone (“‘Eating Well’” 282-
283). The question of “Can they suffer?” does not lead Derrida to advocating for 
vegetarianism or veganism (what he would deem to be a form of sacrificing the 
sacrifice), though non-human animal suffering is undoubtedly an inextricable aspect of 
eating non-human animals. That eating the animal requires its death demands that 
Derrida address what shape this death takes, that is, human killing of the human is 
murder, human killing of the animal is sacrifice (of the animal). This speaks to the larger 
topic in this interview, “the violent institution of ‘who’ as a subject,” which Derrida sees 
as the foundation of the refusal to deem human killing of the animal to be murder (283). 
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Let us think of sentience, suffering, sacrifice, and the subject together. For Derrida, 
suffering is so important because it is the non/ability to feel pain, in his view it is also the 
primary connection between human and non-human animals, this suffering demands 
response vaguely described as addressing the other. If, as Derrida suggests, responsibility 
and response can never be predicted, measured, or assessed, then this address, this 
response to the question of suffering is always open, even in the forms of killing and 
violating the non-human animal subject (by refusing to see the animal as a “who”). While 
Derrida’s question is framed as leaving no doubt as to the existence of non-human animal 
suffering, there is nothing but doubt when it comes to how to respond to this suffering. 
Perhaps more importantly, responding (to suffering) is given over to the human as non-
human beings are not conceived of as capable of response. The question of suffering (or 
rather, the way it is posed and utilized here) does not seem to me posthumanist in the 
sense of working within and against the human, instead, it relies on the human to ask, 
witness, and respond to suffering and requires the continued suffering of the animal to 
elicit human compassion in the face of human cruelty.  
Cary Wolfe, another prominent scholar in posthumanisms, similarly and 
dissimilarly seems to take recourse to the human via conflations of non-human animal 
sentience and suffering as well as linkages between shared being suffering and an overtly 
human compassion. I will be engaging with Wolfe’s What Is Posthumanism? as this work 
not only attempts to define posthumanism(s) and what that work requires, but also 
engages with the work of numerous scholars who have grappled with questions of the 
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human and animal and categorizes them by their “level” of posthumanism. In the 
introduction, Wolfe begins his breakdown of the work and meanings of animal studies, 
fleshing out humanist posthumanisms and posthumanist posthumanisms, the latter of 
which he argues “fundamentally unsettles and reconfigures the question of the knowing 
subject” (xxix). This labor seems promising to me, especially regarding its implicit aim to 
sever ties between human knowing and non-human animal knowing, feeling, ability, and 
ways of being. However, as the piece unfolds I find even Wolfe’s “posthumanist 
posthumanism” to vacillate between embracing and untangling posthumanist conflations 
of sentience and suffering and relying upon and casting off human knowledges. Wolfe 
identifies two forms of finitude that human and non-human animals share, the “radical 
passivity and vulnerability” of bodily suffering and death and secondly, the binding 
condition that is Derrida’s “trace,” that which “exceeds and encompasses the 
human/animal difference and indeed ‘the life/death relation’ itself.” (xxvii) Regarding the 
former, Wolfe focuses on a shared embodiment that does not allow escape from pain, 
suffering, and ultimately, death. We should question why finitude must inherently 
involve suffering, that is, why can corporal finitude not be viewed as comforting and/or 
relieving? In a quite telling analysis, Wolfe looks at the work of Daniel Dennett, who 
differentiates between pain and suffering based on who is an “enduring subject,” that is to 
say, non-humans may feel pain but human consciousness is required for suffering (45). 
Wolfe account of Dennett is that his argument is not about “a difference in degree but a 
difference in kind, an ontological difference,” and it is worth noting that Wolfe himself 
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argues that human and non-human beings do not experience the suffering of the same 
“kinds or levels” (however that could be measured and by whom) (46). Wolfe’s issue 
with Dennett “is not the ethical foregrounding of pain and suffering” but rather that 
“Dennett’s ontological distinction between pain and suffering is based on a set of 
phantom abilities, anchored by but not limited to language and its imagined 
representational capacities in relation to the world of things, that no subject, either 
nonhuman or human, processes in fact.” (46) Although Wolfe analyses the work of many 
scholars, this engagement with Dennett clarifies two key aspects of his posthumanism: 1) 
giving ethical prominence to suffering over other modes of being does not preclude a 
posthumanist posthumanism and 2) sentience and suffering differs in kind for humans 
and non-humans. The latter aspect may possibly loosen the tethering of human sentience 
and suffering, while tightening it between non-human sentience and suffering; Wolfe’s 
subsequent turn to Derrida’s quite different take on suffering, which calls for rethinking 
consciousness and its ethical implications, does not minimize this possibility.  
 In chapter three, “Flesh and Finitude: Bioethics and the Philosophy of the 
Living,” Wolfe explores how non-human animal suffering is differently handled by Peter 
Singer, Martha Nussbaum, Cora Diamond, and Derrida.  I am interested in not only how 
these scholars handle suffering, but how Wolfe’s exploration of their work reveals his 
own precarious position on non-human sentience and/as suffering. Wolfe seems to agree 
with famed animal liberationist theorist Peter Singer that “the question [of the animal]” is 
not one of weighing or valuing human and non-human moral being and interests equally, 
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but rather arguing that given similar interests, humans and non-humans share a similar 
interest in avoiding pain, and that interest (in light of all other interests being aligned) 
must be given consideration regardless of species being (57-58). My problem with this 
position is that human interests are clearly privileged, while non-human interests are only 
given importance if they have to do with pain; non-human interests that are not based in 
avoiding pain are sidelined in favor of any and all human interests that do not require 
human and/or non-human species suffering. Wolfe positions Singer’s reading of Bentham 
as an opening for the philosophical variations on the posthumanist question of suffering, 
that the capacity for suffering (and pleasure) “‘is a prerequisite for having interests at 
all,’” and therefore the capacity for suffering must inherently take precedence (63). I am 
struck by the inclusion of pleasure here as opposed to non-suffering and I do not argue 
that various human and/or non-human interests should take precedence over that of 
suffering; however, that Wolfe thinks this argument would inevitably lead to 
philosophical agreement on the question of suffering signals for me the function of 
suffering as the limitation of posthumanisms (64). 
Wolfe’s engagements with Nussbaum, Diamond, and Derrida are most interesting 
to me in terms of non-human animal being passed over as suffering. Nussbaum is 
concerned with non-human animal recourse for justice in the face of “‘slavery, torture, 
and lifelong subordination’” and argues that justice has more potential than calculating 
well-being by interests when it comes to the “‘maltreatment of any sentient being’” 
(Wolfe 64). Nussbaum’s conception of “embodiment and finitude” is “not reducible to 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
sentience and suffering per se” as, in Wolfe’s words, she is more concerned with how 
human treatment of human or non-human subjects “enables or impedes their 
‘flourishing,’ a flourishing that is based on a more or less empirical assessment of the 
capabilities, needs, characteristic behaviors, and so on of the particular being in question” 
(66). Wolfe is trying to get away from Nussbaum’s reliance on human knowledges and 
justice as well as human and non-human animal competing interests and flourishings, but, 
I argue, too quickly dismisses the potential of flourishing apart from human knowledge. 
This knowledge is clearly problematic in Nussbaum’s greater conception of non-human 
animals being direct recipients of justice, but nevertheless considering non-human animal 
flourishing has merit beyond sentience as suffering. As long as non-human flourishing is 
kept open, not bound by human definition and measure, it presents possibilities for non-
human being that Wolfe blanket rejects in the name of posthumanist posthumanism.  
Cora Diamond also finds the concept of justice to be the most useful response to non-
human animal suffering. Diamond advocates for a non-rights-based justice opened to 
non-humans by humans, that is, it is not by abandoning the special status of the human 
but intensifying it in order to be in ethical relations with “fellow creatures” (Wolfe 77). 
These ethical relations require not only human justice, but must be prefaced and followed 
through with an exclusively human compassion. Wolfe’s understanding of and response 
to Diamond is that “what generates our moral response to animals and their treatment is 
our sense of the morality and vulnerability that we share with them, of which the brute 
subjection of the body … is perhaps the most poignant testament.” (74) The 
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aforementioned quote points to what I see as a major problem in the conflation of non-
human animal sentience as suffering: its preservation of the human, here mostly notably 
through human notions of compassion, empathy, and justice, and indeed, of justice as 
compassion. Diamond argues that appeals to the human to prevent suffering lose their 
footing without species difference as the human no longer has a distinct moral impulse or 
response; human sympathy through imagining the plight of the animal is the key to 
justice (Wolfe 77). This notion of human ethical response to non-human suffering 
actually needs non-human being to be only suffering in order to delineate the human, 
therefore, non-human sentience as suffering can be understood as in line with liberal 
humanisms.  
Nussbaum, Diamond, Derrida, and, it seems, Wolfe, agree that “the fundamental 
ethical bond we have with nonhuman animals resides in our shared finitude, our 
vulnerability and morality as ‘fellow creatures’” (80). This position strongly suggests that 
the most important capacity of non-humans is the capacity to be harmed, and moreover, 
to be harmed by humans. Yet, Wolfe criticizes the link between Derrida’s posthumanist 
posthumanism and Diamond’s humanist posthumanism: 
  
… vulnerability, passivity, and finitude are recuperated as a ‘being-able’ and a 
‘transitivity,’ thus ontologizing and hypostatizing the split between the human and 
the other—all its others—across which the human then reaches in an act of 
benevolence toward an other we imagine is enough like us to warrant ethical 
treatment. This only reinforces our suspicion that this human being is an 
essentially homogenous and undifferentiated creature that is capable of a more or 
less transparent relationship to its own nature, a relationship that it then expresses 
in and through language and may then extend benevolently—or not—to the 
nonhuman other. (85) 
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Wolfe’s articulation of non-human sentience as suffering seems to me, quite inconsistent, 
sometimes pushing shared suffering to the forefront and other times retreating from the 
implications of this push. Wolfe appears to agree with the importance suffering is given, 
even to non-human beings, but challenges the way the question of non-human animal 
suffering projects itself back onto the human. In response to Derrida, Wolfe states that: 
 
… humans and animals may share a fundamental ‘non-power at the heart of 
power,’ may share a vulnerability and passivity without limit as fellow living 
beings, but what they do not share equally is the power to materialize their 
misrecognition of their situation and to reproduce that materialization in 
institutions of exploitation and oppression whose effects are far from symmetrical 
in species terms. (95) 
 
 
In other words, humans may twist non-human suffering for human interests but the 
opposite is not possible. For Wolfe this power changes the question from what should be 
done in light of non-human suffering to what will be done, but the notion of non-human 
suffering exceeding non-human being actually has not changed at all.  While these two 
passages allude to the limitations and possibly even the violence of human compassion, 
Wolfe returns to shared human/non-human vulnerability and human compassion in the 
fifth chapter, “Learning from Temple Grandin: Animal Studies, Disability Studies, and 
Who Comes after the Subject.” Through the work of Grandin, Wolfe elaborates on the 
connection between differently abled human persons and non-human animals and how it 
may produce shared being relations that “points us toward the necessity of an ethics 
based not on ability, activity, agency, and empowerment but on a compassion that is 
rooted in our vulnerability and passivity” (141).  
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 
 Throughout What Is Posthumanism? Wolfe touches on different types and 
positionings of posthumanism(s), such as Derrida’s posthumanist posthumanism and 
Diamond’s humanist posthumanism in the third chapter. In the fourth chapter, “‘Animal 
Studies,’ Disciplinarity, and the (Post)Humanities,” he further draws these 
categorizations in relation to how one practices within a discipline, mapping humanist 
humanism (eg. Heidegger, Habermas), posthumanist humanism (eg. Foucault), humanist 
posthumanism (eg. Singer, Nussbaum), and posthumanist posthumanism (eg. Derrida, 
Haraway). While Wolfe does not argue that only works he deems to be in the way of 
posthumanist posthumanisms are useful for posthumanisms, I am greatly concerned by 
how theses categorizations may cement the two main issues I identify in posthumanisms: 
1) joining sentience and suffering for non-human beings and 2) relying on human 
understanding and knowledge of non-human animal being and feeling. I am less 
interested in why certain scholars are placed where they are in Wolfe’s disciplinary 
matrix than in what it means to define the level of recourse to the human. Is Nussbaum’s 
dependence on human justice, for example, any less posthumanist than, say, Donna 
Haraway’s dependence on human knowledge sites and practices?  
 Donna Haraway’s work on “companion species” in The Companion Species 
Manifesto explores interspecies relationships and what it means to be accountable to, 
love, and live with each other less violently. While some posthumanist scholars conflate 
non-human animal sentience and suffering, I do not see Haraway doing this kind of work, 
instead she explores these interspecies relationships as snares of cruelty, pleasure, 
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sadness, joy, work, and play (Companion Species 12). Embedded in beings’ flesh are our 
histories of living and laboring together, using one another, yet there is also great 
happiness for all beings in companion species (38). In When Species Meet Haraway 
elaborates on the place of suffering when considering non-human animal being and 
beings, making it clear that companion species are made of and bound by just as much by 
experiences of play, work, and comfort as they are by experiences of pain and 
exploitation. However, I take issue with what I understand to be Haraway’s ambivalence 
with regard to non-human animal suffering for the purposes of scientific knowledge as 
well as her investment in human understanding and knowledge practices. Her position on 
suffering is most clearly explained in the third chapter of When Species Meet: “Sharing 
Suffering: Instrumental Relations between Laboratory Animals and Their People,” which 
opens with a story from Nancy Farmer’s A Girl Named Disaster. The story takes place in 
Zimbabwe, at a sleeping sickness research testing site where guinea pigs are smothered 
with topical poisons and inflicted with parasite bites. An old man, Baba Joseph, 
introduces a young girl to the site, sticking his arm into the guinea pigs’ cramped, 
infested cage in order to share their suffering. I believe that this story best demonstrates 
the way that Haraway thinks about human/non-human labors and scientific knowledge 
practices, but it also reveals her larger conceptions of humanity, animality, sentience, and 
suffering not limited to the research lab and the human/non-human relations that occur 
within them. In other words, Haraway’s position on human/non-human being relations 
inside the lab has great implications outside of it. 
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 Haraway argues that there exists “the practical and moral obligation to mitigate 
suffering among mortals—and not just human mortals—where possible and to share the 
conditions of work, including the suffering, of the most vulnerable lab actors.” (When 
Species Meet 70) The “most vulnerable lab actors,” of course, are non-human animal 
testing subjects, who Haraway does not deny all agency but instead considers 
“significantly unfree partners.” (72) For Haraway, non-human animal suffering does not 
equal victimization or sacrifice as it is an unescapable part of non-human animal labor in 
the lab. Emphasizing the importance of sharing, response, and responsibility, Haraway 
deems both human and non-human laborers to be responsible and “response-able” in the 
lab (71). From Farmer’s story Haraway claims the (non)position of the human with 
regard to the non-human animal suffering one may take part in: “Baba Joseph’s bitten 
arm is not the fruit of a heroic fantasy of ending all suffering or not causing suffering, but 
the result of remaining at risk and in solidarity in instrumental relationships that one does 
not disavow.” (70) Non-human animal suffering, then, is necessary and may be met with 
always-inadequate human justifications, but it does not relieve the human obligation to 
care for and share the suffering of non-human beings. From Haraway’s position, the 
problem is not the instrumental human use of non-humans, but rather human defiance of 
the demands of these relations, namely recognition of, caring for, and sharing pain. While 
this position does not reduce non-human animal being to suffering, it gives to the human 
control of the conditions which systematically produce non-human animal suffering and 
leaves humans with little accountability beyond a non-response. It elevates the human 
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“gaining” of knowledge above non-human animal being, and this, I argue just as 
violently defines non-human animal being as conflations of sentience and suffering. 
Haraway acknowledges that “acquiring knowledge is never innocent” but too easily 
accepts the non-human suffering that such acquisition requires (70). At once, human 
suffering in the name of research and knowledge can be both necessary and good, but not 
legitimate (72). These points shape a human way of being with animals that does over-
define them by suffering, but at the same time will not cease human claims to cause that 
suffering.  
 Haraway argues that human responsibility towards non-human animals might be 
best considered and cultivated through labor rather than rights, as rights-based 
frameworks rely upon the special status of the human. We should “take animals seriously 
as workers” although they are allowed little to no part in forming or shifting the 
conditions under which they labor and suffer (When Species Meet 73). Thinking through 
work, pain, freedom, and necessity together, Haraway refuses to denounce human use of 
non-human animals, even when such use leads to or requires their suffering. For 
Haraway, human use of non-human animals does not equate to violation of non-human 
being, especially for the purposes of knowledge production, as “relations of use are 
exactly what companion species are about.” (74) Companion species, while promising as 
a theoretical framework to explore being relations, is not the “non-humanism” it promises 
to be if its human ethical comportment towards the non-human animal takes suffering as 
a given, albeit in a different way from posthumanist conflations of non-human sentience 
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and suffering (164). Haraway contends that the fact that suffering can never be endured 
evenly by all parties working in the lab does not mean we should do away with laboratory 
use of animals even if it causes non-human pain and death, instead, it means “that these 
practices should never leave their practitioners in moral comfort, sure of their 
righteousness.” (75) The infinite unsettledness of the human pertaining to the non-human 
is the work of “culturing a radical ability to remember and feel what is going on and 
performing the epistemological, emotional, and technological work to respond 
practically.” (75) But who defines what is a practical response in the face of suffering, 
especially if the action of causing that suffering is already deemed to be practical by 
those who would cause and respond to it? Who is given a “radical ability,” radical 
feeling, radical being, in performing and theorizing interspecies labors? How is this work 
non-humanist if it exploits non-human beings not only to produce human knowledges, 
but also “new” human ways of feeling and being? While Haraway does not conflate non-
human sentience and suffering, her assumptions concerning the share-ability and know-
ability of non-human suffering is intensely problematic for posthumanisms as it builds a 
new way of being and knowing (while) human on the backs of non-human beings.  
 Returning to Haraway’s encounter with the story of Baba Joseph, if the important 
part of the action of putting his arm in the cage was not taking their place but rather 
attempting to understand their pain, then we must once again turn to the issue of human 
empathy and what it can and cannot do. Haraway is interested in “nonmimetic sharing,” 
affectively springing from reading about Baba Joseph: “There is an element of mimesis 
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in his actions that I affirm: feeling in the flesh what the guinea pigs in his charge feel.” 
(When Species Meet 75) Why must humans feel this, affirm this non-human pain in their 
own flesh? If the human does not or cannot feel it, is it still there? Is the act of feeling 
what the non-human animal may feel an adequate, ethical response? Haraway argues that 
given that there is no truly sufficient or justifiable reason for inflicting pain on non-
humans, the human response is to witness it, share it, and not take it for granted; this 
response must be “material, practical, and consequential.” (75) Responding to this pain 
while working to maintain it instead or eradicate it is, in Haraway’s view, not humanist, 
yet, there is nothing present in the text about how the non-human being may respond or 
even room in the text to account for non-human response. Thinking back to Derrida and 
whether the animal can respond in its own name, it seems the lab site both requires and 
prevents this response, indicating for me that Haraway’s position does take recourse to 
the human. Of what sharing pain as a response to causing suffering does, Haraway claims 
that “Human beings’ learning to share other animals’ pain nonmimetically is, in my view, 
an ethical obligation, a practical problem, and an ontological opening. Sharing pain 
promises disclosure, promises becoming. The capacity to respond may yet be recognized 
and nourished on this earth.” (84) Why is it important to disclose to the human? What 
does this make known? If the acceptable border of human ethical response to the non-
human animal is sharing pain, what does this reveal about non-human animal being? That 
is, if sharing suffering is response, and response is respect, then sharing suffering is 
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respect, and interspecies becomings rely on continued non-human suffering that humans 
both set up and share (88).  
 Stephanie Jenkins argues that Haraway’s work on non-human animal suffering 
and response is a “nonresponse” endemic in “hypo-critical animal studies.” (506) 
Haraway’s answer to Derrida’s violation of the (non-human animal) subject and the 
sacrifice is that killing is not the problem because one cannot be outside of killing but 
rather “The problem is to learn to live responsibly within the multiplicitous necessity and 
labor of killing.” (When Species Meet 80) Here Haraway is making a distinction between 
killing and killing responsibly, the latter of which forecloses further response to suffering. 
Haraway argues for killing (non-human beings) responsibly and with (human) 
consequence, calculation, and reason, though she acknowledges no reason can ever be 
entirely adequate. Jenkins points out that Haraway does not differentiate between 
“degree, kind, and intent of killing,” that is, the various rifts between and within killing 
and making killable (507). Haraway adamantly “defends” the killing of non-human 
animals so long as there is thought given to it that is meaningful to the human (When 
Species Meet 87). It is crucial to note that the relationship between sentience and kill-
ability in Haraway’s work comes down to the question “who falls below the radar of 
sentience and so is killable.” (89) Thinking through this linkage, if the problem is kill-
ability (killing irresponsibly, for Haraway) then does Haraway also take issue with 
measuring sentience and suffering though these measurements are key to the functioning 
of scientific sites, practices, and knowledges?  
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Ultimately, Haraway’s position on suffering is that humans must hold the tensions 
of non-human animal suffering, especially in instrumental use, “acknowledging shared 
pain and mortality.” (When Species Meet 83) She stresses the significance of caring and 
care work, though it is elucidated as “the work of paying attention and making sure that 
the suffering is minimal, necessary, and consequential” (82). Questions that are sadly 
already answered spill from this definition: Minimal in whose eyes? Necessary and 
consequential for whom? Haraway may not explicitly conflate sentience and suffering 
but she does offer suffering as a crucial aspect of human relation to the non-human while 
remaining somewhat indifferent to actual non-human suffering. While I praise the 
importance Haraway gives to flourishing rather than “just” relieving suffering, that she 
proposes this flourishing via “compassionate action” ties together practices of love, 
affinity, empathy, and still, knowledge. Haraway titles this chapter “Sharing Suffering: 
Instrumental Relations between Laboratory Animals and Their People,” and near the end 
writes of “good experimenters and their critters.” (90) I would like to close my 
exploration of Haraway by briefly troubling the meeting of these possessive claims. If the 
conditions and pains of labor, especially in the research lab, can never be borne or shared 
equally, then human and non-human being actors in the lab can never equally or even 
comparably belong to one another. Given the state of relations in the lab, the qualification 
of “good” for experimenter coupled with the possessive claim makes me wonder about 
what it means to be a non-human being as a scientific instrument that warrants ethical 
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response. If response and respect are sharing suffering, then does the human act of 
sharing suffering give some kind of having or owning over to non-human being?  
Stacy Alaimo’s work in Bodily Natures develops the concept of trans-corporality 
as “thinking across bodies,” acknowledging “the often unpredictable and unwanted 
actions of human bodies, non-human creatures, ecological systems, chemical agents, and 
other actors.” (2) Alamio focuses on trans-corporality mainly in relation to the human, 
particularly human bodies, but argues that its implications expand outward to non-human 
beings. Alaimo’s trans-corporality is committed to bodies as active rather than passive 
matter, and she contends that trans-corporeality can address and attend to pains, 
sufferings, and harms done to bodies both human and non-human. Alamio argues that an 
ethics arises from trans-corporality, but does not elaborate on these ethics or how they 
may or may not attend to suffering through entanglements of vulnerable bodies. I find her 
framing of human corporeality and (with, as well as opposed to) more-than-human nature 
curious, as she never directly addresses non-human corporealities. Defining trans-
corporeality as “thinking across bodies” is questionable to me for two main reasons: first, 
Alamio never explicitly discusses non-human bodies as bodies, never really attends to the 
difference between non-human beings and objects, and second, trans-corporality as a 
concept accepts that all bodies are already given over to each other in their becomings, 
therefore, defining the movement as “across” seems odd. Furthermore, the fetishization 
of bodies and connections that birth and effect the flesh and the push for a fuller material 
and fleshy (here, meaning even deeper the skin) exploration of being, if curbed by human 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
 
exploration, requires the occupation of human flesh (Alaimo 6). Alaimo appears to be far 
more interested in what trans-corporeality might mean for the human, or rather, what it 
might for rewriting the terms of humanity through human (trans-)corporeality. The 
porosity and penetrability of bodies, and the potential for their harm, injury, and toxicity 
are the foremost issues of Alamio’s trans-corporeality, which work to overlay bodily 
vulnerability with experiences of trespass, pain, and illness. That Alamio conceives of 
what is unpredictable as already what is unwanted delivers the limits of a trans-corporeal 
ethics, and this seems to me a different iteration of posthumanist conflations of non-
human sentience as suffering. That is, it is not so much that sentience equals suffering for 
non-humans, but the connectedness of the vulnerability of all bodies as the imperative for 
ethical consideration and action. The ability to feel pain and illness (especially at the 
hands of human industry and endeavor) stills functions as the primary connection 
between human and non-human beings, whether directly or mediated through creatured 
environments.  
While the interconnectedness of bodily harms forms the core of Alamio’s 
concept, in the text itself Alamio is most concerned with human bodies and the “invisible 
movement of xenobiotic substances across human bodies and more-than-human nature.” 
(125) Present in the text is the consistent phrasing of human bodies versus nonhuman 
natures, which leads me to question the wording of bodies and natures. I use the word 
“versus” to point to the contrast between bodies and natures because of the regularity in 
which Alamio uses these terms, stabilizing their links to humanity and other-than-
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humanity. Why bodies and natures? If Alamio aims to dissolve human/non-human, 
nature/culture, and active/passive humanist dualisms, are these terms invoked to bring 
about their own dissolution or is this pairing indicative of a humanist leaning in this 
particular ecofeminism? Can only humans harm through bodily connection? Does that 
position non-humans as only absorbing human harms? In either case, Alaimo’s work is a 
branch of posthumanist conflations of sentience and suffering given the persistent 
juxtaposition of acting individual humans with the collectivity of receiving non-human 
beings and environments, even though Alaimo writes against the opposition of passive 
nature and active culture (136). Alamio does not deny non-human agency, or being and 
acting apart from or within suffering, but neither does she engage with non-human 
possibilities of being (145). She rejects the somatophobia, or fear of the body, that is a 
part of traditional Western philosophy, liberal humanisms, and liberal feminisms 
(Spelman 119). Fearing the body, particularly the loss of bodily control and corporeal 
pain and death, still haunts feminisms, but what does Alamio’s rejection mean for non-
human beings and less-than-human beings who already bear the burden of excess 
embodiment and are differently vulnerable to the unpredictability of the body in itself and 
at the hand of others? (Alamio 5) In other words, does her rejection of somotophobia 
coupled with her concern for the “unwelcomed and unexpected” things that human 
bodies do or that other things do to/in them take recourse to the human? I argue that it 
does, not only because in trans-corporeality the human ripples outward but also because it 
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enthusiastically occupies the (human) body in all its feeling while nearly exclusively 
addressing human harms.  
Alamio gives importance to human knowledge but not necessarily human 
knowledge practices, as Haraway does. She uses the work of Ursula Heise to emphasize 
the importance of human understanding, aligning her project of trans-corporeality with 
Heise’s project of ecocosmopolitainism: comprehending environmental connections; both 
projects, she argues, require “the mediation of scientific information.” (Alaimo 16) This 
mediation, through trans-corporality, “ruptures ordinary knowledge practices,” unsettles 
our understanding of both what and how we come to know, and produces multiple, 
dissonant epistemologies (17). Alamio calls for knowledge practices which include 
“nonhuman nature as a participant rather than as an object of inquiry,” which is in line 
with my gesture towards an unknowable posthumanism, but without specification, could 
easily slip into Haraway’s instrumental use of non-human beings recast as non-human 
“participation” (42). The locations and purposes of such knowledge are also in question, 
given Alamio’s attraction to the “often hazardous landscapes of risk society.” (17) She 
argues that we do not have enough information on human-made substances and human 
processes and practices that harm bodies, and that we cannot “protect” and “preserve” 
vulnerable bodies and environments separately (18). I adamantly agree with both of these 
arguments, but I want to further consider the language Alamio uses. “Hazard”, “risk”, 
and “toxicity” crop up throughout the text, warning of interconnected harms and the 
consequences of chemicals, poisons, pollutions, and “pernicious substances” (104). 
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Modern “risk society” and culture is given meaning through human-produced matter that 
permeates bodies human and non-human. When I asked after the locations and purposes 
of human knowledge, I am thinking about what these ominous words mean in terms of 
vulnerability as vulnerability to harm; this is especially interesting to me given Alamio’s 
rejection of somatophobic impulses. Alamio calls for a recognition of and accountability 
for harms and who bears the burden of trans-corporeal exchanges, most thoroughly 
engaging with humans who have been gravely harmed but also condemning 
environmental justice projects for their failure to consider non-human beings. This 
demand for interspecies recognition and accountability is the most hopeful aspect of her 
work for me. While being vulnerability is over-defined by harm, especially at the hands 
of humans, trans-corporeality insists that we rethink what and who well-being and health 
includes.  
 A groundbreaking work which, I argue, shatters the aforementioned limits of 
posthumanisms and hints at where posthumanisms could go is Mel Chen’s Animacies. 
Chen defines “animacy” as a “quality of agency, awareness, mobility, and liveness” with 
the “capacity to rewrite conditions of intimacy.” (M. Chen 2-3) Chen’s exploration of 
animacies, broken into categories of words, animals, and metals, troubles intra- and 
interspecies differences and hierarchies and disrupts how we define life, liveliness, 
wellness/well-being, awareness, affectivity, and agency. Animacy is unfastened and 
largely undefined, but certainly not neutral with regard to the bio- and necropolitical 
stakes of animacy hierarchies (5). Chen’s “animacy” undoubtedly complicates sentience 
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and suffering for human and non-human beings, as it agitates what is categorized and 
understood as living, non-living, dying, and thriving; bodies may not move or be 
animated in the normative sense of living matter and objects, words, and noises may 
affect and effect in ways that are typical of living matter. Chen does not seek to give a 
sense of life to those beings and objects that are regularly denied it, but instead to look at 
how lively being and being lively is defined and the affects and effects of those 
definitions. Affect is rethought of as feelings and stirrings that cannot arise individually, 
with affectivity coming about through bodies and things together, within, across, and 
against animacy hierarchies (12). Animacies recognizes the complexities of being 
relations, not over-defining being by suffering yet not ignoring or defending suffering or 
practices that require suffering. Importantly, against many posthumanisms Chen’s 
Animacies does not fetishize the corporeal, refusing the given body/cyborg binary that 
many posthumanisms rely upon (3).  
 As a linguist, Chen’s work can be read as playing with language more than 
anything else, beginning with what it means to be animate, full of life, and well-in-being. 
Because Chen conceives of animacy within and away from these meanings, this work 
has, perhaps, the most potential of all the theorists I explore in this thesis to resist non-
human animal being and feeling as always already one of pain. At the same time, probing 
hierarchies of animacy—of what/who is lively, livelier, who can suffer, suffer greater, 
deeper, more significantly—this work inherently calls into question humanist arguments 
that other human capacities enhance their/our abilities to suffer more than other creature-
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beings. Chen’s analysis of the U.S. contemporary bio-necro-political terrain includes 
non-human being and object lives that expands understandings about the raced, sexed, 
and sexualized managements of life and death and I am interested in what this kind of 
work tells us about how we could approach non-human animal being and feeling without 
falling into what I deem to be the traps of posthumanisms. There is something there in the 
slipperiness of animacy, in imagining the ungraspable tactile quality of the term and the 
constant evasion of the certainty of what it may refer to which at once refuses and alludes 
human knowledge and the fixity of non-human being (M. Chen 9). Animacy and 
sentiency are connected life (and lacking in life) concepts and therefore reworking 
animacy reworks sentience (8).  
 Although Animacies as a whole project refuses to play by the posthumanist 
“rules” I have outlined in this chapter, I am most interested in Chen’s work on “Words” 
and “Animals” and the implications of this work to untether non-human sentience and 
suffering. In “Words,” Chen argues that language itself is animated but also that it has the 
power to animate, de-animate, and/or re-animate. Languages’ animations and capacities 
to animate both structure and undo animacy hierarchies and the ordering and valuing of 
human, animal, plant, and object life, living and nonliving matter. Chen states that “For 
linguists, animacy is the quality of liveness, sentience, or humanness of a noun or noun 
phrase that has grammatical, often syntactic, consequences.” (M. Chen 24) The consistent 
significance of the concept across languages coupled with the variations on definitions 
and hierarchies of animacy together reveals both the importance and utter instability of 
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animacy and adjacent concepts. Contesting animacies from within, then, can possibly 
release the barring of the non-human from the realm of sensate beings while not cycling 
between sentience and/as suffering. If (human) language users can harness animacy 
hierarchies to affirm or alter the position of beings and matter, as Chen suggests, then 
conceiving of creature beings and creature hope within constantly disturbed and 
contested animacies may be able to detached sentience and suffering or even call into 
question the theoretical power of suffering itself. Chen asks “if language helps to coerce 
certain figures into non-being, or to demote on an animacy hierarchy, then what are the 
modes of revival, return, or rejoinder?” (14) Here, reclaiming as reanimation is the work 
of political possibility, although reclaiming assumes dispossession, lack, and/or loss (79). 
In Animacies de-animation and/as dehumanization are forms of objectifications, with 
dehumamization meaning towards non-life, non-being, and death (social and/or 
corporeal). Chen’s work on “living states of being that have been marked as equivalent to 
death” reminds me of how beings human, less-than-human, and non-human have 
differently been addressed as beings that it would be better to do away with rather than 
allow them to exist in so-called continuous and inescapable states of suffering (43). Is the 
overextension of suffering a posthumanist attempt to reanimate non-human beings? If so, 
what does this assume about suffering’s relationship to non-human being? 
 These questions leads me to Chen’s work on “Animals.” Chen argues that “the 
animal transubstantiates beyond the borders of our insistent human ontologies” (M. Chen 
13). In other words, non-human ways of being and feeling cannot be defined or contained 
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by human philosophies on the nature of being. Animals are non-human beings constantly 
created and existing in the (human) social imagination and so Chen issues a caution not 
to conflate the human imaginings of animals with non-human animal beings. This at first 
may appear to be obvious, or a differently-worded caution against anthropomorphizing 
animals, but Chen is not warning about ascribing human attributes to the animal, but 
presuming to know anything about the animal at all (90-92). For me, the unquestionable 
posthumanist question of suffering, that the suffering of non-human beings is knowable, 
is a part of this caution. Chen is concerned with “how the sentience of animals is 
assessed, especially with regard to its primary criteria: language and methods of 
communication.” (90) This is interesting, because here Chen is not speaking to sentience 
as ability in the humanist sense nor to sentience as suffering in the mainstream 
posthumanist sense, instead urging us to question sentience itself within animacy 
hierarchies. Referring to hierarchies of animacy in non-human animality, Chen states: 
 
Thinking—and feeling—through sentience promises a revising of dominant 
animacy hierarchies, through its allowance of a broad range of interanimation and 
uncognized recognition. But sentience is also not without its problems, 
particularly if it is either restricted to what could be discoverable (and falsifiable) 
through experimental research or conceived in terms of the presence of pain and 
pleasure. (93) 
 
 
The aforementioned passage brilliantly illustrates the two main problems with 
posthumanisms I have outlined in this chapter: first, how sentience is sutured to pain and 
second, that sentience can be somehow discovered and understood by and through human 
knowledge practices. While posthumanisms that conflate non-human sentience and 
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suffering are located primarily in questions of being and the ethical response to being, 
Chen’s work is not about questions of being nor is it about coming up with the right 
questions or actions that will enable us to treat each other well. In other words, there is no 
linchpin for ethical response. There is nothing fully capable of answering for and to 
violence in any form, however, that there is no linchpin for a posthumanist ethic does not 
means the only response is a non-response. Truly, the never-ending plurality and constant 
reflexivity of a posthumanism that does not seek the thing to return to does not violate 
beings in its quest to end violence against beings. 
The work of Monique Allewaert, along with that of Che Gossett and Alexander 
Weheliye, together highlight not only posthumanisms’ conflation of sentience and 
suffering but its focus on other-than-human suffering as non-human animal suffering; 
together, these issues illustrate the necessity of posthumanisms taking the work of critical 
race studies seriously and using it as both a foundation and a guide for the field. 
Parahumans, as conceptualized in Monique Allewaert’s Ariel’s Ecology, are persons of 
color, fragmented and broken by colonization, but while the category of parahuman is 
borne of experiences of pain and anguish Allewaert refuses to define the parahuman by 
them. Instead, she gives greater importance to the possibilities of staying within 
parahumanity, as her interest in parahuman stories and performances is driven by the 
pleasures and political possibilities within pain, explicitly apart from rehabilitative 
projects (Allewaert 86). That is, Allewaert does not seek to rehabilitate the parahuman to 
the category of human, but looks to the redressive possibilities of the fragmented state of 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
the parahuman. Allewaert argues that the parahuman may generate political possibilities 
for not only parahumans, but non-human animals as well, “producing a mode of 
personhood and politics not grounded on human exceptionalism.” (113) Existing between 
humanity and animality presents different avenues of relating to human, less-than-human, 
and non-human animal beings, and these relations are not limited to shared abilities to 
suffer nor are the political possibilities limited to alleviating or eradicating pain. What 
parahumanity offers are ways of existing and relating to other beings differently while 
not forgetting harms done or releasing accountability, because the possibilities of the 
parahuman can never make those harms right, good, or in any way justified. The signifier 
of parahumanity, the broken, brutalized body, is not just a body dismembered and made 
to suffer, but a body that supports and needs support from other beings (98). This body 
does not allow us to forget the suffering it continues to endure, yet it demands something 
more than the hollow promise to end that suffering or a fixed understanding of that state 
of being as only suffering. Allewaert believes that taking parahumanity as a purely 
negative state of being or parahumans as always pained beings is completely in line with 
definitions and intentions of colonizers, therefore, exploring the possibilities of staying 
within parahumanity is a crucial anticolonial resistance (100). Dissimilarly, presenting 
non-human being as pain, loss, and absence does not do non-human animals any favors, 
arguably, this is one way in which some posthumanisms meet liberal humanisms and 
colonizing logics.   
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Che Gossett’s “Blackness, Animality, and the Unsovereign” considers the close 
relationship between Blackness and animality that links human and non-human animal 
abolition, disrupting assumptions about distinctions between human and non-human 
rights, conditions, protections, and pains. Gossett’s work makes clear the importance of 
not analogizing or comparing less-than-human and non-human exploitations and 
sufferings, but rather considering their connections and the ways in which they maintain 
or may even undo one another, and this, I argue, has far greater, more radical potential 
than posthumanisms that focus on non-human animal sentience as suffering. Gossett, 
reading the work of Frederick Douglass and Donna Haraway together, defines abolition 
“as a means of worlding or ‘becoming with,’” acknowledging the impossibility of ending 
different being exploitations and pains apart from one another. Gossett argues that 
“Animal liberationists must confront the devaluation of black life and racialization as 
animalization and the prison industrial complex as part of a movement for abolition,” but 
this work is also impossible if non-human animal sentience is already suffering or Human 
knowledges are needed because it dismisses alternative human knowledges and ways of 
being and becoming with non-human animals. One of Gossett’s main problems with 
critical animal studies is its timeline, locating the present as a time for non-human animal 
liberation that must come since we are now past human chattel slavery, a timeline that 
not only denies non-human animals modes of being that are not suffering, but denies less-
than-human humans modes of suffering and exploitation that are now supposedly solely 
animal. The conflation of non-human animal sentience and suffering then, doubly 
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functions as a speciesist and racist mechanism. In Habeas Viscus Alexander Weheliye 
talks about suffering in a way that does not flatten or universalize injurious experiences. 
That is, suffering is not a universal experience that can be recognized and understood in 
others, nor can it be responded to after recognition. I would like to note that Weheliye is 
exclusively talking about humanity and Black claims to (human) flesh given the 
violences and exploitation of chattel slavery. I do not wish to twist his ideas to fit my 
argument regarding the delineation of the human, but I do think that his work highlights 
the way that many posthumanist scholars invoke a Eurocentric idea of suffering devoid of 
particularity and how they take less-than-human suffering as non-human suffering. 
Perhaps this is the reason that some scholars in posthumanisms, critical animal studies, 
and ecofeminisms so easily analogize the systemic violences against human and non-
human Others while only explicitly attending to the suffering of non-human animals.  
José Muñoz’s queered concepts of disidentification and hope have the potential to 
work against conflations of non-human animal sentience and suffering and dependence 
on human knowledges of non-human animal being and feeling. Muñoz does not 
explicitly grapple with the non-human but his work does not reduce explorations of being 
and feeling to solidifications of objects of knowledge, in fact, for Muñoz “knowing” is 
always questionable. He specifically separates knowledge and expectation from desire, 
positioning disidentification as an unstable and unpredictable de- and recoding of 
dominant culture that only arrives from spaces of marginalization and hope as a longing 
for that which cannot yet be known. Keeping the spirit of Muñoz’s disidentification and 
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hope presents, to my understanding, an opening for posthumanisms to consider non-
human being and feeling without scrambling to have it within human grasp or 
comprehension, or to use it for some foreseeable end, even with the intent to benefit non-
human animals. While I consider dismantling human-controlled systems that cause non-
human animal suffering to be of great importance, I cannot believe that the human 
imposition on non-humans the excess burden of corporal agony could possibly lend itself 
to the amelioration of non-human conditions of being. This theoretical overextension 
seems to make impossible relief and hope for all creatures, non-human and otherwise. 
What Muñoz’s work enables me to do is to break from and with the unstated 
requirements of working in posthumanisms, namely from writing non-human sentience 
as always already suffering, which I consider to loop back to liberal humanist 
understandings of non-human animal being. Is defining non-human animals entirely by 
one mode of being any better than denying them that mode entirely?  
 In Cruising Utopia Muñoz imagines a hope and futurity that is not defined by the 
present and asks us to consider the possibilities of resisting definition (here, of 
queerness). He looks to both the “no-longer-conscious” and the “not-yet-conscious” to 
critique the present and bring forth what could be, throwing consciousness itself into 
question, as well as abilities of being, feeling, affecting, addressing, and being addressed 
(Cruising Utopia 20). I see this work as complicating what it means to be present in the 
world, with far reaching implications for creature-being. Queering consciousness in this 
way has the potential to rework the way we think about non-human animal sentience, 
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conceiving of desire and pleasure within violence marginalization, hopes and imaginings 
not defined by current times and conditions. Muñoz’s hope is always looking to what 
might come and refuses define the future by the present, which is a much welcome 
change from posthumanist works that seek to create a future for non-human beings by 
leaning on human inflictions of harm. Although I want to attend to hurts non-human 
beings have endured, are enduring, and will continue to endure, I am also inspired to look 
to creature-beings that have not yet been born into the world as well as those long-passed 
for unknowable ways of hoping in violence. In this work, Muñoz’s hope is somewhat 
limited by way of Ernest Bloch, who conceives of hope as purely and uniquely human. 
Muñoz does not completely agree, as is evident in the following except: “I talk about the 
human as a relatively stable category. But queerness in its utopian connotations promises 
a human that is not yet here, thus disrupting any ossified understanding of the human.” 
(25-26). I take issue with this, as I argue that we must not predicate hope on the 
continued existence of the human, assuming that the human, even in a different and 
unknowable form, will be on the horizon. Regardless, Muñoz’s refusal to discipline or 
define being and feeling is hopeful “beyond” the human, and in my view, this refusal is 
the key to shifting what posthumanist work means and does. He sees the pragmatic queer 
politics of the present to be emptied of meaning, possibility, pleasure, and promise; 
conversely, hope and futurity are not about what aims are most easily attainable and 
accomplishable. Dissimilarly, the limits of posthumanisms addressed here may be seen as 
a means to achieve what is practical and do-able for non-human beings, but ultimately 
 
 
 
 
85 
 
 
denies hope to creature-beings human and non-human alike. Admittedly, it is more 
difficult to grapple with the complexities, contradictions, and inconceivablities of what it 
means to be ethically with other creatures than to rely on mapped truths of being and 
relating to one another, however, the accomplishability of the latter forecloses the hope of 
the former.  
 I understand disidentification as Muñoz details it to be a form of redress, as 
disidentification alters the conditions of systemic marginalization, exploitation, and harm. 
The queered performances Muñoz analyzes in Disidentifications rupture and rework 
minoritarian subjectivity. I am thinking about disidentification with the human as more 
than an overly simplistic identification with non-human being, form, movement, 
experience, or feeling, but rather questioning what it means to be human, non-human, 
animal—not trying to fully know what any of it means but constantly trying to rewrite the 
terms of occupation and identification in and with them. Disidentification, like and 
maybe as an act of (creature) hope, takes what is with few assumptions what will 
be(come) and can work against cementing non-human being in inescapable, constant 
states of damage. Reading Marga Gomez’s performance that parodies lesbian stereotypes, 
Muñoz writes “she performs her disidentifactory desire for this once toxic 
representation.” (Disidentifications 3) This stirs in me the question of what it means to 
alter posthumanisms from within, enclosed by humanisms. What if posthumanist 
exaggerations (as in the spectacular spectacle in the vein of Hartman, not a dismissal) of 
the sufferings of non-human beings could function differently? That is, could they be 
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used to point to the need for considering creature-being seriously? To call the human into 
question while rejecting non-human sentience as suffering? This transformative work 
would necessitate navigating jagged ethical and political terrain, considering 
disidentification as not just about the identities of those performing, but the ripples of 
those actions. Muñoz states that “disidentification is a step further than cracking open the 
code of the majority, it proceeds to use this code as raw material for representing a 
disempowered politics of positionality that has been rendered unthinkable by the 
dominant culture.” (31) In this, I see disidentification with the human as not only pointing 
out the problems with humanisms, as posthumanisms so often do, but utilizing the 
problems of the human to rethink how all beings are in the world with one another. 
Disidentification is fragmented and sometimes insufficient; there are no grand claims 
about this work as the answer, as enough, or of any single concept or framework as 
capable of fully dismantling systemic violence and exploitation. The unsettledness of the 
term, as if the word itself is in motion—back and forth, but always existing in multiple 
genres of being—betrays its incomprehensible possibility.  
 
Implications & Hoping Within/Against Suffering  
 Disidentification with the human and/as doing creature hope are clumsy concepts. 
As I write this thesis I am fumbling with them, and not just in the metaphorical sense. I 
stare at my notes and my flickering, waiting cursor too often at a loss for words, wildly 
waving my hands in a frustrated attempt to call them forth, in an attempt to figure out 
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how to convey what words can never express. I ask myself if this work even makes sense 
outside of my head, if its incoherency prevents connection; yet, this incoherency is what 
draws and endears me to these concepts. The unspoken demand for cogency and 
coherency in posthumanisms, in the ethics that will supposedly give us the answer for 
how to treat other beings well, is really a demand for the same in non-humans, in all 
creature-beings; that is, a demand for a cogency and coherency of being. Suffering is 
important and compelling, so I am not trying to downplay or deny its existence or its 
gravity, but when it becomes the only aspect of non-human being that matters 
posthumanisms meet humanisms in their circumscription of non-human animal being. 
Regarding posthumanist conflations of non-human sentience and suffering, I understand 
the logic behind trying to create rational, compact, deployable arguments; it simplifies 
and clarifies what ethical response within and against violences looks like. I understand 
why so many focus on empathy, because pain can seem absolute. I understand why some 
draw upon human knowledges and knowledge practices, after all, we are not abstract 
individuals capable of shedding the human. However, I cannot ignore that there are heavy 
issues with how suffering is being talked about and how it is made untouchable.  
 This chapter is my attempt to question the ostensibly unquestionable thing we call 
suffering, especially its function in posthumanisms. Reading through these theorists, I 
have noticed disturbing patterns in the way suffering that is talked about: the assumption 
that there is a singular experience of suffering that all beings experience the same or 
similarly, that we can understand to the extent that a single word is capable of 
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summarizing it; the notion of a natural, human response to suffering that can be 
provoked; and that beings that are conceived of as always already suffering, which may 
lead to the position that they are better off not existing or being at all. When we presume 
the primacy of suffering, I wonder what we are not asking. What pathways to ethical 
relations are we not pursuing? What are other ways we could be discussing suffering? 
Why does the question of suffering already fall under questions of being? I would like to 
(formally) close this chapter by circling back to Derrida and his continuous return to the 
question of suffering. Following Derrida’s human abyss, I argue that the question of 
suffering can only ever lead back to itself, to its own posing, in much the same way as the 
human infinitely announces itself to itself. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
CREATURE-BEING, HOPES AND ANXITIES  
 
 
Creature Hope in Practice  
 I originally envisioned this chapter as an exploration of disidentification with the 
human and/as creature hope through texts that I read as not invested in discovering, 
recovering, or attending to the human. I will do this work, in part, through a 
disidentificatory, hopeful, creaturely analysis of Franz Kafka’s classic text The 
Metamorphosis and works of queer of color poetry in the online journal Nepantla; 
however, this chapter has transformed into a scattered, circuitous development of my 
understanding of these concepts in all their possibilities and limitations, hopes and 
anxieties. I diverted from my original plan in order to include my work on (creature) hope 
in places of hopelessness, considering humans experiencing homelessness with non-
human animal companions, the policing of intimacies and pleasures in spaces of social 
death, and interspecies companionship and community in seemingly hopeless situations 
as well as creature hope(s) in dissonance, remembering my experiences in mental health 
institutions where my own hopes were predicated on non-human experiences of 
exploitation and violence. The scatteredness of this chapter is intentional and important to 
me because I want to consider the concepts of disidentification with the human and/as 
doing creature hope from various spaces and in various modes but also because I see
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many stories playing out in this thesis. This thesis winds from the first chapter 
introducing disidentification with the human and/as creature hope as concepts that I 
understand to crucially differ from many posthumanisms, to the second chapter that 
questions the posthumanist limit of non-human sentience as suffering, to this chapter that 
explores interspecies hopes and anxieties that I understand through my concepts, to the 
fourth and final chapter about interspecies intimacies and sometimes competing, 
dissonant, unknowable, and/or violent creature hope(s). This chapter flows from a 
widely-read classic Western text to a very personal experience that sets up the final 
chapter. In its entirety, this thesis is a parallel scholarly project and personal story, the 
latter is woven throughout my exploration, mapping my naivety, disillusionment, 
frustrations, pain, and hopes in both intentional and unintentional ways.  
In the following sections I want to be clear that my aim is not to overlay these 
texts and subjects with my concepts of disidentification with the human and/as doing 
creature hope, make claims about authors’ intentions with regard to the human, or twist 
their words to suit my project, rather, I want to see what new possibilities they may 
present if read alongside these concepts. I imagine using these concepts as a prism rather 
than a lens, to see the aforementioned “objects” in new and unpredictable ways. Just as 
disidentification with the human and/as creature hope is not about presenting “the” 
ethical answer for how to exist with other beings, my own practices of doing creature 
hope in terms of these texts are not about the finding and presenting “the” correct 
interpretation but reading and writing about them for and with purpose. At various points 
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in this project I have italicized “doing” in terms of creature hope to place emphasis on 
creature hope as a way of actively working with what beings have available rather than 
making grand claims of conceptual discovery or positioning one’s work as new or 
entirely apart from and/or against previous offerings. This doing of creature hope is my 
methodological guide for the following readings. What joins these readings, despite their 
vastly difference subjects, is the hopelessness of nailing down the human and non-human 
and the consequences that arise when we try to do just that. Creature-being and hope is 
about the impossibility of an absolute human or non-human, exposing human/non-human 
comparisons and analogies, particularly within posthumanisms, as products of the human 
itself with all its accompanying violences. 
 
The Metamorphosis, a Disidentificatory Reading  
The Metamorphosis by Frank Kafka is a classic text, very well-known and 
widely-taught. In my reading and analysis of this novella I am not primarily concerned 
with how it is normatively taught nor with Kafka’s original motivations or intentions for 
the story, rather I want to analyze this text through my concepts of disidentification with 
the human and/as doing creature hope in order to further unfold these concepts and to 
express their non-location. That is, I did not discover or come up with these concepts and 
I do not own them; this work of disidentification and hope is already happening and has 
been happening for a long time and can be found in vastly different places and times. I 
will not argue here that Kafka wished to shed the human or that he would take issue with 
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recourse to the human in the same way I do, instead, I will consider his work in The 
Metamorphosis in relation to two main themes in this thesis: first, how my reading allows 
for a more flexible, open, and complex understanding of relations within and between 
creature beings than approaches that look to and rely on non-human similarities to the 
human; and second, how my reading lets me explore what disidentification and hope 
mean when confronted with intra- and interspecies disgust and demands for affinity, 
compassion, and empathy.  
 In The Metamorphosis Gregor Samsa awakes one morning to find himself 
transformed into a large insect, retaining his human mind and memories but entirely 
insect in bodily form. Gregor’s contradictory and competing desires, despairs, pleasures, 
and pains, human and non-human, function as the primary conflict in the piece. Gregor’s 
seemingly abrupt transformation is initially only in body, but as time passes his mind 
begins to change in accordance with his new species form. There are numerous conflicts 
between Gregor’s previous and current states of being, and he finds he cannot bring the 
human and insect parts of himself together in harmony, only hold them in tension with 
one another. He cannot hang on to the human parts of himself and be physically 
comfortable at the same time and he cannot fully let go of the human and be mentally 
alright with himself. His physical changes bring about new being desires: what to eat, 
where and how to move, and what his space should look like. While inhabiting his human 
body Gregor had loved milk, but when it is brought to him in his insect body he finds it 
now repulses him and finds trash far more appetizing. The longer he lives in his non-
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human body, the more Gregor prefers a different habitat, such as the dark, cramped space 
under his couch. Objects that used to be meaningful and comforting as a human, 
particularly a much-loved painting, are now in the way, impeding his movement across 
the walls of his room. Gregor finds new pains and pleasures in his now body, not only 
new tastes but new sensations and ways of being and moving: the random and 
uncontrollable movement of his many legs, feeling and knowing through his antennae, 
the fresh perspective from crawling on the walls and ceiling of a long-familiar dwelling 
space, and the new spatial longings for darkness and close confines. The pain of newly-
acquired injuries in his insectuous legs and jaw is coupled with the pleasure of inhumanly 
quick healing and new bodily vulnerabilities are matched by new corporeal resiliences 
(Kafka 21, 26). Gregor’s complex feeling about his state of being is indicated by 
simultaneous senses of “shame” and “ease.” (20) His sorrow and worry at the loss of his 
human body is juxtaposed with breathing “more freely” and feeling “relaxed and almost 
happy” in his distinctly creature-being (26). At one point, Gregor experiences a sudden 
sense of alright-ness with and within his new body; of course, this feeling does not last, 
but his affective fluxes and switches point to a complexity of being and feeling that 
cannot be discernably human or non-human. Generally, Gregor has great difficulty 
existing with his “human” mind and insect body and is both troubled and relieved by how 
his mind changes in (dis)conformity with his body. He accepts, however grimly, his new 
state of being and ultimately his fate, even though is means a slow, lonely, uncomfortable 
death.  
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 To think of Gregor’s contradictory and competing aspects of being and feeling, 
human and non-human, is to think of his disidentification with the human and distance 
from human (kind). Gregor’s physical transformation separates him from the human and 
from his family in very painful ways, but this separation was also felt prior to 
transformation. In other words, Gregor’s alienation precedes, not follows, his 
metamorphosis. Prior to the morning he wakes to find himself an insect, he worked as a 
traveling salesman in order to keep his struggling family afloat and dealt with feeling 
isolated from others, frustrated with the demands of his career and of the human world at 
large, and exhausted from lack of sleep and content. Gregor always felt disconnected 
from humanity, and as a traveling salesman and an insect he felt a lack of control of 
circumstances. I argue that his metamorphosis from human to insect is a literal 
embodiment of all his fears, anxieties, isolations, and disappointments he felt in his 
human form. Gregor’s way of being following his transformation is one of 
disidentification with the human, though this concept can project back onto his previous 
human form. Muñoz conceived of disidentification as the decoding and recoding of 
dominant culture by way of minoritarian subjectivity and I have used it in this project to 
study the ways that human Others may identify with and against the human as a way to 
survive their less-than-human status and to be differently with other creature-beings. This 
concept enables a reading of The Metamorphosis that allows for an unmarked analysis of 
being and of what is at stake for those denied and/or at odds with the human. Oxford 
Dictionaries defines “metamorphosis” in the non-zoological sense as “A change of the 
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form or nature of a thing or person into a completely different one, by natural or 
supernatural means.” (“Metamorphosis”) This definition seems to adhere to both 
normative readings of The Metamorphosis as well as normative understandings of being 
kind and/or form. My reading of the story of Gregor’s metamorphosis offers is not one of 
a human changed into an insect, but of a creature-being dealing with an unexpectedly 
altered body and inconsistent and sometimes incompatible desires and disgusts, none of 
which are entirely human or non-human. Gregor’s story also gestures beyond its own 
telling throughout the decades since its introduction, to an approach to what ethical 
relations between creatures could be without trying to find human likeness in non-
humans, unlike posthumanisms the rely on the human acknowledgement of shared 
vulnerability, finitudes, and suffering. Just as Gregor could not clearly differentiate 
between or neatly align his human and non-human aspects of his being, only hold them in 
indistinct tension with one another, so too is that how we should think about 
disidentification and creature hope “after” the violence of the human. Holding the 
“human” and “non-human” in indistinct tension is important because it offers a way to 
think about ethically being with other creatures that does not rely on difference or the 
maintenance of difference from the human while taking into account the violence that 
humans have done to less-than-human and non-human beings.  
 The transforming relationships between Gregor and his family members also 
allows me to further explore a theme that has flowed throughout this thesis: the problems 
with ethical considerations for other beings that are contingent on sympathy and/or 
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empathy. The rampant disgust and repulsion for certain beings and the insistence on 
familiarity, affinity, compassion, and empathy for ethical being relations are problematic 
apart from one another, but together foreclose any ethical consideration of less-than-
human and non-human beings that does not rely on human impulse. In The 
Metamorphosis Gregor’s family, consisting of his cohabitating father, mother, and sister, 
each differently feels some combination of sympathy and disgust, former love and 
current horror. All of his family members, who Gregor previously worked very hard to 
fully support, feel only the echoes of love for their son/brother, as the potent feeling is 
apparently irreconcilable with his current insect body. While they allow him to stay in his 
room, it now functions as his holding space. While they fulfill his most basic needs in the 
beginning, they feel extreme discomfort and animosity at his very existence and presence 
in the house. Gregor’s mother claims to still care for Gregor, but at first she refuses to 
visit him and later has great difficulty coping with the very sight of him. His sister is his 
primary caregiver, but in the end practically begs for his death and is the one to decide to 
let him die. His father displays towards him both some sort of compassion and 
recognition of being but also great violence, finally causing his death. He mortally 
wounds Gregor and following the initial violence is reminded of his blood ties to his son 
“despite his current sad and revolting form,” however, this recognition does not seem to 
eat away at his utter disgust, as he precedes to neglect a dying Gregor (Kafka 32). Once 
again, I am thinking of trash animals, of pests to humans, of what is means to predicate 
ethical relations on loveability and proximity against Kafka’s choice for Gregor to turn 
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into a “horrible vermin” (7). Gregor’s body as giant insect conjures tremendous revulsion 
from his family, even as they weakly and sporadically attempt to sympathize with him. 
The unloveability of Gregor as a vermin, the ineffectiveness of sympathy, and the grossly 
violent workings of the human are made perfectly clear in the final pages of The 
Metamorphosis, which fittingly coincide with the final days of Gregor’s life.  
Near death, Gregor experiences physical and mental pain, loss of mobility, 
neglect, and misunderstanding, yet in the end he also feels comfortable in his pained 
insect body and at peace with his feelings of love for the family that ignored and abused 
him. Gregor’s family members’ actions in his last days shed light on why we cannot 
continue to affirm hope through the human and human affectivities. After Gregor is 
injured, his mother cleans his room in order to help him heal, but she cleans it too well 
for his inset body and the dampness exacerbates his condition and makes him gravely ill. 
For me, this leads to a way of thinking about living with other creature-beings that is 
away from human intentions and (mis)understanding. However kind the intentions 
behind the action of cleaning the room were, they sealed Gregor’s fate and this 
misunderstanding only intensifies the uneasiness, disgust, and apathy felt for Gregor. The 
family then allows the room to become very soiled and begins to clutter the room with 
object unwanted elsewhere in the house, as this is also how they feel about Gregor. In a 
conversation in the room below Gregor’s floor, they have a conversation about what to 
do with him in which they deem themselves to be tortured, forced to endure, and 
“persecuted” by an animal, by his mere existence (Kafka 40). They decide to let him die 
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and after this occurs they feel hope, all having found jobs that hold “particularly good 
promise for the future,” a future absent Gregor who had previously financially supported 
all of them through a job that made him miserable; with their “new dreams and good 
intentions” The Metamorphosis comes to a close (44).  
On September 6, 2000, Dr. Warren Breckman delivered the Penn Reading Project 
Lecture at The University of Pennsylvania, titled “Kafka’s Metamorphosis In His Time 
and In Ours.” Breckman began this lecture as follows:  
 
… with its exploration of identity, of belonging and exclusion, of tolerance and 
intolerance, The Metamorphosis raises many questions for people like you, 
students who are facing a time of transition and transformation. Of course, my 
hope is that your education … will not transform you into beetles, but into less 
earth-bound creatures. Nonetheless, the tale of the unfortunate Gregor Samsa can 
make us think more deeply about our own identity, about the fluidity of what we 
take to be stable and fixed, and about the perils and miracles of our own 
metamorphoses. 
 
 
I find Breckman’s call for the students he is addressing to become “less earth-bound 
creatures” quite interesting considering that my reading of The Metamorphosis calls for a 
deeper, more complex consideration of what creature-being means for ethical 
engagements with one another. Why can the seeming fixedness of the human not be 
dismantled by the fluxes and flows of creatures? Why is the relationship of creature to 
environment one of constraint? In my reading, this story is not one of strict identification 
or of binaries such as belonging/exclusion and tolerance/intolerance; rather, it is about the 
disorder, grunginess, and inconceivability of being. That is, Gregor never fully identifies 
as human or insect nor does he ever completely belong to or become excluded from his 
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family or the human. Furthermore, the question of (in)tolerance does not get at what it 
means to disidentify with the human and/as doing creature hope facing disgust, apathy, 
hostility, and/or fear. To tolerate is to endure, which as The Metamorphosis so clearly 
shows us, does not generate ethical thought or action towards other beings. My point here 
is not that we should dismiss or condemn Breckman’s lecture, or any reading and 
analysis for that matter, but that we must be constantly open to and committed to 
practices of disidentification and hope in order to see what these concepts offer us and all 
the places they can be found.  
 
Nepantla, Liminal Spaces & Species 
 
 
Bridges span liminal (threshold) spaces between worlds, spaces I call nepantla, a 
Nahuatl word meaning tierra entre medio. Transformations occur in this in-
between space, an unstable, unpredictable, precarious, always-in-transition space 
lacking clear boundaries. Nepantla es tierra desconocida, and living in this liminal 
zone means being in a constant state of displacement–an uncomfortable, even 
alarming feeling. Most of us dwell in nepantla so much of the time it’s become a 
sort of “home.” Though this state links us to other ideas, people, and worlds, we 
feel threatened by these new connections and the change they engender. – Gloria 
Anzaldua 
 
 
The above quote by Gloria Anzaldua appears on the welcoming page of the 
inaugural issue of Nepantla: A Journal Dedicated to Queer Poets of Color. I believe that 
this quote speaks to the possibilities of disidentification with the human and/as creature 
hope, of existing and working in boundless, murky, creaturely space, both within and 
against the human. From liminal spaces the poets of Nepantla grapple with their 
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experience of marginalization, violences, pleasures, and hopes, sometimes calling into 
question the very notion of the human, muddying the boundaries of the human/in/a/non-
human, and reaching out to Other creatures across time and space. The unlimited promise 
of disidentification and creature hope can be seen in the poetry of those persons existing 
in the margins of humanity. The realities and imaginings of these queer of color poets are 
hopeful beyond the human, reminding us that all beings’ pasts, presents, and futures are 
always already inextricably bound together and so too are our hopes. In this section, I 
will be looking at Naima Woods’ “Necropsy” and Amber Atiya’s “if my slumlord 
allowed pets” from the first issue of Nepantla and Joshua Jennifer Espinoza’s “I Dream 
of Horses Eating Cops” and Jess X. Chen’s “The Last Words of the Honey Bees” from 
the second issue.  
When I first read Nepantla in November 2014, “Necropsy” by Naima Woods was 
the poem I became most fixated with, and then reading Muñoz’s work last Spring I 
became overwhelmed with the possibilities of this piece. “Necropsy” was my stimulus 
for this thesis, as Woods queers the human and non-human, alive and decreased, real and 
imagined; through these queerings Woods imagines a possibility and hope not predicated 
on the human. An amateur version of a necropsy is performed in this poem, a necropsy 
being “the examination of an animal after death. The purpose of a necropsy is typically to 
determine the cause of death, or extent of disease.” (“Necropsy Factsheet”) While a 
“necropsy” can refer to the procedure performed on any animal species, the term 
“autopsy” is traditionally and typically reserved for humans; however, “autopsy” is being 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
 
used more frequently as it may be “more palatable to pet-owners” and “reinforces the 
concept that animal and human health are inextricably linked” (“Necropsy Factsheet”). 
Woods, prodding the splayed corpse of a chick, reimagines their self as this bird, 
vulnerable and open to the investigation and interpretation of sex. Since “necropsy” is not 
a commonly used term I want to think about the significance of its usage here; perhaps it 
could point to the bodily similarity/difference that Woods is searching for, for some 
difference in possibility for the bird that Woods has not yet found (but hopes for) in the 
beginning of the poem. Instead of allowing a human-specific term to be extended to the 
non-human, Woods insists on using a broader term for examine both their person and the 
fallen bird. I also find the discovery aspect in relation to death or disease to be telling, 
because Woods is not trying to find the bird’s cause of death, but rather its (and her own) 
cause for hope. This chick, now free from the confines of its socially determined body 
through death, inspires Woods in life. The human and non-human meld at points in this 
piece and at other points are quite distinct; Woods operates on the chick and looks to it 
for form, and at other times the boundary is blurred through a poetic melding of the two 
bodies. When the poet searches the bird’s body for sexed parts, it could be their own 
body search taking place. The wing and beak in the last line of the poem is both of the 
chick and the poet; the chick now and the poet in the future. The body “escaping its skin, 
hunting for purpose” is that of the bird, but becomes a form that Woods will presumably 
seek to emulate in the future (Woods).  
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Did this morbid exploration, this necropsy, actually take place? This necropsy, 
real or imagined, both comforts and inspires Woods. The poet articulates the necropsy as 
happening in the present, but looks towards a future of possibility, even though that 
future is actually in the way of escape through some form of death, corporeal or 
otherwise. When Woods describes the bones of the bird no longer holding the body’s 
form and the very structure of the body transforming, I hear Muñoz’s queer futurity. Must 
the “no-longer conscious” be human to be able to bring about utopian queer futurity? 
(Cruising Utopia 20) Woods’ poem throws the very state of the human body into 
question, calling upon a mode of hope that can only exist beyond the human in the way of 
disidentification. What I find particularly striking about this piece is the slippage between 
human and non-human corporalities. Throughout the poem there are moments where it is 
unclear whether the bird, the author, or both persons together are being referenced. 
Perhaps even more interesting is when Woods chooses to include or exclude the claiming 
of “I.” Of the seven stanzas in “Necropsy” five locate the author as “I;” in the third and 
final stanzas there is no such claim to subject position. “This body turns outward” begins 
the third stanza, and although the previous stanza spoke specifically of the bird’s body, 
ending in a semi-colon, it is telling that a break occurs before the body referenced 
becomes more abstract (Woods). In Woods’ exploration of the body it reads as though 
they are turning their probe inwards before the next stanza cleaves them again.  
I read “Necropsy” as a poetic form of disidentification with the human and/as 
doing creature hope. The physical forms named “human” and “animal” are continuously 
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muddied, the intimate exploration of the bird’s body troubles normative conceptions of 
material forms, and most importantly, the body of the corporeally dead bird not only 
represents hope and possibility for Woods, but hopes and possibilities arise from the 
action of performing the necropsy. Woods explicitly acknowledges the possibilities the 
chick quite literally conjures for the poet.  “The bones have reinvented themselves” “the 
body no longer weighted with work or conditioned by movements” “It’s just a body 
escaping its skin, hunting for purpose” “let death be a marker of possibility. Become 
something more than a body.” (Woods) Woods seems to be calling for a mode of death 
different from that which the bird experienced, but a death still full of freedom and hope. 
This poem, perhaps more than any other in this collective, exemplifies my argument for 
the need of a hope beyond the human and a posthumanism not indebted to the human as a 
valued category of existence. Woods’ intensely hopeful postmortem dissection of the 
chick simultaneously makes obvious the need to dismantle the human and the 
impossibility of doing so due to its endlessly regenerative violent manifestations of 
human subjectivities. I would also argue that Muñoz’s notion of “utopian impulse” or a 
performance of utopia is very much present in “Necropsy” (Cruising Utopia 26). The act 
of doing this green necropsy is not only a physical performance of an operation, but a 
performance that enables new hope and potentiality for queer lives: freer, more 
pleasurable, unconfined queer embodied experiences.  
This poem was the catalyst for my concept of disidentification with the human 
and/as doing creature hope. No one can step out of the human, but Woods imagines a 
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new way of being through an exploration of a non-human being’s body, a way of being 
that does not rely upon violent human notions of sex and gender. The chick, while dead 
in body, is not just a passive figure that Woods physically dissects or imagines on, rather, 
the chick is active in Woods imagining and becoming. The bird and Woods are both 
participants in the necropsy, and more importantly, the gesture towards new ways of 
creature being is done together. The action of performing the necropsy is doing creature 
hope, as Woods’ hopes spring forth from the stirring of the body, physically and 
affectively. In the final stanza of “Necropsy” Woods writes the following: “A dead bird 
knows how to avoid [line] self-pity [line] let injury be swaddled [line] let death be a 
marker of possibility.” The imagery of swaddling injury, of possibility coming from harm 
and what seems to be the ultimate finality, perhaps best illuminates what it means to keep 
creature-being and hope open. 
“I Dream of Horses Eating Cops” by Joshua Jennifer Espinoza primarily 
addresses police brutality against people of color. This poem both full of despair and 
hopeful, or more fittingly, hopeful from within despair. In this piece Espinoza is 
mourning state violences while fantasizing and imagining the unimaginable: a kind of 
futurity for queer persons of color. Espinoza’s poem does not strike me as an act of 
disidentification with the human and/as doing creature hope simply because they mention 
non-human animals multiple times, but because they locate reincarnation as animals as a 
site of possibility and an answer to “the same violence swallows itself and produces 
bodies [line] and names for bodies.” Espinoza opens with “i dream of horses eating cops 
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[line] i have so much hope for the future [line] or no i don’t.” This imagery of horses 
eating cops is jarring because of their historical working relationship; cops riding horses, 
getting around on them, performing duties, and committing violences turns into the 
consumption of not only human persons but figures in a position of state power. 
Dreaming of horses eating cops turns positions of exploitation and consumption on their 
head, and this imagery is especially vivid because horses are herbivores, and there is a 
terrifying and terrific strangeness to imagining human flesh, torn body parts, and blood 
dangling and dripping from bitted equine mouths, harnessed for state use by now-victims. 
“I Dream of Horses Eating Cops” brings together the human exploitation of non-human 
animals for state service, police brutality against dehumanized persons of color, and the 
state’s reliance on violences against less-than human and non-human animal others. This 
piece also invokes a hope that comes from within a space of social death, and perhaps can 
only be found through disidentification with the human: “i name my body full of hope 
despite everything [line] i name my body dead girl who hasn’t died yet.” (Espinoza) 
Espinoza uses non-human animals in two ways within and against injury, first, in a 
reversal of horse-cop power dynamics and second, in ending with a hope for a rebirth on 
what I understand to be the level of creature-being: “i hope i come back as an elephant 
[line] i hope we all come back as animals [line] and eat our fill [line] i hope everyone gets 
everything they deserve.” This is Espinoza’s wide-open wish for something new that 
does not and cannot lead back to this place of being-value stratification.  
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In “The Last Words of the Honey Bees” Jess X. Chen sets up and continually 
builds on a metaphor between the lives and work of bees and women of color as well 
harms against them. Chen’s poem highlights how much our lives and hopes rely on each 
other, both in ways that are natural and essential to life on earth (such as bees pollenating 
flowers and crops) and ways that are constructed (persons of color, especially women of 
color, have their labors exploited for the benefit of white supremacy). Dissimilarly, both 
the labor of bees and women of color is exploited and the fruit of their labors are claimed 
by white humans: “You found our hive and renamed it colony” (J. Chen). Chen notes that 
this claiming is also a denial of reliance; that when the bees die, vegetation will dies, food 
will run out, non-human animals will die, and humans will die. When women of color die 
and cannot labor for others, what will die with them? Honey bees and women of color 
differently hold the world up in their labor and being, but they also are differently being 
harmed and killed by the very beings that rely on their work. To my sight, reading this 
poem beside disidentification with the human perfectly illustrates how this work of 
disidentification is already happening, especially in the margins. Chen seems to identify 
more with the lives and fates of honey bees than the fully human humans. It may also call 
for a kind of creature hope because it urges readers to think about the connections 
between creature-beings; the lines “The poison in the pollen is poison in our colony is 
poison in your children” and “Honey? [line] Who will raise the flowers [line] when we 
are gone? Honey, [line] do you see our queen? [line]She is next. And then [line] the 
Earth, and you, [line] Honey” collapses the privileged, untouchable Human (J. Chen). 
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Considering this piece and my analysis of Dr. Randy Laist’s “Why I Identify as 
Mammal” from the first chapter together makes me think about different modalities of 
identification and disidentification, how and why disidentification flourishes in liminal 
spaces, and what it means to be in a position in which one must disidentify. That is, Laist 
is choosing to identify as something other-than-human in addition to the category of 
human that he will always be afforded while marginalized humans are barred from the 
human and may disidentify as a means of coping, survival, and socio-political 
transformation. Chen’s “The Last Words of the Honey Bees” does not require human 
affinity or make empty attempts at empathy, but instead recognizes the value of beings 
such as honey bees and women of color and how both are differently dying from 
violences perpetuated by those who rely on their labors.  
Amber Atiya’s “if my slumlord allowed pets,” the final poem I would like to 
consider from Nepantla, explicitly discusses the living conditions and experiences of 
non-human animals on the streets along with the conditions Atiya faces as a queer person 
of color living in an impoverished urban area. “These streets weren’t paved for 
tenderness” is a stanza on its own, describing the state of the circumstances for all beings 
in this space and time (Atiya). Atiya begins this piece by explicitly relaying their wish to 
adopt all the non-human animals experiencing homelessness, hunger, and violence, if 
only their living situation could accommodate such a wish. This hope that the poet 
expresses is both for themselves and other creatures, human and non-human, to live 
together in support. Perhaps more than any other poem in this journal it calls for a bond 
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between human and non-human animal Others, as both live in precarious states of being, 
liminal spaces where the future is so unclear and unpredictable. The “if” in the title of 
this piece means that Atiya is imagining another time in this place, an alternate reality or 
even a future, in which all those who live in Nepantla could do away with certain spatial 
boundaries marked by species and live better, more livable lives.  
 I argue that like the poems above, “if my slumlord allowed pets” is performative, 
“doing in futurity” for queer persons of color and for non-human animals in its call for a 
mode of collective belonging that is not limited to humanity (Cruising Utopia 26). The 
subjects in this piece are not always completely distinct; the following stanza in particular 
asks the reader to consider whether the poet is only writing about the non-human animals 
scraping by: “trimmed with scabs [line] toppling trash [line] for fries and wing tips.” 
(Atiya) The boundaries of the human and animal are convoluted not only by condition 
but also by the potential for comfort and shielding from the harsh realities of the past and 
present. Atiya figuratively reaches out for those non-human animals suffering in the 
streets, even though they themselves also live in liminal space, and in doing so works to 
break down the boundaries of species and value. They imagine an unlocatable point in 
time and space that would allow for their communal existence and in doing so actively 
works for this future. This poem implicitly attends to sex, gender, race, class, and species 
in tension with one another, which I believe opens us to a posthumanism not bound by its 
own object of study. The tone of this piece is overflowing with the desire to care for 
Other(ed) creatures, sadness and disgust at the conditions that all of the current 
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inhabitants must grapple with (but not disgust of beings), and the hope that in some other 
time affection and closeness could occur between human and non-human inhabitants 
alike. The overt desire in this piece is for a pleasure that comes with safety and security 
across the borders that reproduce species difference. Of course, relying on human affinity 
for non-human animals is highly problematic, as I have previously discussed, but it 
would be equally problematic to dismiss or invalidate tangled desire to care for others 
and the desire for survival in liminal spaces. 
 
(Creature) Hope in Places of Hopelessness 
 In Mid-October 2015 I took a trip to Asheville, North Carolina; it was the 
weekend before my thesis proposal defense and I needed to get my mind off of my 
project for a bit. Moving through the crowded streets, I came across an outdoor wall 
where passersby were encouraged to write their hopes for their lives and to read of 
others’ hopes. One could read on this wall scribblings about future travels, finding love, 
and dream jobs. Leaning against a fence beside this wall sat a homeless woman and a 
dog. As we passed the pair, I heard a woman behind us loudly remark to her partner 
“Why would you even have a pet on the streets? You can’t even take care of yourself.” 
Although this trip was meant to take my mind off my thesis, it sparked a curiosity about 
what creature hope means in places of hopelessness. Why was this woman so affronted 
by the brief sight of an interspecies intimacy on the streets? What could this reaction 
reveal about the anxieties surrounding the human? I began thinking not only about 
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policing intimacies and pleasures in liminal spaces, but also how those beings in the 
margins live intimately, both pleasurably and painfully, with other creature-beings. 
Thinking through these questions in relation to persons experiencing homelessness with 
non-human animal companions affords one the chance to consider expanded notions of 
companionship, community, and survival. What does it mean to hope in and from liminal 
spaces in which all aspects of being and living are supposed to be defined by hardship, 
loneliness, and dispossession? What does it mean to survive and even thrive with another 
being in these spaces, resisting scripts of human/non-human animal relations and often 
facing extreme animosity from others? The policing of persons experiencing 
homelessness living with non-human animal companions seems an anxious, angry 
response to interspecies intimacies, disclosing the violence of the human towards human, 
less-than-human, and non-human beings and the intimate, hopeful possibilities of living 
with Others in the margins of the human and human societies. Without romanticizing 
homelessness or erasing the dangers and precarities of being in that position, we need to 
consider what the loud rejection of relationships between homeless human and non-
human beings says about how proper humans treat both their own kind as well as non-
human animals.  
 I will examine these questions through an exploration of Leslie Irvine’s My Dog 
Always Eats First: Homeless People & Their Animals; this text is not without its issues 
but it tells the stories of persons experiencing homeless with non-human animal 
companions, and,  unfortunately, this is not a topic that has been written about 
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extensively. It is important to consider that this is a sociological study, but I am reading 
and interacting with it from the concepts of disidentification with the human and/as doing 
creature hope. That is, I will be engaging more with the stories told than with the 
sociological study itself. The stories, for me, play with human; some stories I read as 
persons disidentifying with the human, refusing to talk about their companions in terms 
of ownership. These stories demand that we think about what the condemnation of 
human/non-human relationships on the streets may mean for the human. These stories 
arise from spaces of social death, where human ideas of life value and being value are 
troubled. Irvine describes her study as exploring “what it means to care for and be in a 
relationship with an animal, and the role of the animal in one’s sense of self.” (3) 
Specifically, she is interested in what parts “pets” play in homeless persons’ identities 
and narratives, in how these persons narrate their relationships with non-human animals 
in order to navigate life on the streets. I want to explore even deeper, to what these 
relationships and reactions to these relationships tell us about the human. Read with 
disidentification and creature hope, these stories highlight not only a hope for humans 
beings abandoned and disregarded as humans by others of their normative species kind, 
but also hope for a way to be and live that is not measured by typical standards of human 
success and happiness. My theoretical framework for this exploration is greatly informed 
by the work of Lisa Cacho in Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the 
Criminalization of the Unprotected. In this text Cacho “examines how human value is 
made intelligible through racialized, sexualized, spatialized, and state-sanctioned 
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violences” and the ways in which social death makes “certain vulnerable and 
impoverished populations … deserving of discipline and punishment but not worthy of 
protection” (4, 5). Cacho is talking about populations with different relationships to the 
U.S. legal system, particularly persons of color who exist in permanent states of 
rightlessness and ineligibility for personhood due to the makeup of their bodies rather 
than their behavior (6). However, her work makes me think about how not only certain 
bodies are needed for criminalization but also certain bodily relations to public and 
private spaces. Persons experiencing homelessness are vulnerable in that they are Others 
dead to others, and their very presence in the world is already one of trespassing. That is, 
their socio-spatial position defines them as failures in the ways of human property 
ownership and labor contributions as well as largely unworthy of love, companionship, 
and hope. Cacho argues that “Value is ascribed through explicitly or implicitly 
disavowing relationships to the already devalued and disciplined categories of deviance 
and nonnormativity” and that “we are all recruited often unwittingly and/or unwilling to 
devalue lives, life choices, and lifestyles because valuing them would destabilize our own 
precarious claims to and uneasy desire for social value” (18, 27). If we read this argument 
regarding social death, being-value, and disposability beside interspecies intimacies on 
the streets, then what does our admonishment of persons experiencing homelessness with 
companion animals tell us about the instability of the human and the disjointed ideas we 
hold about values of human lives, non-human lives, and certain relationships between 
these beings? When one distances themselves from persons experiencing homelessness 
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and decries their relationships to other beings, they reify the human, the values of the 
human, and their standing in relationship to the human.  
 In the opening of My Dog Always Eats First Irvine recounts an experience many 
years earlier in which she and other person encountered a homeless man and his dog: 
“We took turns telling him how his dog deserved a better life. He might have chosen 
homelessness, we said, but his dog had not.” (2) They tried to call Animal Control but 
were brushed off as they were not able to say that the dog was suffering in any way. 
Irvine not only assumed that the dog would be better off without their human companion 
but that they would be better off in a human-designed institution for non-human animals, 
one which regularly devalues, abuses, and kills non-human animals. The homeless 
persons telling their stories in this study discuss frequent confrontations over their non-
human animal companions, and when Irvine approached these persons she found that 
they were eager to prove that their relationship was one of care: “Accustomed to 
criticism, they were quick to assure me of the health and safety of their animal. They 
showed me bags of food and jugs of water.” (23) Irvine argues that these confrontations 
are “an attack on the homeless person’s character that deems him or her unable to care for 
the animal and therefore underserving of animal companionship.” (46) I argue that such 
confrontations are about more than just concern for non-human animal well-being, 
operating on the assumption that persons experiencing homelessness are unworthy of any 
kind of intimacy regardless of the care they may or may not be able to provide. I believe 
that the confrontation functions as an act of interspecies intimacy policing, revealing 
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anxieties about human and non-human beings existing in spaces of social death, on the 
margins, apart from normative ideas of human institutional control.  
Ideas about property, ownership, success, and status come together in many of 
these stories. In Pali’s case, for example, she had to scrape together money and fake an 
address in order to adopt Leadbelly, a coonhound, who was scheduled to be euthanized 
(Irvine 133). That Pali had to call upon property ownership in order to save a being 
whose relationship to humans is commonly defined by ownership reveals how 
human/non-human animal relationships in the margins threaten the human. The 
juxtaposition of poverty and “pet ownership” is jarring to many people (46). A common 
reaction to this sight is “‘they shouldn’t have a pet if they don’t have a home,’” as home 
property ownership is seen as a prerequisite for proper ownership of a non-human animal 
(48). If the rage around this issue was about the care of non-human animals, then people 
would be inclined to rescue non-human animals from shelters; after all, around 2.7 
million dogs and cats, common companion animals in the United States, are killed every 
year just for existing in spaces outside of human control (“Pet Statistics”). However, their 
offers to buy non-human animal companions off homeless persons makes clear that the 
rage is primarily about an uncontrollable intimacy that breaks down normative human 
values and relationships to Others. Why are we more concerned about homeless non-
human animals existing in caring relationships with homeless humans than with the 
staggering number of non-human animals killed every year simply for being homeless? 
In my reading of these stories, I have often found that non-human animals are not usually 
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viewed as commodities in spaces of social death. In the following paragraphs, I will 
explore the ways in which persons experiencing homelessness with non-human animal 
companions disidentify with the human and do creature hope by recasting their 
relationships with non-human beings in distinctly posthumanist terms.  
Irvine argues that “Most homeless pet owners responded to affronts by redefining 
pet ownership to incorporate what they do in the course of caring for their animals.” (53) 
I would argue that these people not only redefine pet ownership, but work within and 
against human/non-human relationships and intimacies as well as notions of the human, 
conceptually and institutionally speaking. This is an action, this is lived, this is the doing, 
the practice of creature hope. This is not just a simple, reducible, clear, concise 
(re)definition, but a way of living and being with other beings that continually points to 
the problems with normative human relationships to human, less-than-human, and non-
human beings. Irvine identifies three main avenues for this “redefinition” (53-54). First, 
homeless persons articulate that their companion animals eat first, eat well, and/or eat 
with sacrifice on the part of their human companion. Second, they emphasize constant 
companionship and care, recounting that these beings are rarely or never apart from one 
another. Many of these person see leaving a non-human animal companion alone, in a 
house, yard, and/or cage as tantamount to abuse. One person interviewed argued that 
leaving a non-human animal objectifies it, de-animating into a “‘thing,’” twice stating 
“‘It’s their pet,’” thus gesturing to the concept of pet ownership as a violence in and of 
itself (Irvine 55). Third, homeless persons frequently spoke of non-human animal 
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freedom, the ability to “‘run and romp,’” as one homeless man put it. In these stories, 
homelessness is sometimes spoken of as a better situation for non-human animals, as 
houses and leashes are viewed as significant unfreedoms and a violence against non-
human natures and habitats (56). In this way, there is great meaning in one man’s simple 
statement about his dog: “‘He never has to be on a leash except when we come down 
here.’” (2) Clearly, persons experiencing homelessness ascribe different meanings to their 
non-human relationships than is typical of human “pet ownership;” meanings that often 
push against the human identity of owner and notions of non-human beings as property.  
Given the frequent rejection of proper human and non-human relationship scripts 
by homeless persons, perhaps there lies the potential for greater human/non-human 
intimacies in the margins. Homeless persons report a greater attachment to non-human 
animal companions than other populations (Irvine 5, 9-10). In Irvine’s study “A majority 
of those interviewed identified their pets as ‘their only relationships with other living 
beings’ (10). The stories told by homeless persons cast non-human animals as best 
friends, family, children, and as both friend and family in one. As Irvine notes, these 
descriptions of non-human animal companions as friends and/or family may seem typical 
and unimportant but they actually speak to the specific precarity and liminality of 
homelessness (72). These persons narrated their lives around their non-human animals, 
challenging notions of kinship, as in family, and of kin and kind in a way that throws the 
delineation of distinct and differently valued species, especially the human against the 
non-human, into question. Besides discussing their fellow creature-beings in terms of 
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family and friend, homeless persons describe them with existential meaning, as is evident 
in one woman’s story: “‘Maggie reminds us of what life can be like … She gives me that 
little piece of ‘I’m still here.’’” (75) Non-human animals sometimes were spoken of as 
being “everything” and perhaps most affectively, as a “home” (85-87). Many spoke of 
their non-human animals as the only thing keeping them from committing suicide, as 
lifesavers and life changers keeping them being in the world (118, 143). One woman, 
Denise, referred to her cat, Ivy, as her “‘suicide barrier’” (147). Many mentioned their 
disappointment in humans in relation to their non-human companions, but maybe this is 
also a disappointment in the human, and looking to other-than-human beings and worlds 
is an act of necessary, disidentificatory resistance. In some of the stories, people spoke 
not only of survival with non-human beings but of healing them. Candy, a trans woman 
living in a bus in an industrial yard with her partner and many cats, all of which have 
their own names and stories, treats the injuries and illnesses of cats she finds or who find 
her (91). Candy joyfully claimed that “‘There’s no limit on how many I could love,” and 
told Irvine that she did not want her living situation to change because there was no other 
place she could live with “‘all these cats.’” (92) 
Vulnerable in their homelessness, many people discussed their non-human 
animals not only in terms of companionship or company, but as a comfort, commitment, 
and constant presence (Irvine 41). Human/non-human intimacies in the margins offer 
belonging and hope in a place of deep uncertainty and instability. One homeless man, 
James, pointed out they live largely unnoticed, unacknowledged, and uncared for by 
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“‘our kind.’” (100) In disparate ways, human and non-human beings living on the streets 
are seen as not mattering, not mattering not only in the sense of not being significant but 
also in not being mattered, as in not existing to others. Forging intimate relationships with 
non-human animals means living with, caring for, being cared for, and mattering to and 
with another being. Irvine writes that in homeless persons’ stories of “possibility and 
promise … the animal represents hope.” (80) I think this is a bit flattened for narrative 
consumption; companion animals do not just represent hope for persons living in the 
margins but their relationships are also hope in action. Living together and surviving 
together, that is not merely a representation of hope, is it doing creature hope by and for 
human and non-human beings that have been differently violated, expected to suffer, to 
be in constant states of loss and pain, and to die social and corporeal deaths alone.  
 Irvine writes that “Defining oneself in coexistence with another species represents 
a form of borderland thinking. A ‘borderland’ is a shared space, often a site of 
negotiation and struggle over who holds power within it.” (104) Borderland, nepantla, 
liminal space, the margins—these terms all lead me to disidentification with the human. 
What if we read these stories beside the concepts of disidentification and creature hope? 
Instead of thinking about being and doing in relation to human ideas of morality and 
worth in the way Irvine does, of the relationship as a means to achieve human ideals, 
what if we thought about how being and hoping against species boundaries looks 
different from a place of minoritarian subjectivity? I do not want to force these stories to 
fit human ideas of being and being together, but rather to see them apart from these 
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notions, to what they may disclose about how fully human humans are supposed to treat 
and relate to human and non-human Others. I cannot claim that these stories completely 
get away from the human; for example, some rely on the “perceived unconditional love” 
of non-humans and a “speaking for” companion animals (Irvine 81, 116). However, they 
do actively work against human scripts of coexisting with other beings, often refusing 
any stratification of existence, nearing creature-being.  
 
Creature Hope(s) in Dissonance, a Non-Conclusion  
Bridging my work in this chapter on interspecies intimacies, hopes, and anxieties 
and the fourth and final chapter about interspecies intimate desires and actions and the 
theoretical and visual splintering that occurs around bestiality is this brief piece that I am 
calling “creature hope(s) in dissonance.” I want to discuss my own experiences in mental 
health institutions and the conditions of existing in and exiting that space in relation to 
how creature hope(s) are not impervious to contradiction and harm, especially given that 
through my academic research I have come to consider mental health institutions largely 
to be a containment for social ills and as captive spaces onto which cultural sickness and 
failure are projected. I also take issue with these institutions because they rely on the 
subjugation of less-than-human and non-human animal Others through certain 
anthropocentric, androcentric, racialized assumptions about rationality, logic, 
intelligence, and a healthy mind. As is mentioned in the beginning of the first chapter, 
writing this thesis has been a very raw process; it is my attempt to write within wounds, 
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both of others and of my own. Given the way I have set up this project, I cannot omit my 
institutional experiences of captivity, violation, despair, and hope and the ways in which 
my hopes for escaping a form of captivity were predicated on non-human experiences of 
exploitation and violence. Discussing these experiences and my hesitancy and need to 
include them my thesis chair rhetorically asked “How do you survive this?” In other 
words, how does one grapple with the forced complicity in other beings’ violences that 
run alongside your own harms and pains? I do not have an easy or orderly answer for 
this, and that is a crucial aspect of disidentification with the human and/as doing creature 
hope: one can only think, act, and hope with what is available to them in any particular 
place and time. In that sense, what matters is not finding and laying out a “right” 
posthumanist ethics, but contending with the impossibility of an ethical answer to 
unethical situations with everything one has at their disposal.  
When I was sixteen I was institutionalized twice, first in an in-state psychiatric 
hospital and later in an eating disorder rehabilitation hospital halfway across the country. 
At this point in my life I was already very much invested in eradicating non-human 
animal suffering and had been a vegetarian for some time. In these facilities, 
vegetarianism and veganism are often pathologized and considered disordered forms of 
eating, even when they are not a part of the main issue. What does it mean that refusing 
to participate in this form of violence is tantamount to mental illness? In the psychiatric 
hospital I had the option to consume animal products or to not eat at all. Oddly enough, at 
first the doctors did not notice that I was not eating, and later did not seem too concerned 
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with whether or not I was eating but did tell me that it was not normal, that perhaps it was 
part of the reason for my suicidal ideation rather than my ever-changing SRI cocktail. I 
remember resigning myself to the non-choices offered and eventually eating a tuna melt 
sandwich every day. I remember the savory sadness of that consumption. Was I sick for 
not wanting to eat it? Immoral for doing it anyway? In the eating disorder rehabilitation 
center, I was told that my vegetarianism was quite possibly an eating disorder in and of 
itself. In this hospital, there were levels of institutional “freedom” based on behavior, 
which could leading to outings and eventually home. Did I want to leave the grounds? 
Did I want to go home? These questions were clearly tied to another: Was I going to eat 
what they provided? That is, animal products— foods that were physically and mentally 
healthy and right for a human to eat. My captivities were written over by normative ideas 
of what constitutes a mentally healthy human relationship with non-human animals. What 
does it mean to have to be complicit in a system of non-human animal captivity and 
violence in order to fulfill the conditions of your treatment and secure your own release 
from an institution which has dissimilarly held you captive and violated and exploited 
you? 
I have decided to tack on “A Non-Conclusion” to the title of this section because 
this is not only a short conclusion to the penultimate chapter, but a broader motion to the 
work I will do the fourth and final chapter. Chapter Four is about interspecies sexual 
intimacies, normatively understood through the concept of bestiality, which we cannot 
talk about without already violent conceptual footholds such as consent, agency, and 
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protection. I will explore how creature hope(s) themselves can be violent and destructive 
to other creatures as creature hope even when used it its singular form is always plural 
and these hopes do not always jive with one another. The desire to fuck a horse or a pig, 
the desire to escape my institutional captivity and misery, these desires do not seem so 
different to me as they both may require violations of other creature-beings. Desires for 
and/or acts of bestiality continue probing how the human undergirds what our ideas of 
sane interspecies relationships look like as well as the ultimate unknowability of desires 
occurring both intra- and interspecies.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
INTERSPECIES SEXUAL INTIMACIES, BLINDLY 
 
 
Bestiality, Proper   
 For me, practicing creature hope in terms of writing this thesis means attending to 
the aspects of creature hope that may be contradictory, irreconcilable, violent, or that 
resist any sort of analysis at all—this is the incoherency of beings, hopes, and ethics that I 
have been asking after across all the chapters in this project. In the closing chapter to this 
thesis I am not so much specifically speaking to the concepts of disidentification with the 
human and/as doing creature hope, but gesturing more broadly to them by unpacking 
interspecies sexual intimacies, desires, and acts, understood most commonly through 
terms such as bestiality and/or zoophilia. “Bestiality” may refer only to some form of 
sexual penetration between humans/non-humans or to a number of sexual human/non-
human sexual contacts including masturbating on a non-human animal or masturbating 
that non-human animal, oral, anal, or genital contact, watching sexual contact between 
human and non-humans, harming or killing for sexual pleasure, or consuming 
pornographic materials (Beetz 57). The term “zoophilia” is typically used to describe “an 
exclusive or predominant desire for sexual contact with animals” and it may be used on 
its own or in addition to bestiality (Beetz 56) “Zoos” feel sexual attraction to non-human 
animals and possibly romantic love as well (Miletski 18). The aim of this chapter is not to
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condemn or sanction bestiality and/or zoophilia, but to discuss how interspecies sexual 
intimacies, desires, and longings are dealt with in texts that question and complicate these 
intimacies’ relationships to bestiality and/or zoophilia, focusing on two main objects: the 
French novel A Dog’s Head (Une Tête de Chien) and the 2007 American documentary 
Zoo. I will also briefly analyze the 1974 Belgian arthouse film Wedding Trough (Vase de 
noces) to highlight my watching of Zoo. My analysis of these texts includes the following 
themes: first, the excesses and absences of interspecies desire and/or/as bestiality—
intimate desires and actions that resist full telling and/or viewership either through a 
saturated or empty presence; second, the limitations of various intertwined discourses 
surrounding bestiality/zoophilia considering violent footholds such as consent, agency, 
and protection, and what these concepts do for the human subject; and third, the rifts and 
ruptures of being, limitations of ever knowing or acting completely with another creature-
being, and creature desires that cannot be fully known or understood, as they may be 
aligned, at odds, or somewhere in between. To conclude this chapter and wrap-up my 
project for the time being, I will consider the impossibility of thinking beyond the human, 
even within disidentifications and creature hopes, elaborating on the limitations of these 
concepts given the stickiness of the human. I feel this is an appropriate way to close both 
the chapter and my thesis as a whole, as I will address how these concepts struggle to 
account for hopes that are in themselves violent. 
 For me, what the various objects I will explore in this chapter show is that 
creature beings, hopes, and desires cannot ever fully be known or understood. 
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Interspecies sexual intimacies, whether contemplated through the discourses about these 
intimacies or texts that probe them from the inside, reveal that certain human and non-
human hopes, desires, pleasures, and pains are not always knowable or communicable to 
others. How can a human ever know that a non-human wants to engage in sexual 
intercourse? How can a human not attracted to beings of other species ever know why or 
how another human can feel that way? There are limits to knowing, speaking of, and 
viewing these intimacies and the beings engaged in them. There are gaping faults 
between creature-beings even when their bodies are intertwined or their minds are 
supposedly linked by way of species being. Derrida’s abyssal limit of the human 
envelops even these deep gorges, as the desires that drive acts of interspecies sex are both 
embedded in the human and may threaten its partial unraveling. Put another way, 
interspecies sexual desires and acts may uphold the human by screwing the non-human or 
somewhat work against it by screwing species lines, but it is all still the about the human. 
 In The Beast & the Sovereign, Volume I Derrida argues that “bestiality, 
characterized either as perversion or sexual deviancy, zoophilia that pushes people to 
make love with beasts or to make love to beasts, or as cruelty - this bestiality, this double 
bestiality (zoophilic or cruel) would also be proper to man.” (69) He goes on to say that, 
the work of Lacan and Deleuze show that “bestiality and (transcendental) betise … are 
reserved for mankind … they are proper of mankind … beasts are incapable of them … 
one cannot qualify as “bestial” or bete (bete in the sense of betise) beasts that have no 
relation to the law, that they cannot be cruel and responsible.” (The Beast 178) What this 
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pairing of quotes tells us is that the “bestial” in bestiality refers not to a non-human that is 
sexually desired and acted upon by/acts with a human, but to a human behaving as an 
animal either in sexual perversion or inhuman cruelty (the two forks of bestiality that 
Derrida speaks to). Therefore, bestiality is not about non-human desire, pleasure, or pain 
in relation to human/non-human sexual intimacies but the seepage of the human’s base 
“animality” into human desires and actions towards a non-humans. In this understanding 
of interspecies sex as besitality, non-human animals cannot act with a human in sexual 
intimacy and are only objects of desire for a human-beast, they themselves cannot act on 
their desires or consent to those of humans. What this discloses is that consent is more 
about the subject can give consent than consent itself. Bestiality is proper to man, the 
proper subject. Yet, accounts of human/non-human sexual acts in which humans claim to 
know something about non-humans desires and wants (such as in Zoo) are also bound by 
both human ways of knowing and human desires, which also seem to shore up the proper 
subject, albeit in different manner.  
What I am getting at is that any answer to the implicit questions of human/non-
human sexual desires and intimacies is bound by the human and therefore we cannot 
pretend to know anything about non-human desires. Non-human desires, and human/non-
human sexual intimacies for that matter, cannot be adequately accounted for, so perhaps 
it is better to address them in all their unaccountability. These intimacies defy explanation 
and justification whether they may be for allowing or disallowing them, so I am more 
interested in exploring the limits and traps of knowing, understanding, seeing, or 
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speaking of these intimacies than in making any sort of argument for or against them. I 
find an analysis (however broken) of these limitations in terms of bestiality and/or 
zoophilia important for the concepts of disidentification with the human and/as doing 
creature hope because they tap into the unknowability of desires and the beings that have 
them and the futility of ever “sufficiently” viewing, discussing, or theorizing them, never 
mind creating a coherent, deployable ethics around them. 
 
“Did you think of a dog while you were pregnant?” 
Jean Dutourd’s A Dog’s Head, originally published as Une Tête de Chien, relies 
on a fantastical element much in the vein of The Metamorphosis, dealing with a man, 
Edmond, born with a human male body and the head of a spaniel. Just as The 
Metamorphosis points to problems with the human (namely, trying to find similarities 
to/differences from the human to guide relations with non-human beings) so too does A 
Dog’s Head, and although these problems could certainly be addressed more generally 
for the purposes of this chapter I am most interested in how this novel invokes and 
retreats from bestiality, often simultaneously. I will be addressing this double movement 
through two key themes: first, the dual absence/excess of bestiality always in tension in 
this piece, as bestiality is omnipresent but is often denied or eclipsed, and second, how 
creature beings and desires cannot be completely known or understood, as the ubiquitous 
questions regarding Edmond’s sexual desires may leave the reader teetering and 
frustrated. In the forward to the 1998 English translation Wendy Doniger calls Edmond 
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“a crossbreed, a half-caste creature” (Doniger viii). What a subject steeped in species 
hybridity means for bestiality is that it is inescapable. Whether Edmond sexually desires, 
is desired by, and/or engages in sexual relations with human or non-human animals the 
relationship can be viewed and understood in terms of bestiality. In other words, there is 
no sexual relationship for Edmond that would not be overwritten by bestiality. This calls 
into question not only proper human/non-human relations and the desires of non-humans 
towards humans, but how bestiality and zoophilia are predicated on distinctly human and 
non-human beings. What this means outside of fantastic fiction is that bestiality and 
zoophilia may be particularly violent speciesist concepts, even if certain human/non-
human sexual desires and acts themselves are deeply rooted in speciesism. Doinger 
writes that A Dog’s Head “toys throughout with the idea of bestiality.” (x) For me 
bestiality is a much larger part of the novel, as Edmond’s very existence brings to mind 
(and holds it there) the possibility of the impossible springing from interspecies sexual 
relations. Although Dutourd does more than hint that human/non-human intercourse was 
not a part of Edmond’s creation the notion of bestiality is lurking, ever-present just by 
way of Edmond’s character even if the question of his sexual exploits were not at issue in 
the novel. Doinger clearly writes that this novel is partly about the marginalization of 
queer persons, claiming that “The dog’s natural wish to mate with dogs, when his parents 
and their world would want him to marry a nice girl, is not very hard to decipher in this 
way” and that bestiality must mean something else for “human parable” (xii). I want to 
work apart from this automatic alignment of bestiality and human queerness, to an 
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analysis beyond analogy, metaphor, or a search for something fully human to learn; 
instead, I want to ask after the tensions and rifts at play. 
 I am particularly interested in the absence/excesses of bestiality in the way of 
interspecies sexual acts and desires. Bestiality is always present in this piece whether it is 
being discussed at the moment or not; there is an absent presence of bestiality just by way 
of the question of Edmond’s very existence. There also lies an excess in the stacked 
bestialities of dogs sexually desiring Edmond, while he may or may not sexually desire 
them, while he desires human women, who often throw themselves at him precisely 
because they believe he desires and has sexual intercourse with dogs. This absent yet 
excessive question of bestiality is introduced on the very first page of A Dog’s Head, 
which opens with Mme Du Chaillu being told that she had “just given birth to a child 
with a dog’s head” after “twenty years of sterility” (Dutourd 1). Given the circumstances 
of both former sterility and the newborn baby’s species hybridity, her husband is briefly 
distrustful of his wife’s fidelity, both of the marriage and of the human species, but for 
readers this possibility is not absolutely foreclosed. M. Du Chaillu goes on to ask his wife 
“‘Did you think of a dog while you were pregnant?’” to which she answers “‘Never! Not 
once!’” he presses her further “And … before?” to which she repeats “‘Before?’” in 
definite surprise but not definite answer (2). So while Dutourd suggests that Mme Du 
Chaillu never engaged in sexual relations with a spaniel, the lack of her answer to her 
husband’s questions leaves the reader’s question unanswered as well. This unanswered 
question signals the prospect of bestiality that is always open throughout the book; in 
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fact, it is nodded to at various points, such as when Edmond jokes with his future wife 
that “‘My mother obviously made love with a dog. That’s why I have this head.’” (123) 
Furthermore, M. Du Chaillu’s pressing question of whether his wife thought of a dog 
while pregnant or while conceiving Edmond highlights an extended idea of what may be 
considered bestiality, overloading possible personal and perhaps secret interspecies 
desires with acts and accusations of bestiality.  
 As Edmond grows up, his father does not allow him near dogs, even chasing them 
away whenever they come near. Once, when Edmond pets a poodle on the street, his 
father whips and berates him, instilling a deep sense of intense shame around dogs 
(Dutourd 5). Of the incident M. Du Chaillu says to his wife “‘That child distresses me. 
He is unquestionably attracted by dogs, and we must avoid that at all costs.’” (6) 
Edmond’s mother does not seem so concerned but his father, perhaps still anxious about 
Edmond’s species paternity or perhaps his wife’s desires but unquestionably anxious 
about Edmond’s sexual inclinations, says that for Edmond to be with dogs (sexually or 
non-sexually) is “Catastrophic! Besides, there’s the question of morality. Understand me, 
Henriette. That boy has a canine predestination. We must do everything to fight it. As far 
as I’m concerned, I shall be inflexible on that point.’” (6) Together they decide not to 
even speak of dogs and when they must be addressed, to make them seem monstrous. 
Edmond’s parents even go as far as to consider letting a dog attack Edmond “so as to 
imprint their hatred in his flesh” and he soon fears, hates, and is disgusted by dogs (7). I 
read this reaction to young Edmond’s affection towards and non-sexual touching of dogs 
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as a gaping excess of bestiality, that is, Edmond himself brings to mind the question of 
bestiality which overlays his every relationship with a dog (however brief) but Edmond is 
oblivious to the very existence of what might be called bestiality. At this point Edmond is 
very naïve of his father’s worries, a point which Dutourd makes very clear, posing a 
layered functioning of bestiality in this piece that brings together the constant doubt of his 
species origin, the overreaction to any intimacy with dogs, and the lacking knowledge of 
any such interspecies sexual intimacy.  
At fourteen, a few years after he overcomes his fear of dogs, Edmond suggests 
that the family get a dog as a pet, which his father promptly and adamantly refuses. When 
Edmond inquires as to the reason his father replies that he knows why, but Edmond truly 
does not understand what his father is implying. When Edmond persists his father says he 
will not abide by Edmond’s “‘unnatural proclivities,’” telling him to “‘try to develop the 
tastes of [Edmond’s] age’” to be “‘normal’” and “‘healthy’” (Dutourd 23). Edmond is 
then suddenly “overcome by a Christian’s recoil before the sins of the flesh.” (23) The 
double bestiality of M. Du Chaillu’s assumption of Edmond’s sexual tastes blurring into 
the question of his wife’s tastes is signed only by Edmond’s doggy head, and it is around 
these empty bestialities that Edmond’s naiveté meets his sudden and overwhelming sense 
of shame. There is also present in this scene the excesses of assumption and mortification 
closing around the dearth of non-knowledge, which positions bestiality as a continuous 
and inescapable aspect of Edmond’s life. For Edmond there is no desire around non-
human beings, even non-sexual desire, that is free of bestiality. It is interesting that 
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Edmond’s potential desire to be with dogs is seen as immoral, always invoking bestiality, 
but a human woman’s potential desire for Edmond is proper and permissible, though it 
still is marked by the deviance of bestiality. Edward’s father is anxious at the thought of 
him being with a dog in any capacity, but Edmond seems to sexually prefer human 
women; this preference is clear, though it does not preclude his possible desire to 
sexually be with dogs as well. Later, others will encourage him to marry a human 
woman, which fantastically pleads for consideration of what it means that a half-human 
belongs to humanity, at least in part. In other words, the bestiality of a human-dog hybrid 
with a human is somehow a lesser bestiality than the bestiality of a human-dog hybrid 
with a dog. Considering Derrida’s work in The Beast & the Sovereign, Volume I, 
Edmond, at least in part, is human and therefore accountable for his desires and actions 
with regard to non-human beings. Moreover, for Edmond to act upon sexual desires for 
the non-human sets up a dog-human acting as a human acting as a beast, creating a 
doubly-fissured human.  
At the age of fifteen, Edmond braggingly lies about his sexual exploits with 
human women, which his classmates easily believe even though in truth he has never had 
a sexual experience with any other being. During one story, a lover’s greyhound 
scratches and whines at the door while Edmond and a woman are having sex. Edmond 
says “‘She got pretty well worked up … that one,” presumably referring to the human 
woman (Dutourd 26). He elaborates that afterwards he kicks her dog. There are many 
absences/excesses of bestiality in this story, first, Edmond’s own inexperience coupled 
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with the strikingly bizarre sexual encounter he describes, secondly, the classmates’ 
gullibility with regard to the story it itself, thirdly, the imagined woman’s arousal at 
having sex with a hybrid human-dog and her own dog’s frenzied noises, and finally, 
Edmond’s actions in the story—violently engaging with his lover’s canine to punctuate 
his sexual encounter. Later, after earning higher degrees, Edmond enlists in the military 
where his is propositioned by quartermaster-sergeant. The sergeant comes on to Edmond 
with the following “I’ve always had a weakness for doggies. Not to the point of going 
with them exactly, like in the Bat d’ Af. But with you it’s different … you remind me of a 
drummer boy I knew, and your little mug’s like Bonzo’s—it gives me funny ideas’” and 
Edmond rejects the advance “with horror”  (35). A crucial movement is happening here, 
where homosexual and bestial sexual desires are joined and overburdened with one 
another in both the sergeant’s advance and Edmond’s rejection, echoing Doinger’s 
association of queerness with bestiality and bestiality with queerness. Upon uttering his 
desires, the sergeant is immediately fearful of his suggestion of sodomy combined with 
bestiality, a bestiality that is somehow more pronounced when Edmond could sexually be 
with a human man than with a human woman. Edmond despairs at the “excesses” in this 
sexual suggestion, at the excesses of desire and the uniqueness of such excesses as there 
is no other beings like him (36). After all, his superior finds in him qualities that 
viscerally summon two previously desired beings. The sergeant also calls upon the 
conditions which supposedly facilitate interspecies sexual relations in the “Bat d’ Af,” 
elaborated on in the footnotes as “The Bataillon d’Afrique, a disciplinary corps in which 
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conditions are extremely hard and vices are extremely developed.” (35) This invocation 
links measures the sergeant’s actions and desires against actions in another unit, 
assuming that the conditions in the corps necessitate bestiality and fracturing desires for 
interspecies sexual relations and presumed acts of interspecies sex. What these absences, 
excesses, and fractures mean for bestiality is that it is a concept caught in a double 
movement towards and away from it, resisting both definition and certainty.  
 I am also struck by the way in which A Dog’s Head makes a motion towards the 
inability to ever fully know or understand a creature-being or the desires that they may or 
may not have. Most notably, the reader can never be quite sure of all of Edmond’s sexual 
desires in terms of the species of potential partners, though it is spoken of a few times 
throughout the novel. At certain times his sexual desire for canines is completely closed, 
both from Edmond’s perspective and from Dutourd’s perspective as narrator, and at other 
times it is left open, posing the omnipresent question “Does he or doesn’t he?” Following 
this question are others, such as if Edmond even realizes the full range of his own desires, 
if it matters either way, why must we know, and can it be known? Much like Gregor in 
The Metamorphosis, Edmond is written as having both human and non-human desires, 
never fully reconciling or even delineating his human and dog aspects of self. Just 
because he has the head of a spaniel does not mean that his mind is that of a dog, 
whatever that may mean, as Dutourd implies that he possesses a “human” intelligence 
paired with doggy desires and impulses; this complexity of being, thinking, desiring, and 
acting also seems to be present in his sexual desires and actions.  
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 By age eleven, Edmond has overcome his fear of dogs seared into his mind and 
flesh. He once again is able to feel affection for dogs and it seems that is affection is 
returned. Dogs are drawn to him and revel in his caresses, though it is unclear whether 
their desire is for a distinctly human affection given their propensity to approach Edmond 
over non-hybrid humans (Dutourd 19). This question is not definitely a sexual one, but 
implores that we consider possible non-human desires for humans and the problem of 
assuming anything about non-humans’ consent or lack thereof given that no creature-
being, non-human or otherwise, is completely knowable to another. Such an 
unknowability forecloses any meaningful ethical consideration within a fixed and 
definitive posthumanist ethics. After being discharged from his military service, Edmond 
begins working at a bank and falls in love with co-worker, a human woman named 
Marianne, and she interacts with him with playful affection. Dutourd describes her as “a 
depraved little person. For the length of two hours she was eaten up with curiosity at the 
idea of making love with a man-dog.” (67) In the midst of a date with Edmond she feels 
intense shame and flips to speaking to and treating him as a misbehaving dog, a behavior 
that she continues to engage in for the entirety of her presence in Edmond’s life. Edmond 
feels both love and sexual desire towards Marianne, which Dutourd makes clear and 
seems sympathetic to as narrator, however, Marianne’s sexual desires are written as 
debased and perverted. The movement of sexual desire seems to divide the desires with 
regard to bestiality, that is, Edmond’s desire for Marianne is normalized and moves away 
from bestiality while Marianne’s desire for Edmond is made deviant and moves toward 
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bestiality. It appears that Marianne’s curiosity coupled with sexual desire is part of what 
makes her desire perverse while Edmond’s love purifies his desire. This brings the double 
movement I previously analyzed together with the utter unknowability of creature-beings 
and the reasons for their lusts and longings. 
Edmond himself has similar thoughts on the sexual inclinations of any woman 
who might bring herself to sleep with him: “I’ll never succeed in seducing any normal 
girl or woman. What’s left, then? Prostitutes and depraved creatures.” (Dutourd 74) The 
presumption of the deviancy of their desires does more than assume something about 
their being, desires, and motivations, it also obscures Edmond’s own longings in the way 
of non-human beings. Edmond later buys four dogs for companionship but “did not go so 
far to analyze the affection he bore his dogs.” (96) From this it can be gleaned that 
Edmond’s desires are obscured even from his own mind, unknowable even to himself. A 
well-learned being inclined toward Cartesian thought, he mostly tries to think of himself 
only as a human man, though his undistinguishable human/non-human body and desires 
are present throughout the book. That is, the humanist mind/body dualism inherent to 
Cartesian philosophy allows Edmond an escape from the possibilities of his own 
interspecies sexual desires, supposedly based in the lesser, animalized lusts of the body.  
Dutourd writes that Edmond’s “sexual desires inclined him naturally toward 
women” but reading this I am unsure if this desire is so “natural” and if his desire 
towards dogs is one of purely non-sexual species company (96). To be sure, Edmond 
outwardly regards his dogs mostly as his children, as some humans are apt to do, but he 
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also feels things that are decidedly less typical and straightforward in terms of sexual 
desire (Dutourd 99). He is said to be “a little in love” with one of his dogs, Lucian, and 
refuses to pet his short-haired dog, Alexander, as “To stroke such a naked animal seemed 
reprehensible to him. He protected himself from all confusion of feeling. When 
Alexander, lying on his back, offered the spectacle of his stomach, Edmond would turn 
away his eyes in embarrassment.” (100-101) His happiness at interacting with this 
particular dog is tied up with a potent feeling of shame, feelings that he dares not probe as 
they have the potential to unravel his carefully crafted species being. Lucien is described 
by Dutourd as approaching Edmond with “a real lover’s shyness which stirred our hero to 
the marrow.” (101) Edmond “believed that Lucien loved him, and he reproached himself 
for the voluptuous pleasure this idea incurred.” (102) So while Edmond sexually desires 
human women, it seems that he has sexual stirrings and excitements at the mere thought 
of near sexual intimacies with his pet dogs. Whether or not Edmond genuinely wants to 
be with dogs in a sexual sense is not so important to me, I am more concerned with the 
arcane aspects of Edmond’s desires as well as the desires of his dogs. Any assumption of 
these desires is only that, even to Edmond, straddling the human and the non-human. 
Others presume that Edmond’s relationships with his dogs are at least in part sexual, yet, 
at this point it is clear that he has not acted upon any desires that he may have. Edmond 
does indeed sexually desire and act with human women and they revel in his presumed 
bestiality, though he does not pick up on these feelings. During intercourse, one woman 
exclaims “‘Edmond, take me like a bitch!’” and a different woman asks if he likes her as 
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much as his dogs (104). Edmond is unaware of the full meaning behind these 
impassioned utterances, calling to nesting bestialities that he cannot bring himself to 
entertain even in the privacy of his own mind.  
Edmond later meets and falls in love with a society woman named Anne who he 
regards as his intellectual match, yet he recoils from even the imagining of him and Anne 
together sexually, “debasing herself” (Dutourd 117) Anne is not easily pushed away, as 
she is in love with Edmond as well, and Dutourd writes that “When one looks at it coldly, 
it must be admitted that Anne’s love for Edmond was disturbing.” (125) Edmond is 
initially captivated by Anne’s quirky insanity, though it becomes less endearing to him 
after she reveals that she sees him as a human prince who was spelled to have the head of 
a spaniel and he realizes she is actually mad. Anne’s confession that her love is for a 
tragic figure is a pivotal moment for Edmond and he embraces parts of his canine desires, 
developing an “increasing taste for dogs; for by now he constrains himself no longer and 
pursues males and females with the same ardor. This equal attraction toward either sex 
deserves to be pointed out: it is completely animal.” (147) The book draws to a close with 
Edmond, Anne, and a number of dogs living in squalor and the last line of the book 
acknowledges that Anne is pregnant. With the developing relationship between Edmond 
and Anne, the absence/excess of bestiality joins the inability to comprehend 
uncomprehendible beings and desires. The final line loops back to the opening of the 
book, reposing a slightly different iteration of the never-answered question of bestiality in 
terms of three characters: Mme Du Chaillu, Edmond, and Anne. The circumstances 
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surrounding Anne’s pregnancy are foggy, the only discernible aspects of their lives at this 
point being her insanity with regard to Edmond’s species hybridity, Edmond’s 
deteriorating humanity, the pack of dogs that now lives with them, and the various ghosts 
of bestiality that haunt their lives. The only question that is answered by the end of A 
Dog’s Head is the one that M. Du Chaillu asked of his wife many years earlier: “‘Did you 
think of a dog while you were pregnant?’” (2) In any case, Anne would undoubtedly 
answer “Of course.”  
 
Mr. Hands, Offering a(n) In/Sight that Isn’t   
 Apart and especially together, 2007 American documentary Zoo and the 1974 
Belgian arthouse film Wedding Trough (Vase de noces) exemplify the unknowability and 
incalculability of creature-beings and their desires, particularly in relation to interspecies 
sexual intimacies that may be framed through bestiality and/or zoophilia. The title to this 
section refers to the primary subject of Zoo, whose nickname was Mr. Hands even within 
a community of people with propensities for having sexual relations with horses; for a 
long time, it was the only name they knew him by. What I find striking about these two 
films is that they both deal with interspecies sexual intimacies, but neither offer an 
orderly or pointed analysis of these intimacies. Zoo is riddled with disturbed visuals and 
audio that is matched by the presentation of irregular, competing, and blurred bits of 
knowledges that do not lend themselves to any kind of comprehension of a thing which 
we might call bestiality and/or zoophilia. Wedding Trough has no dialogue at all nor does 
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it steer the viewer through scenes that always make sense, it allows the viewer to wander 
to nowhere in particular by only the disjointed sounds and scenes of the farm. Zoo and 
Wedding Trough offer neither sight nor insight in the typical usages of those terms, they 
do not lead one to any specific position on interspecies sexual intimacies, because there is 
nothing and nowhere to be arrived at. The absent and unwatchable penetration of Mr. 
Hands and the present and unwatchable penetration of the unnamed pig in Wedding 
Trough presents to my sight the utter impenetrability of creature-beings and desires.  
 Zoo is about the paradoxically hidden yet very exposed life and death Kenneth 
Pinyan, a Boenig engineer who died in July 2005 after suffering a perforated colon 
sustained during sex with a horse (Lim). As alluded to in the title and introduction to this 
section, one of the most remarkable aspects of Zoo is the way the film is shot so as to 
portray how interspecies sexual intimacies refuse full disclosure through troubled 
audibility and visibility. Scenes of bestiality are never shown and yet bestiality is always 
present, bringing me back to the absences and excesses of interspecies sexual desires and 
acts; the obscured visual that refuses to show bestiality yet does not allow the watcher to 
think of anything else. The film plays with unusual visuals: spots of harsh light in 
darkness, faces halfway or completely cloaked in shadow, barely discernable outlines of 
dark human and horse figures against only slightly lighter backgrounds, low camera 
angles in dark corners looking up through lighted tunnels and dark barns, trucks driving 
into dark grey-blue horizons, a light sky jaggedly cut by black forest, scenes of almost 
complete darkness with a horse snorting, wide open rural scenes juxtaposed with visons 
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of closed barns and tunnels, a distorted reflection of a human face in a pot of water as he 
discusses his first sexual encounter with a horse. One zoo (short for zoophile), Coyote, 
talks about zoo gatherings and what it means to them to finally be able to let their guards 
down and to be able to talk openly about their desires and experiences while their faces 
are partially masked in shadow. It is clear in the movement of the camera, the 
overwhelming darkness punctuated by points of light, and the obscuring of documentary 
subjects the instability of seeing and sensing and more importantly what is/is not seen or 
sensed. There is a scene near the beginning of the film in which Jenny, a woman who 
“rescued” the horses from the barn where members of the local zoo community engaged 
in sex with them, randomly talks about how one of her horses’ hurt his eyes by 
continually poking in blackberry bushes and that they had to remove both eyes. Towards 
the end, while the rescued horses are discussed, a veterinarian shines a light into the 
viewer’s eyes before the perspective suddenly shifts to the viewer being the third party 
watching a horse’s eye examination. Zoo’s focuses a great deal on sight and viewership, 
on what it means to see and who can doing the seeing. The story of the blackberry horse 
asks of me what it means to see in relation to non-human desire as well as to whom that 
sight might be open or closed. The rapid perspective shift that imagines the viewer first as 
the rescued horse then as a witness to the exam displaces subjects in relations to 
unthinkable intimacies, shaking loose positions on and in bestiality.  
 The closest we get to seeing human/horse sex in Zoo is seeing a group of people 
watching tapes depicting the doings of Mr. Hands and other zoos in the barn. We can 
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hear the sounds of the tapes but we cannot see them; we see only those sitting around a 
table watching the tapes, their faces lighted by the screen, flickering with the actions of 
the tapes and their own feelings toward what is going on. There is something about this 
watching others watching interspecies sex, this meta viewership, which turns the focus 
not to what is happening on the tapes but both inward and outward, to our own 
perceptions of human/non-human intimacies and how they may or may not be reflected 
in the faces of others. It also leads me to think about the impossibility of seeing bestiality, 
literally and figuratively. In other words, bestiality cannot be seen because it is not 
actually shown on film, but also because a thing called bestiality may not exist at all in 
the sense of Derrida’s betise/bestiality as reserved for man given that bestiality functions 
as a marker of the human and of legal personhood (The Beast 178). Furthermore, even if 
we were to watch the tapes, would we see bestiality in the way of knowing what 
happened? We can hear what it means to view and hear about others engaged in 
interspecies sex from the perspectives of two zoos. One man remarks that even after his 
first sexual encounter with a horse, he did not understand the significance of this 
encounter or that it could be considered zoophilia; Coyote similarly emphasizes the 
importance of the internet and new avenues of participation, saying “if you can’t be there, 
at least you can see it” (Zoo). For some, desires and intimacies can be somewhat 
communicated through a digital mode of seeing, intangible but not without bodily 
feeling. In a dark barn with the only light bleakly coming through dirty windows one can 
see the outline of a man, named only as H, and listen to what his life is like after Mr. 
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Hands’ death:  “My secret is out. Everybody in the world knows what I did … I was evil 
because I have a love for my animals more than most people do … [they said] ‘Go away. 
Just get out of our sight.’” (Zoo) I find this particular scene’s work on sight to be quite 
complex, splitting seeing and knowing and using the sight-play of the video to stress the 
communicated wishes of those who think they know something about the intimacies the 
man engaged in or even about the man himself. H, covered in darkness, discusses this 
revelation as his undoing, a revelation which made others want him to be unseeable, and 
indeed, at many points in this film he is just that. 
 A dark pasture with one bright spot, gentle horse snorting sounds, a naked human 
man steps into the light and H speaks: “You need to go out in a pasture with a bunch of 
horses. They’re going to come to you. They’re gonna see who you are. See what they do 
to ya. That’s what you need to do.” (Zoo) Jarring, overlapping audios with mismatched 
pictures: shadowed shots of a bare-chested man nuzzling a horse, harsh whispers of 
mathematics, an atomic bomb explosion, the sounds of horse trotting. End scene. Zoo’s 
use of music cut with static, voice overs without necessarily matching visuals, and 
seemingly irrelevant clips are crucially important. In “‘The consummation of the 
swallow’s wings’: A Zoo Story” Kevin Ohi deems this to be the a- and desynchronization 
of visuals and audio; such “asynchronicity … drives apart intelligibility and conviction, 
an asynchronicity that means that human experience escapes human language and 
meaning.” (739) Reading Ohi and Derrida with my own watching of Zoo, I am thinking 
that the work of Zoo may be to fundamentally disrupt bestiality through highlighting the 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
 
absences/gaps/excesses of such. In other words, the lack of interspecies sex scenes 
joining the constant discussion of them, the reflexive viewing of others’ viewing, and the 
fiercely discordant and puzzling visual/audio may all be pointing to the way that 
bestiality folds against actual interspecies sexual intimacies.  
 Taking doing creature hope seriously as a practice means watching and writing 
about Zoo with the violent footholds of consent, agency, and protection in mind and 
dealing with the way both advocates and condemners of interspecies sexual acts rely 
upon these humanist concepts. Ohi argues that “consent itself poses questions about the 
boundaries of human subjectivity … a subjectivity present to itself experiences sexuality 
as governed by intention.” (717) In this way, consent essentially protects fully-human 
humans and is far more about creating and bolstering the subject that can give consent 
than about ethically caring for violated creature-beings in any form. This unfortunately 
means that populations such as human children and non-human animals that are framed 
as particularly vulnerable to violation are also framed as unable to give consent, denying 
them a subject position that may in fact make them less vulnerable and subject to various 
violences. To be clear, I have no interest in arguing that children and/or non-humans can 
give consent but I have a deeply vested interest in pointing out the destructive traps of 
consent and adjacent concepts, especially the ways in which they are deployed to serve 
privileged interests and to uphold the human. As Zoo seems similarly disinterested in 
focusing the exploration along the lines of criminality and legislation the analysis of this 
theme is a bit shorter but nevertheless equally important in my eyes. Consent is called 
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upon during a panning shot of Enumclaw, Washington fields, while Senator Pam Roach 
talks about the morals of the area, the beauty of the farm lands, and of the people who 
love animals, adding that it is a “great place to raise children.” (Zoo) She goes on to say 
that she “could never believe that an animal would do this on their own” assuming some 
degree of coercion must have taken place due to children and animals’ innocence (Zoo). 
This is right in line with Derrida’s deconstruction of bestiality, where the non-human 
cannot possibly participate or be held accountable yet the non-human is still insulted as 
humans become lesser human-beasts through interspecies sexual acts (The Beast 178). 
The non-human cannot consent because the non-human is not the proper subject to 
consent, the subject proper of bestiality. The senator tellingly ties together the inability 
for non-humans to consent with the innocence of children and non-humans and the need 
to love and protect non-humans and children, supporting a certain subject that can know, 
decide, and exercise an afforded agency in accordance with the human.  
 Protection is very closely related to consent, as those who are not deemed to be 
capable of giving consent must be protected from those who will take advantage of this 
inability. Imagine now a scene of an anesthetized horse being lifted up on an operating 
table by an apparatus hanging by the ceiling. After the horses were rescued from the 
farm, Jenny explains that “We didn’t want anybody showing up here who was part of that 
circle who would want to adopt him, so we made the decision to geld him that night.” 
(Zoo) The “rescuers” castrated the horse that Mr. Hands had sex with in an attempt to 
protect him from other zoos that may want to purchase him in order to have sex with him, 
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sex for which the horse could never give consent. There is a humanist disconnect present 
here, where consent matters for sex but does not matter for castration. Never mind that 
horses do not consent to being eaten, harnessed and ridden in the non-sexual sense, 
existing as pets, working on farms, and being shown, their consent does not matter to 
humans in other situations involving genitals, including breeding, birthing, and gelding, 
and therefore they are not protected from these violations even though they may do equal 
or far greater bodily harm. The difference that suddenly warrants frameworks of consent 
and protection is that of sexual desire, human and/or non-human. Consent as it relates to 
bestiality does not ask us to consider what the horse would have wanted, it assumes that it 
is better for the horse that he not have intact genitals than genitals that could be used for 
that, the unspeakable and unseeable.  
 Humans who engage in interspecies sex and those who do not necessarily oppose 
it are not exempt from the problems of using consent to discuss interspecies sexual 
relations. In an extended audio clip there is a conversation in which two men on a show, 
one being Rush Limbaugh, joke about the Pinyan case and mock the resulting call for a 
bestiality ban and felony convictions for animal cruelty because non-humans have no 
cognitive ability to consent and humans must protect them. Limbaugh and another man 
on the show pose the following questions: “But how do they know the horse didn’t 
consent?” “How in the world … Can this happen without consent?” “If the horse didn’t 
consent then none of this would have happened.” (Zoo) Here, Limbaugh is essentially 
arguing that for a horse to penetrate a human consent must be present in some way; the 
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zoos in the film seem to echo this sentiment in a multitude of ways which I will later 
discuss. The three main problems I see with assuming non-human animal consent is 
present in any given interspecies sexual act are that non-human sexual arousal does not 
necessarily equate to sexual willingness, non-human sexual arousal in the presence of a 
human does not mean that the sexual arousal is for the human, and that consent is a 
violence to non-humans in any form as it functions to uphold the human subject. Consent 
is not a part of the non-human world, at least in its human iteration, and therefore certain 
perceived actions or non-actions by non-human beings as read by humans may be 
mistaken as consent. Calling upon consent may also serve to justify non-human sexual 
exploitation. Ultimately, whether consent is being used to argue for or against allowing 
interspecies sex it makes clear both its own investment in the human and the 
impossibility of ever knowing another creature-being. 
 The interviews of zoos as well as Zoo’s explorative framework give nods to the 
infinite failures that accompany any endeavor to fully know or completely act with 
another creature-being, to the impossibility of the complete alignment of beings, desires, 
and hopes. As is evident in the film, zoos, particularly zoos that act on their sexual 
desires for the non-human, may assume non-human wants and smother the non-human 
with human understandings of being, feeling, and acting. One zoo discusses non-human 
initiation of sexual intercourse: “ … if you stand too long in one place it’s going to 
happen. If you just stand there, they’ll walk up behind you and put their head on your 
shoulder and talk to you. They’re going to pick up that pheromone that your body’s 
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putting off, and they’re going to mount you.” (Zoo) It is not necessarily the act itself that I 
take issue with, but rather the account that the zoo gives that makes the human sexually 
passive, largely removing accountability. I am not subscribing to the notion that the 
human is always active and the non-human passive, but the wording of “just standing 
there” (emphasis my own) seems to suggest that because the human is physically still the 
action of the non-human is a consensual one. Zoos’ mentions of love and assumptions of 
non-human feelings about interspecies sexual intimacies is also open to doubt. Of “being 
zoo,” zoos describe the following: “closer affinity to non-human animals than their own 
kind,” “I love horses,” “It’s the love of animals … it’s like your wife, your kids, it’s the 
same thing,” “You’re connecting with another intelligent being who is happy to 
participate, be involved.” (Zoo) If you will kindly recall from the beginning of this 
chapter, zoophilia is about more than sexually acting with non-human animals, it is also 
about desiring and even loving non-humans sexually and/or romantically (Miletski 18). 
But what does this love require of the non-human? What does love of non-humans 
assume about the sexual reciprocity of the non-human? Does the human understanding of 
love impart on the sexual relation a happiness and willingness that is simply not present, 
or rather, not able to ever be known? Human feelings towards non-human animals should 
not have to be returned or presumed to be returned; both are violences of the human even 
apart from the ways in which they may become fastened to sexual actions, or to concepts 
such as consent and/or coercion. On sexual relations with non-human animals, The 
Happy Horseman explains:  
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It’s a simpler, very plain world. And for those few moments you kind of can get 
disconnected. It’s a very intense, wonderful kind of feeling. I don’t think anything 
really can kind of compare to it. There’s no pain. At no time, in any way, shape, 
or form has anybody forced, coerced, drugs, ropes, whatever. There’s no bondage 
or anything like that involved in any of this, because these are … your friends. 
(Zoo) 
 
 
The feelings of friendship felt by this human during their sexual experiences with non-
human beings is assumed to be matched by the feelings of the non-human. Moreover, 
these friendly feelings linked to sexual desires and actions may change what being forced 
or coerced looks like, especially since there is no and can be no baseline understanding of 
what indicates non-human non-complicity.  
 Among the zoos that discuss their experiences in Zoo, there is the impression that 
they feel that they know and understand non-human animals on a much deeper level than 
any other human precisely because of their sexual desires and actions. A member of the 
Enumclaw zoo community that met Jenny after Mr. Hands’ death argues that Jenny’s 
experience with horses counts for very little in comparison to that of zoos. Amidst scenes 
of a wild, bucking stallion, this zoo says “Well, my impression of Jenny is that, uh … She 
doesn’t know her ass from a hole in the ground when it comes to a horse. Period. She 
comes across as being a person who knows everything there is about horses, but to me, 
she doesn’t know anything about them at all. Even her husband doesn’t know how to 
handle a horse.” (Zoo) The zoo regards Jenny, who is quite knowledgeable concerning 
horses in the standard sense, to be ignorant of their bodies; this ignorance supposedly can 
only be overcome by intimately “knowing” a horse. I find the everything/anything 
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qualifier of knowledge to be extraordinarily interesting; it is as if all knowledges 
regarding horses are completely irrelevant in the face of a zoo’s knowledge, and 
furthermore, no non-zoo human can truly act with a horse in the way a zoo can, as is 
evident by the statement about handling a horse. In a voiceover that comes after this 
account Jenny herself insinuates the limits of her own understanding of horses’ sexual 
desires and actions, describing what happened when she came for the stallion and argued 
with a zoo about the bill of sale. She recounts that during the argument a mini horse came 
up to the stallion and started giving him a “blowjob,” an incredibly disorienting scene of 
which she says “It was the strangest thing I’ve ever seen. Ever.” (Zoo) The Happy 
Horseman discusses the kind of uniquely deep connection that zoos have with non-human 
beings, saying that “The sex was just a small component of it … I’m talking to you on the 
same level that you’re kind of staring at me. Mammal to mammal.” (Zoo) This account 
hints at a different and more profound kind of knowing, relating, and being with a non-
human animal, one that depends on sexual intimacy but is not bound by it, leading to a 
knowledge on a mammalian plane. For this zoo, it is clear that the meeting of warm blood 
and warm flesh betrays the secrets of the non-human and, if only for a few moment, 
dissolves the line between human and non-human mammal; such an account echoes the 
visceral resonance of non-human mammals to Dr. Laist. That is not to say that sexual 
intimacies reveal all of the non-human, as another zoo argues that some knowledge of 
individual non-humans is required prior to engaging them sexually in an explanation of 
what went wrong the day that Mr. Hands’ was fatally injured: “Something bad happened 
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out there. I don’t think Mr. Hands knew this particular animal very much and I don’t 
think that the gentleman that was with him was really attuned to that animal as well.” 
(Zoo) So while some zoos in the film automatically link knowledge of non-humans and 
sexual actions with/on non-humans, others see sexual intimacies as at least somewhat 
divorced from knowing. 
 In the final moments of Zoo, over the view from a trotting horse’s back, Jenny 
speaks to her surprise at the intense love relationships that a zoo may have for with their 
“animal partner.” Of this love, she explains that through her research “I don’t yet quite 
know how I feel about that, but I’m right at the edge of being able to understand it.” 
(Zoo) For me, the film plays at the edge of this understanding, of not being able to fully 
understand zoos and of not being able to understand any creature-being completely, of 
not being able to fully see, hear, witness, know, or be with. While the film exposes some 
aspects of the zoo world it also purposely obscures certain scenes, faces, and facts. An 
example of this obscuration is that Zoo never plays Kenneth Pinyan’s name aloud nor 
does it show it on screen, imitating Mr. Hands’ own actions, as H says that “There was 
things in him that he really didn’t want people to know … it was about a year before I 
knew Mr. Hands’ real name … it was just always Mr. Hands ‘I go by Mr. Hands.’” (Zoo) 
At the time of his death, the media originally would not reveal the name of the victim and 
during an audio clip of the name finally being revealed on air, the documentary cuts out 
before the name is said. The abrupt cut off after “an employee, now deceased, who 
worked at Boeing Corporation named K … ” announces the striking unknowability of the 
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subject of the broadcast, a built-in argument that knowing the name says little about who 
this persons was, why they desired who/what they did, and why/how they engaged in the 
sexual activities they did (Zoo). Similarly, Zoo “does not offer any sustained account of 
the psychology of zoophilia” (Ohi 721). In other words, the film is not concerned with 
the causes of human/non-human sexual desires or what drives one from desire to action 
and it does not attempt to fill in the ruptures and rifts between desire and understanding 
desire, running parallel to my larger argument about the unknowability of creature-
beings. Perhaps the reason that this film resonates with me so strongly is that it does not 
seem at all interested in understanding but in a project of stretching how we think about 
human and non-human intimacies and shaking loose our bestial certainties about those 
intimacies. Indeed, Charles Mudede, writing partner of director Robinson Devor, once 
called Zoo a “thought experiment” (Lim). In its mundane portrayal of human/horse sex 
against the scandal of bestiality the documentary has been criticized for “evading moral 
issues” but Ohi argues that it does not “sidestep ethical questions around bestiality. Its 
form is a mode of ethical inquiry, and of desire.” (736) I am thinking along these same 
lines, that Zoo’s persistent uncertainty is its ethics and that posing a “thought experiment” 
as an “ethical inquiry” is imaginably the most useful way to consider the questions that 
interspecies sexual intimacies birth, because it cannot not build the answer into the 
question.   
 Wedding Trough, also known as “One Man and His Pig” “The Pig Fucking 
Movie,” is about a lone, clearly mentally ill male farmer that lusts after a pig and has sex 
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with her (“Wedding Trough”). She delivers piglets, although it is not clear if these are 
fully pig or fantastically human-pig offspring, and the piglets eventually provoke his 
frustration and disappointment so he hangs them and displays their bodies. Seeing their 
decaying bodies, the Sow, mad with grief, runs around until she is trapped in muddy 
water and drowns. When the man finds her body, he buries her and tries to bury himself 
alongside her. He suddenly gets up in a rage, destroying and consuming his jars of bodily 
waste until he finally he hangs himself. Wedding Trough is a black and white film with 
no dialogue, although it is far from a silent film. It too teases the absences and excesses 
of interspecies desire and the unknowability of beings through its film choices; no 
dialogue is far from no noise, no telling, and clear viewing is far from clear seeing, clear 
understanding. There is present an excess of viewing in Wedding Trough, it shows 
everything from sex, to birthing, to excreting, to eating excrement, to vomiting, to 
suicide; neither sex between a human and a pig nor the brutal killing of non-human 
animals (both real and simulated for the film) is too much to show. This excess of 
viewing is met with the absence of understanding of what is being viewed, and through 
the lack of dialogue the film relays its indifference to human understanding. After all, 
there is no dialogue but there is never silence; the sounds of the farm can always be heard 
in pig squeals, turkey gobbling, duck quacking, bird songs, rooster crowing, heavy 
human breathing, human and non-human grunting and sloppy, slurp-y eating. Traditional 
Belgian music, ominous electronic beeping music, and a bell that the man rings can also 
be heard in select scenes. I find interesting the absence of viewing acts of bestiality in 
 
 
 
 
154 
 
 
Zoo in relation to the excess of viewing in Wedding Trough, the latter of which contains 
scenes so explicit and obscene that I felt the need to cover or close my eyes and from 
which I found myself physically recoiling from the screen. Wedding Trough shows a man 
screwing a pig from behind in one long scene shot from multiple angles, somehow 
making it more pronounced, as if announcing “here it is.” This single extended scene 
showing human/pig sex is somehow more jarring and excessive than multiple scenes of 
interspecies sex in its starkness, the near-constant suggestion of sex surrounding the 
explicit scene.  
 Zoo refuses to show that which it continually discusses, keeping the viewer on the 
edge waiting and wondering, never being released from the subject matter but never fully 
viewing it either. Wedding Trough never discusses interspecies sexual desires or actions, 
but continually alludes to them and overwhelms the viewer with the sights and sounds of 
human/pig sex amongst other disturbing scenes. Together, these films exhibit the 
impossibility of ever really seeing or understanding that which is most often considered 
bestiality, whether or not it is explicitly shown; sight is not necessarily insight. Wedding 
Trough’s long scenes of non-human animal faces between explicit scenes of interspecies 
sex, human madness, human and non-human deaths as well as the sow’s deafening 
squeals upon seeing her hanging babies’ bodies twirling in the sunlight both denote the 
limits of human seeing and hearing. There is so much of non-human creature-being that 
humans can never understand no matter how much is seen or hidden—it is always both 
too much and never enough. 
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Closing: Sticky Human, Hopes & Harms 
 In this conclusion I aim to wrap up this chapter and my thesis as a whole, 
primarily by discussing the limitations of my concepts of disidentification with the 
human and/as doing creature hope. In the introduction to my first chapter I asked “Can 
‘creature’ offer us a new direction for hoping against the violences suffered by human, 
less-than human, and non-human beings and hoping apart from defining beings by the 
very violences they may or may not suffer?” (2) In closing, I want to briefly address the 
impossibility of thinking beyond the human, even within disidentifications and creature 
hopes given the stickiness of the human, how these concepts struggle to account for 
hopes that are in themselves violent, and what kind of work creature hope can and cannot 
do. Surely there is no beyond or outside of the human, even in this project; the human is 
abyssal and haunting and these concepts will never be free of it. The endless human 
means that the human is sticky, unable to be completely shaken off—hence my penchant 
for the double movement “with/against” the human—and therefore even the hopefulness 
of creature is contaminated by the human and the violences that accompany it.  
 This final chapter on interspecies sexual intimacies and/or/as bestiality and 
zoophilia allows me to write about disidentification and creature hope in a way that I do 
not think I have fully been able to do until this point in the thesis, because what this 
chapter really points out is how beings and hopes can clash or just miss one another as 
beings are ultimately unknowable. I think this chapter in particular highlights both the 
limitations of the concepts themselves, in that one creature’s hope is potentially another’s 
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violence, violation, or hopelessness, and why these concepts are so very necessary, 
meaning that they are capable of a distinct reflexivity—grappling with beings and hopes 
that cannot be known or forcibly aligned. Disidentification as I have used it in this thesis 
by borrowing from the work of José Muñoz, is the de- and recoding of dominant culture 
from the position minoritarian subjectivity, recoding dominant culture into new forms 
made impossible within that very culture (Disidentifications 31) But what of minoritarian 
subjectivities in the plural? What of dominant subjectivities meeting minoritarian 
subjectivities in one being? A zoo, for example, may decode and recode various humanist 
understandings of the human, recuperating the non-human animal for their own purposes 
and in accordance with their own desires. As is evident by testimonies in Zoo, certain 
persons’ disidentifications with the human and hope/desire for interspecies sex does not 
absolutely preclude violation or harm utilizing the human, therefore, I believe it is 
necessary to make a distinction between the hopes of individual creature-beings and the 
larger concept of creature hope. The hopes of creature-beings may not be innocuous, they 
may be violent or destructive to another being. One beings’ hope and/or pleasure may be 
another beings’ hopelessness and/or pain. Dissimilarly, creature hope as a larger concept 
can only be practiced without an end to guide it because hope (as I have used it here and 
as Muñoz uses it in Cruising Utopia) is only for that which cannot yet be completely 
imagined or sought, anticipated or harnessed to reach specific ends but for that which is 
still fervidly desired. These concepts that I have worked to express in this thesis may 
struggle to cleanly account for hopes that are in themselves violent and to make a 
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pathway for clear ethical response, but just as they are capable of dealing with the 
complexity and contradiction of beings and hopes so too are they capable of reflexively 
dealing with the contradictions in the concepts themselves. Furthermore, this is a 
capability not marred by ill comparisons and analogies or strict identifications and 
categories that enable the myth of the human/animal binary even within posthumanisms. 
Disidentification and creature hope are also capable of a deep sincerity about the place 
and functioning of the human, a sincerity that I have rarely encountered in most works, 
but they cannot shake off the human. Were such a feat not impossible, I am not 
convinced that would be the point anyway.  
I hope to be the kind of scholar and the kind of being that is constantly becoming 
more knowledgeable, more articulate, more creative, and more accountable. I hope that 
one day I look back on this thesis and can see the faults in it with new eyes and imagine 
how I would write it differently, better somehow. I also hope that when I look back on 
this project that I will be able to say that these concepts and the uncertainty that they 
require has stayed with me, that these concepts have informed my work since in such a 
way that I have not left them unchanged, just as they have not left me unchanged in this 
moment. That is, I hope that at that time I have taken them to new places and allowed 
them to change. I wrote my thesis on disidentification with the human and/as doing 
creature hope because I could not imagine writing it on any other topic, and I mean that 
quite literally. When I began writing I was so disheartened that I did not know how else I 
would be able to get through the thesis writing process, if not with and for creatures, with 
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and for creature hope. This project is not about releasing accountability to other creature-
beings or letting humans off the hook, so to speak. It is not about justifying the suffering 
of non-human beings or introducing a non-response. It is not about human love, human 
compassion, human understanding, or proximity or likeness to the human. It is not about 
advocating for harmed others, harming them less, harming them differently, or denying 
harming them at all. It is not about sexed, gendered, and/or racialized analogies of less-
than-human and non-human beings, subjections, and violences. This project is not about 
the continual reliance on suffering at particular theoretical moments when it seems as if 
there is nowhere else to turn just because suffering seems like an easy, solid base on 
which to build a posthumanist ethics. It is not about what is conceivable and attainable 
right now because what is conceivable and attainable right now is always just another 
regeneration of violences. For me, this project is about exploring the complexity of what 
it means to be in ethical relationships with other creature-beings, especially those made 
less-than-human and non-human, instead of compacting and simplifying what an ethics 
means or what it asks and requires of us. It is about non-human and less-than-human 
Others always deserving more. For me, the practice of doing creature hope demands 
more, it is about a constant demand for more and this demand is always in the wake of 
injury. There is no point which can be arrived at, no point in which no more is demanded, 
because if Muñoz’s work tells us anything, it is that hope is forever on the horizon, just 
out of reach but full of unforeseeable promise.
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